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ABSTRACT

A RETROSPECTIVE STUDY ON RAMPAGE SCHOOL SHOOTINGS: CONSIDERATIONS
FOR SCHOOL-BASED THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAMS
Seth H. Chapman, Ed.D.
Department of Leadership, Educational Psychology, and Foundations
Northern Illinois University, 2017
Kelly H. Summers, Director

Since the mid-1990s, the incidence of rampage school shootings reached unprecedented
levels and resulted in hundreds of deaths. Rampage shootings are both essentially random and
defined by acts involving an attack on multiple parties. The purpose of the current study was to
apply prior research to analyze previous multiple victim K-12 public school shooting incidents,
specifically rampage school shootings occurring over the past two decades in the United States.
This study is intended to help identify best practices for developing and conducting threat
assessments in K-12 public schools by assessing the validity of Newman’s (2004) five-prong
model. Newman et al. (2004, p. 229) identified five “necessary but not sufficient” conditions
needed in order for rampage school shootings to occur.
This study utilized a historical case study methodology. In total, twelve rampage shooting
incidents from 1996-2013 matched the criteria identified in Chapter 3.
The overall results, represented in Table 4.4, provide support for the efficacy of Newman
et al.’s (2004) framework. Behavioral threat assessment teams are likely the best method for
prevention. While no process will completely eliminate risk, an assessment team utilizing

Newman et al.’s (2004) framework as described in this study may be the best investment of time
and resources a school district has to protect the safety of its students.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
While mass campus school shootings often are considered a recent phenomenon, such
attacks actually occurred during the early 20th century. For example, in 1927, Andrew Kehoe
murdered his wife and then bombed a school in Bath, Michigan. Kehoe killed forty-five people
and, another fifty-eight were wounded (Brezina, 2008; Kleck, 2009 as cited in Rocque, 2012).
To date, the Bath, Michigan incident represents the deadliest attack on an American public
school. Despite sporadic school-related attacks throughout the 20th century, such incidents did
not occur with alarming frequency until the mid-1990s when students began attacking their own
schools (Langman, 2009b; Midlarsky & Klain, 2005). Since the mid-1990s, the incidence of
rampage school shootings reached unprecedented levels and resulted in hundreds of deaths
(Rocque, 2012). These school shootings initiated a sequence of horrendous events in the United
States (Rocque).
Statistically rampage school shootings are infrequent occurrences. Generally initiated by
a small number of people, rampage school shootings dramatically affect our nation (Newman,
Fox, Harding, Mehta & Roth, 2004). Newman et al. (2004) and Rocque (2012) define rampage
shootings as symbolic, random violent acts carried out in an effort to make a broader statement
against society (Newman et al.; Rocque, 2012). Typically, targeted schools are the center of
suburban and small town community life (Newman et al.). While a school shooter may have
sought an initial target, his or her attack often expands in a haphazard or sporadic manner with
the shooter becoming unaware of their targets (Newman et al.).
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Because of the increased frequency of school shootings, some authors suggest Americans
have come to believe schools are places for potential violence (Kohut, 2000; Midlarsky & Klain,
2005). However, empirical data shows, compared to home and community environments,
schools rank among the safest places for youth (Muschert, 2007). Less than two percent of
school age youth homicides occur at school (Muschert). Specifically, approximately one student
in two million dies at school each year as a result of either homicide or suicide (Muschert).
Despite the low frequency of total deaths in a school environment, the rate of violent
school-based incidents that previously decreased in 2007 have risen to the levels of the late
1990s (Muschert, 2007). A 2014 National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) survey of
84,110 public schools, collected data on 757,000 incidents; 25,740 of these incidents were
classified as violent. Violent incidents involve either making a threat or carrying out a physical
attack. Of the public schools included in the NCES survey 65% reported at least one violent
attack. This represented 15.8 violent attacks per 1,000 students. In 2007, NCES reported four
violent attacks per 1,000 students (Rocque, 2012). Additionally, the 2014 NCES survey noted
serious violent incidents differ from violent incidents because they either involve the use of a
weapon or result in serious injury. The survey reported serious violent incidents had occurred in
13% of the surveyed schools. This equated to .5 attacks per 1,000 students. Approximately nine
percent of the surveyed schools or .3 per 1,000 students reported threats of a physical attack with
a weapon. In the surveyed schools two percent or .1 per 1000, students of the physical attacks
were carried out with a weapon. While serious violent student attacks remain infrequent, the data
suggests school officials should prepare for identifying and preventing these incidents.
Muschert (2007) suggested the attention on school shootings was greater than expected
given the frequency of occurrence of other school violent attacks and victimizations. Other
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research showed school shootings were exaggerated and fueled by sensationalized media
coverage (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009 as cited in Muschert, 2007). It
has been suggested the media legitimizes violence, thereby providing a role model for murder
(Rocque, 2012). Additionally, while television and movies generally portray violence as a way
to gain status, it is difficult to determine how much impact the media has had upon rampage
school shootings. Although most students who play violent video games or watch violent
movies do not kill, some research suggests many school shooters tend to obsessively view
violent mass media content (Langman, 2009b).
Challenges in attaining consistent and reliable data on school shootings exist. In 2015,
Ken Trump, President of National School Safety and Security Services, indicated he was not
aware of either a widespread definition or an authoritative data source on school shootings (Ye
Hee Lee, 2015). Trump argued the extent of school crime and violence has been overstated by
the public’s perception, while federal and state statistics typically underestimate the issue (Ye
Hee Lee). Trump suggested reality exists somewhere in between and in order to define the
severity of the problem it is essential to know the actual numbers (Ye Hee Lee).

Theoretical Framework
Newman et al. (2004, p. 229) identified five “necessary but not sufficient” conditions
needed in order for rampage school shootings to occur. These conditions included
1. A marginalization of the school shooter in social worlds important to him or her;
2. The presence of either a diagnosed or an undiagnosed psychological issue;
3. Either cultural scripts or a template for how the school shooter’s issues may be resolved
by committing the attack;
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4. A failure of school surveillance systems to prevent the attack: and
5. The school shooter having access to guns or other weapons.
Newman et al.’s (2004) study used two specific rampage shooting incidents: Heath,
Kentucky in 1997 and Westside, Arkansas in 1998 to analyze possible reasons for rampage
school shooting occurrences. Newman offered a variety of explanations for why school
shootings occur and analyzed the validity of each explanation. These explanations included
mental illness, “he just snapped,” family problems, bullying behaviors, peer support, changing
communities, violent culture, access to guns, violent media, and the copycat effect. Newman’s
theory (based on research from the Heath and Westside school shootings) suggested a single
behavior or incident was not sufficient to indicate the likelihood of a potential attack. As a result,
Newman theorized a combination of factors needed to be present in order for a school shooting
to occur.
Newman et al.’s framework provides one method for assessing the efficacy of threat
assessment models for school districts across the nation. Additionally, the five factors outlined
in Newman’s research align with other research conducted subsequent to their 2004 study (e.g.,
Langman 2009; Levin & Madfis, 2009; Muschert 2007; Rocque 2012). Newman et al.’s (2004)
theoretical framework, having support from multiple researchers over the past decade, supports
this researcher’s basis for use to guide the current study.

Approach of Study

The current study examines 12 school shooting incidents through the lens of Newman et
al.’s framework of five essential factors. Each of the 12 school shooting incidents used the same
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format to ensure consistency in analyzing the five factors. The case studies are set forth in
chronological order. The information will be organized and categorized as noted below.
1. Overview of Incident
2. School and Community Profile
3. Profile of the Shooter
4. Mental Health or Social Disorder Implications,
5. Access to / Experience with Firearms,
6. Family Environment

The researcher selected school shooting incidents from a literature review on threat
assessments and rampage school shootings. As the researcher discovered cases or incidents, key
indicators were documented and details were cross-referenced.
The research showed the increase in rampage school shooting events began in 1996
(Rocque, 2012). Thus, 1996 became the starting point for the sample selection. Since the facts
of each school shooting incident often are not fully understood until several years later (Rocque,
2012), 2013 was designated as the end date for the study. The researcher designed the timeframe
to ensure access to sufficient factual information. Langman (2009b) noted mass media coverage
immediately following rampage school shooting events is often inaccurate and by the time
accurate information has been released, most media outlets have moved on to other stories. As a
result, reliable information regarding school shooting incidents often does not reach the general
public (Langman, 2009b).
Because the researcher designed the current study to assist United States primary and
secondary school officials in effectively identifying potential threats, shooting incidents
occurring at universities and in foreign countries were not examined. Additionally, the
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researcher only included cases where the school shooter was a currently enrolled student or
attended the victimized school within one year of the shooting incident. This is primarily
because Newman’s (2004) fourth indicator, surveillance of students, would be difficult to
conduct if the potential shooter was a non-student.
Finally, because the researcher determined the eligible sample of cases was too large to
reasonably be addressed in sufficient detail, only the most significant rampage school shooting
incidents were selected for detailed examination. To be included in the current study school
shooting incidents had to result in at least one fatality and also include multiple victims. Using
these criteria, the researcher identified twelve cases for inclusion in the current study.

Problem Statement
Although research shows rampage school shootings increased during the 1990’s and
2000’s, such incidents remained relatively infrequent (Rocque, 2012). Notwithstanding this low
frequency, rampage school shootings are characterized by unique factors, such as the shooter’s
demographic information, attack location, and the lack of a specific target (DeJong et al., 2003;
Fox et al., 2003; Harding et al., 2003; Newman et al., 2004). As such, these unique
characteristics present a challenge to school officials in effectively identifying potential threats.
During the 2013-2014 school year 88% of U.S. public schools reported having a written
plan for responding to an active shooter, and 70% of schools conducted drills using these plans.
This compares to 94% of schools having a plan for natural disasters, 83% of whom practice for
such events (USDOE, 2014).
Unfortunately, teacher classroom training to recognize and respond to threats of violence
is conducted less often than other forms of training. While 95% of teachers and aides received

7
training on safety procedures, just 67% were trained on how to respond to violent incidents
(USDOE, 2014). K-12 public schools during the 2013-14 school year reported crisis prevention
and intervention training conducted in 74% of the schools (USDOE). Training on recognizing
the warning signs of violent attacks were also conducted less frequently (USDOE). Instructional
staff training to recognize early warning signs for potentially violent students occurred at only
48% of primary and secondary public schools, and just 34% received training to recognize
student alcohol or drug use (USDOE).
The paucity of systematic data on averted school shootings is a significant challenge for
school officials attempting to formulate specific interventions (Rocque, 2012). Because the
overarching goal is mitigating the risk of future violent school attacks, one of the goals of the
current study is to address this need. Rocque (2012, p. 311) noted:
Future theorizing should seek to incorporate the phenomenological elements of school
rampage shootings. Such work may help reveal the internal or emotional appeal of these
acts, perhaps leading to a better understanding of why they occur. The data that exists is
suggestive that school rampage shootings arise due to a complex interplay of individual
and community level factors. Policies that intend to make schools safer must equally
attend to all of these factors.
All types of threats that may occur within a public K-12 school environment should not
be treated the same (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). The process of evaluating a child for
a routine behavioral issue or for minor crimes, such as stealing, have not proven to be an
effective indicator for evaluating threats of a more serious and potentially deadly nature, such as
rampage school shootings (McGee & DeBernardo, 1999; Newman et al., 2004; Verlinden et al.).
A successful threat assessment relies upon communication between teachers and students to
create an environment where threats of violence are routinely reported, investigated, and
addressed and the contributing underlying factors receive appropriate attention (Collins, 2007).
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According to researchers at the University of Virginia, this type of crisis management plan
remains largely underutilized by K-12 public school officials and uninvestigated by policy
researchers (Cornell & Williams, 2006). By analyzing Newman’s (2004) five-prong model, the
current study is designed to distinguish between the unique characteristics of rampage school
shooters in order to help resolve potential identification issues in the K-12 school setting.
Additional challenges for school administrators exist in consideration of the role of
school districts in the mental health process. Recent changes to federal regulations through the
Every Student Succeeds Act, may provide new opportunities for schools to support mental health
for their students (Rossen & Cowan, 2016). Rossen & Cowan note that schools can assist in
lowering barriers to seeking mental health care by “reducing the stigma, providing services at no
additional cost, reducing scheduling conflicts and eliminating transportation challenges” (p. 30).
They suggest mental health challenges should be considered similar to vision impairment issues.
Left unaddressed, consequences to student success would be detrimental. Even though schools
are not in the optometry business, legislation has long obligated schools to provide vision
screenings and intervention efforts (Rossen & Cowan).

Significance of the Study

The purpose of the current study was to apply prior research to analyze previous multiple
victim K-12 public school shooting incidents, specifically rampage school shootings occurring
over the past two decades in the United States. This analysis is intended to help identify best
practices for developing and conducting threat assessments in K-12 public schools by assessing
the validity of Newman’s (2004) five-prong model. Principals and members of school threat
assessment teams are the intended audience for this study. However, Superintendents and other
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key leadership positions in school districts may also benefit from the results and implications of
the study.
Due to the complexity of school shootings, it is unrealistic to completely eliminate the
possibility of future school shooting incidents (Muschert, 2007). However, in light of the
inability to eradicate the occurrence of future school shootings, school leaders must focus
attention on reducing the risk of violent attacks on school property. Little is known about the
reasons surrounding school shooting attacks and the potential options for mitigating the risk of
such events (Rocque, 2012). Newman et al.’s (2004) framework is a potential tool to evaluate
prior rampage school shooting incidents. The current study is designed to determine if any
prevention procedures exist for K-12 public school officials to utilize in better informing the
threat assessment process and evaluating potential rampage shooting threats.

Research Questions

The following research questions guided this study on rampage school shootings;
1. By examining past school rampage shootings, does Newman et al.’s (2004)
framework provide a viable lens for analyzing and evaluating the potential for lethal
student attacks within the public school K-12 environment?
2. Do any of Newman et al.’s (2004) “necessary but not sufficient” conditions for the
occurrence of rampage school shootings demonstrate efficacy and reliability?
3. What components of Newman et al.’s (2004) framework should public K-12 school
officials include in their threat assessment or evaluation process to identify potential
school shooters?
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Definition of Terms

The following definitions will be utilized throughout the study:
Bullying is characterized by the bully having more power than the victim. Additionally, bullying
represents a pattern of incidents (rather than a single incident) that results in threats of physical
abuse or intimidation (Langman, 2009b).
Classroom Avenger: A depressed and suicidal, usually Caucasian, adolescent male from a rural,
suburban, or small community who perpetrates a non-traditional multi-victim homicide in a
school or classroom setting (McGee & DeBernardo, 1999).
Cultural scripts provide a model for solving problems through violence. These models may be
real or fictional depictions demonstrated through movies, music, video games, a close friend or
family member, or even another perpetrator of violence (Newman et al., 2004).
Government attacks typically include a government agent responding with violence to student
protests or rioting. The Kent State University shootings are an example. Four people were killed
in the 1970 incident when students protested the U.S. invasion of Cambodia during the Vietnam
War (Caputo, 2005 as cited in Muschert, 2007).
Marginalization of a social group that matters to a person may occur in many forms. School
climate, bullying, social exclusion, rejection of a love interest, and low status in a pecking order
are all examples of how someone may feel marginalized (Newman et al., 2004).
Mass murders target either categories of individuals or the school in general (Muschert, 2007).
Despite not being a shooting per se, the best example of a mass murder incident occurred in 1927
in Bath, Michigan, when a farmer killed 45 people when he blew up a school building. The
attack was apparently retribution for a newly levied school tax (Ellsworth, 1927).
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Psychopaths are narcissistic (which includes egocentrism), lack empathy and morals, and have
anger management issues. Psychopaths tend to make favorable impressions but are typically
sadistic and receive a thrill or satisfaction from making others suffer (Langman, 2009b).
Psychotic individuals are, at least partially disconnected from reality. Psychosis generally takes
place in the form of delusions (false beliefs) or hallucinations (e.g., hearing voices) and includes
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (Langman, 2009b). Symptoms likely include a struggle with
creating and maintaining relationships and a lack of emotional expressions. Psychotic shooters
tend to be adept at disguising their symptoms (Langman).
Rampage shootings are both essentially random and defined by acts involving an attack on
multiple parties. While shooters may have an initial target, they may also expand their range of
targets in an arbitrary or erratic way, suggesting they may be unaware of their targets until the
incident is over (Newman et al., 2004).
Serious violent incidents include rape or attempted rape, sexual battery other than rape, robbery,
physical attack with a weapon, and threat of physical attack with a weapon. Serious violent
incidents are differentiated from violent incidents only by the use of a weapon in the threat of or
action of a physical attack (USDOE, 2014).
Targeted attacks are not meant to be against the school but rather target a specific individual.
Gang related incidents or a student who shoots a teacher or administrator the shooter perceived
had wronged them are examples of this type of shooting (Muschert, 2007).
Threat assessments are a set of operational activities that combine an investigative process and
information gathering strategies with target-violence relevant questions (Reddy et al., 2001)
Terrorist attacks target either a school or students in a politically motivated assault (Muschert,
2007). The 2004 Beslan, Russia, attack where terrorists took 1,200 people hostage and three
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days later killed 344 people, 186 of whom were children, represented the deadliest recorded
school-related terrorist attack (Dunlop, 2006, as cited in Muschert, 2007).
Traumatized individuals are often detached from others and have a reduced ability for feeling
emotions. Feelings of persistent threats from others and minor symptoms of paranoia are
common. Typically, self-mutilation, self-destruction, substance abuse and even suicidal urges
will be present. Occasionally violent behavior toward others will occur (Langman, 2009b).

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Violence in America

Despite the frequency of mass shooting incidents, the United States violent crime rate has
moved in a downward trajectory over the past two decades. Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) 2014 statistics show violent crime incidents dropped by thirty-five percent (FBI, 2015).

Violence in Public Places

While the violent crime rate has dropped over the past two decades, incidents of public
violence such as rampage shootings have occurred at an accelerated rate. From 1966 to 2012,
there were ninety U.S. public mass shootings. This represented thirty-one percent of the world’s
total public mass shootings (Mascia, 2015). Only four countries had more than ten incidents,
with the Philippines having the second most – eighteen (Mascia). Of the U.S. public mass
shootings, sixty-two percent occurred in either schools or the workplace (Mascia). Other U.S.
locations included businesses, restaurants, and movie theaters. Lankford (2015) suggests success
associated social pressures when coupled with symptoms of mental illness may manifest as the
aggression a shooter directs toward academic and professional institutions (Mascia).
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According to Fox and Levin (1998), the motives for mass murder coalesce around five
principal themes. These themes may appear either independently or in combination. The five
themes include 1) Revenge (e.g., a resentful person seeks retribution for some type of individual
failures); 2) Power (e.g., a rampage style massacre created by a marginalized individual
instigating a personal battle against society); 3) Loyalty (e.g., a devoted family man/woman
murders his entire family and commits suicide believing the act will avoid a miserable earthly
life and reunite them in the afterlife); 4) Terror (e.g., a political rebel targets a government asset,
with numerous innocent victims killed to send an emphatic message to those in power); and 5)
Profit (e.g., to avoid having witnesses an assailant executes customers and workers at a retail
store while committing a robbery) (Fox & DeLateur, 2013). Revenge motivation is the most
common theme. Mass murderers who are motivated by revenge view themselves as victims and
seek retribution for perceived unfair treatment (Fox & DeLateur).
Regardless of the theme, co-workers and/or family are most often the primary targets in
mass shooting incidents. In some cases, a place such as a company or school is the primary
target. The killing of victims who are not primary targets in mass shooting incidents has been
termed “murder by proxy” (Frazier, 1975, as cited in Fox & DeLateur, 2013, p. 3). While victims
may be chosen randomly, the setting of the incident may not be. Rampage shooting perpetrators
frequently seek more than inflicting physical harm on their victims (Newman et al., 2004). In
most cases, schools are symbols of society, structure, and class systems the shooter is attempting
to destroy (Newman et al.). A completely random attack is rare (Fox & DeLateur). Random
attacks generally occur when a shooter believes the whole world is unfair and corrupt. The
shooter may show signs of paranoia to the point of psychosis. These apparently senseless
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random killings tend to be most frightening and, while being the least frequent, generate the most
mass media attention (Fox & DeLateur).

Types of Threats

In its simplest form, a threat is defined as a statement of intent to inflict harm (Fast,
2008). There are many types of threats that may occur in a school setting, and it is important for
school staff to understand the nuances of each type so they can utilize the appropriate strategy to
mitigate a potential risk (Fast). Fast, defined direct threats as specific acts focused on specific
targets in a manner leaving no doubt as to the intention. In contrast, indirect threats are vague or
ambiguous. Veiled threats imply an action but do not overtly threaten harm. A conditional
threat, e.g., kidnappings or extortion, state harm may be inflicted if a request is denied.
Additionally, threats may be classified as either transient or substantive. Transient threats
do not evince a premeditated intent to harm (Fast, 2008). Transient threats are often a reaction,
such as a loss of temper. Substantive threats demonstrate sufficient evidence of a sustained
intent to cause harm (Fast).
According to Fast (2008), additional factors should be considered when evaluating a
threat. First, the threats level of detail and specificity often reveal the level of attention
demanded by the threat. Second, the threat’s plausibility is important. Third, it should be
determined whether the person making the threat has experienced a stress inducing personal or
family incident. When evaluating a student threat, a recent loss or personal rejection in the
student’s life may warrant an elevated risk level. Finally, the character of the person making the
threat should be considered. Knowing the baseline behavior of the person making the threat may
be important when assessing the threat.

16
Targeted Violence

Reddy et al. (2001) noted little or no existing empirical guidance on how to best assess
risk for targeted violence in schools. Because different violent behaviors have different
precursors, alternative intervention approaches are required. Students may not demonstrate some
of the “traditional risk factors” connected with general violence and youth delinquency (p. 160).
Studies of youth homicide suggest children who commit murder manifest counterintuitive
characteristics when compared to adolescents who participate in non-violent delinquency
(Cornell, 1990; Reddy et al.). For example, Cornell (1990) found juveniles who were referred for
school evaluations were less likely to have prior mental histories such as prior arrests, placement
in a juvenile facility, problems with school adjustment, and/or a history of prior violent behavior
than juveniles who committed larceny (Reddy et al.). Among juveniles who commit murder,
there may be significant behavioral variance based on the type of homicide committed (Reddy et
al.). School officials’ ability to prevent targeted violence is challenging due to the need to know
the appropriate risk factors of each type of behavior being assessed.
Reddy et al. (2001) analyzed three assessment approaches: profiling, guided professional
judgment, and automated decision making. Recently, profiling, i.e., developing a demographic
or behavioral list to identify the likelihood of a potential risk, has become a familiar term.

Profiling

A profile is a template based on the known characteristics of previous perpetrators. This
template is utilized to compare and assess a suspected or potential perpetrator. When assessing a
risk, profiles often consider demographic data or physical appearances. However, there are no
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data demonstrating the validity or effectiveness of prospective profiling (Reddy et al., 2001). In
addition, concerns exist with respect to using a profile to predict violent school behavior. These
concerns include the profile’s accuracy and the risk of identifying a false positive (Sewell &
Mendelsohn, 2000). Additionally, attempting to label student behavior increases the opportunity
for judgmental bias or using an inappropriate risk factor to assume a potential risk of violence
(Reddy et al.). The risk of stigmatizing children and depriving them of civil liberties may also
exist (Sewell & Mendelsohn).
Research following the Columbine High School shooting incident observed the
characteristics associated with assailants are often too broad and represent too large a population
of students who fit the profile (Brickman et al., 2004 as cited in Collins, 2007; see also Cornell &
Williams, 2006). As a result, over-profiling may create a risk of school officials becoming
overwhelmed and failing to act. Cornell (2004) suggested a more specific list of violence
indicators would produce a more useful description of potential perpetrators.
Guided Professional Judgment

Guided professional judgment, also known as structured clinical assessment, is an
approach involving an interview and evaluation. This approach uses an instrument or checklist to
guide the collection and analysis of information (Reddy et al., 2001). Typically, the evaluator is
a mental health professional, but in a school setting, this may not be possible (Reddy et al.)
Structured assessments, requiring defined answers (e.g., yes/no), are generally more accurate
than unstructured assessments or assessments allowing for open-ended responses (Dempster,
1998; Hanson, 1998; Kropp, Hart, Webster, & Eaves, 1999 as cited in Reddy et al.).
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The guided professional judgment evaluator assesses baseline risk factors of the
probability of violence among people in relevant populations and then uses information gathered
through an interview using a factor checklist (Reddy et al., 2001). The evaluator adjusts each
risk factor’s probability, either up or down, to formulate a research based risk appraisal (Reddy
et al.).
When sample sizes are larger, the guided professional judgment approach has credibility
with mental health professionals. However, limitations exist regarding the usefulness of this
approach in a school setting (Reddy et al., 2001). For example, targeted school violence is a rare
occurrence. Therefore, a base rate is difficult to accurately establish (Sewell & Mendelsohn,
2000). Additionally, empirical evidence for identifying the risk factors associated with targeted
school violence is currently unavailable. Overall, the guided professional judgment approach
lacks evidence to support application in the school environment (Reddy et al.).

Automated Decision-Making

Automated decision-making is a threat assessment encompassing actuarial formulas and
relates to other forms of artificial intelligence or computer generated decision-making methods
(Reddy et al., 2001). These approaches produce the decision rather than allowing the assessor to
decide (Reddy et al.). Actuarial tools, such as weighted risk factors, combine to produce the
likelihood of a potential outcome (Reddy et al.). Actuarial tools are based on empirical research
on a topic (such as violence) and are normally standardized for specific subcategories (e.g.,
murder) (Reddy et al.). Actuarial models are most effective with topics that can be standardized
and validated. Expert systems and artificial intelligence are computer-based or automated
applications designed to provide an instant solution (Reddy et al.). Expertise on a topic is
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presented in the form of an algorithm or computer-generated parameters. Specific case problems
are compared to the computer program to generate a conclusion (Reddy et al.). Automation
eliminates the human error or bias that may occur with other approaches. Both actuarial and
expert system approaches are limited by the scope of current knowledge about a given topic
(Reddy et al.).
Using automated decisions to assess targeted school violence may not be effective due to
the lack of appropriate actuarial equations and valid risk factors (Reddy et al., 2001).
Additionally, concerns exist about using statistical equations to determine the likelihood of
targeted violence attacks due to their infrequent occurrence (Reddy et al.). Equations are not
able to minimize the false negatives or false positives typically identified in assessing targeted
school violence (Sewell & Mendelsohn, 2000). Reddy also noted the use of an equation or
computer model may discount a person’s knowledge of additional factors regarding the specific
incident being assessed.
Reddy (2001) concluded each of the approaches analyzed in her study were either
inductive or relied on factual information derived from prior events. Given the low frequency of
targeted school violence, the deductive examination of the specific facts of each unique case is
generally a more effective approach (Reddy et al.). Similar to empirical research on attacks of
public officials (e.g., Borum et al., 1999; Fein & Vossekuil, 1998, 1999; Fein et al., 1995),
Reddy et al. contended that the development of a risk assessment framework holds promising
potential for use in schools.
Reddy et al. (2001) identified three guiding principles integral to the assessment
approach. First, no homogenous characteristics or profile are shared by the perpetrators of
targeted school violence (Reddy et al.; Fein & Vossekuil, 1998, 1999). Second, in some cases a
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direct threat will be made without a subsequent attack, while in other cases no threat precedes an
attack. Third, targeted school violence is not characterized by randomness or generally the
product of someone who “just snapped” (Reddy et al., p. 168)

Threat Assessment Approach

The threat assessment approach requires an individual to gather information and to
answer questions to determine whether the evidence suggests an attack may occur (Reddy et al.,
2001). The development of an effective assessment approach and accompanying policy may be
the first steps in identifying behaviors or potential outcomes (Chavez, 1999; Furlong &
Morrison, 2000 as cited in Reddy et al.).
Reddy (2001) identified questions to guide the threat assessment process. These questions
address the potential perpetrator’s 1) motivation for the threat, 2) communication about the
threat, 3) atypical interest in targeted violence, 4) planning and/or attack related behaviors, 5)
mental state, 6) cognitive ability to develop and execute an attack, 7) recent loss (including
status), 8) relationship between the potential perpetrator’s communication regarding the event
and corresponding behavior, 9) capacity for inflicting harm, and 10) individual and/or
environmental factors influencing the likelihood of an attack. Answers to these questions
indicate whether the student poses a potential risk for engaging in future violent behavior. For
students identified as potential risks, school officials may mitigate the risk by implementing a
risk management plan or referrals to counselors, social workers, psychologists, or other mental
health related services (Reddy et al).
“School safety is not just a funding issue. It is largely a leadership issue” (Trump, 2010,

p. 20). School leaders are accountable for both internal and external threats. A threat may occur
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by a student or staff member within the school or may come from outside of the school
environment (Trump, 2010). Threats coming from outside of the school environment may
include fleeing bank robber, a terrorist attack, or in some cases a hazardous material spill.
School officials should formulate school security and emergency preparedness plans
(Trump, 2010). Trump (2010) recommended utilizing the U.S. Department of Education’s
Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools program. This program includes five
phases:
1. Prevention: the capability to avoid, deter, or stop an imminent crime or threatened
or actual mass casualty incident. Prevention is the action school officials take to
prevent a threatened incident from occurring;
2. Protection: the capability to secure schools against acts of violence and manmade
or natural disasters. Protection focuses on ongoing actions to protect students,
teachers, staff, visitors, networks, and property from a threat or hazard;
3. Mitigation: the capability to eliminate or reduce the loss of life and property
damage by lessening the impact of an event or emergency. Mitigation also means
reducing the likelihood either threats or hazards will occur;
4. Response: the capability to stabilize an emergency once it either occurs or is
certain to occur in an unpreventable way; establish a safe and secure environment;
save lives and property; and facilitate the transition to recovery; and
5. Recovery: the capability to assist schools affected by an event or emergency in
restoring the learning environment. (U.S. Department of Education, 2013, p. 2)
Good communication between teachers and students is essential to ensure threats of
violence are both reported and investigated (Cornell & Williams, 2006). School-based violence
prevention programs serve the functions of threat prevention, maintenance of a positive school
climate, and threat intervention (Cornell et al., 2004).

Threat Assessment Studies

In the late 1990s, several agencies published checklists, or profiles, delineating warning
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signs for the risk of adolescent violent behavior (Verlinden, Hersen & Thomas, 2000). For
example, the National Association of School Psychologists (NASP, 1999) published Early
Warning, Timely Response; the American Psychological Association (APA, 1999) produced
Warning Signs; the National School Safety Center (NSSC, 1999) published the Checklist of
Characteristics of Youth Who Have Caused School-Related Violent Deaths, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI, 1999) produced Lessons Learned: An FBI Perspective for its
School Violence Summit. These checklists/profiles contained overlapping items and were not
completely aligned (Verlinden et al., 2000). Each profile provided a broad perspective on youth
violence. However, Verlinden et al. contend that to limit misidentification and labeling of
students, the characteristics of youth who commit violent crimes are better studied as distinct
subcategories.
As national associations and federal agencies researched and published guides for
addressing violent school attacks, academic research has also identified methods for assessing
student threats. Examples of this research are discussed later in this chapter where previous
studies are reviewed.

Leakage

Students often tell someone before they carry out a substantive threat. Vossekuil et al.
(2002) found eighty-one percent of the students in their study shared their planned attack with at
least one other person and almost sixty percent told two or more individuals. Additionally,
ninety-three percent of the time the person with whom the plan was shared was a friend,
schoolmate, or sibling. The FBI refers to students communicating their intentions to others in
advance of a violent act as “leakage” (Fast, 2008 p. 238). Leakage may occur in the form of
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drawings, journals, videos or verbal statements. Leakage may also occur when a perpetrator
attempts to recruit others to participate in carrying out the threat (Fast). The peers of a student
who intends do harm are often put in the position of deciding if it is appropriate to tell an adult
and, thereby, placing themselves at risk of being considered a snitch (Fast). According to the
Secret Services National Threat Assessment Center, monitoring leakage is an effective way to
avert school shootings (Fast).
Leakage may occur in a variety of ways. It may be in the form of threats that are not
taken seriously. For example, Mitchell Johnson in Westside, Arkansas, told peers, “Tomorrow
you will find out if you live or die” (Langman, 2015 p. 185). In other cases a friend may be
asked to help in some way, such as when Andrew Wurst of Edinboro, Pennsylvania, attempted to
recruit a partner in the attack (Langman). Michael Carneal told some of his friends to stay away
from school on the Monday after Thanksgiving (Langman). These examples suggest that if a
school official or the police had been alerted to the threat, the attack may have been prevented.
Leakage may also be communicated to school staff. For example, classroom assignments
are a way for a prospective rampage school shooter to foreshadow violence by expressing their
intentions in writing (Langman, 2015). Eric Harris of Columbine wrote an essay on school
shootings. Kip Kinkel of Springfield, Oregon, gave an oral presentation on how to make bombs
and told peers he wanted to become the next Unabomber (Langman). Kinkel was also asked to
write an essay on love at first sight. His essay included disturbing portions unrelated to the topic
of love, including “that is why you go to a pawn shop and buy an AR-15 because you are going
to execute every last mother fucking one of you” (Langman, p. 186). While threats are not
necessarily an indication of an impending attack or a prediction of violence, they do provide a
warning signal that an investigation is warranted (Langman).
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School Climate

School climate may also be a factor in determining whether bystanders will communicate
a potential threat to school staff. Bystanders who did not report suspicion of a potential attack
reported believing a negative reaction would occur and the possibility of the bystander getting
into trouble were deterrents (Pollack, Modzeleski & Rooney, 2008). Pollack et al. advised
school officials to ensure the school climate provides a welcoming environment for sharing
information regarding potentially threatening situations. Pollack et al. further observed “simple
and genuine measures, such as regularly greeting students, talking to students, and addressing
students by name, help to make students feel connected and part of the school” (p. 8).
Bystanders sometimes indicated they did not believe an attack would actually occur.
Reasons for disbelief included the threat having been made over an extended time period and
appearing to be an attention-seeking gesture (Pollack et al., 2008). Bystanders also reported they
believed the attack would not take place as soon as it did. They believed they had more time to
come forward and, therefore, did not communicate the plan to an adult (Pollack et al.). Parental
influence also appeared to play a role. Some bystanders who came forward indicated their
parents reassured them it was the right thing to do (Pollack et al.). In contrast, bystanders who
did not come forward reported they felt influenced by parental advice to avoid involvement.
Pollack et al. (2008) recommended school officials develop policies addressing the
reporting of a threat. Such a policy should include school officials’ role in receiving information
about a potential threat. School staff should be properly trained about how to respond to
information regarding a potential threat as well as how to appropriately deal with an active
threat. Staff should also be encouraged to be vigilant in listening to and being aware of student
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conversations containing clues about a potential threat. Any information about a threat heard
directly or reported by another party should be taken seriously and investigated to determine its
validity.
Langman (2015) noted a common misconception about school shooters is that they are
retaliating for acts of bullying. His study found only forty percent of school shooters were
harassed and under three percent targeted a bully in their attack. School personnel were targeted
far more often than any other type of victim. Langman (2015) suggests the shooter’s rage is
generally driven by school related failures or conflicts. At least ninety-two percent of school
shooters had some type of negative academic experience (e.g., failing classes, repeating grades,
not graduating, detention, expulsion, suspension, etc.). These experiences often influenced the
shooter’s selection of an intended target.
What does a safe school climate look like? The U.S. Department of Education’s and the
U.S. Department of Justice’s (1998) joint publication, “Early Warning Timely Response: A
Guide to Safe Schools,” presented a list of safe school climate characteristics. According to
Dwyer, Osher, and Warger, a safe school climate exhibits the following:
A focus on academics – an environment in which academic achievement is valued and all
students are capable of achieving good academic outcomes. It will engage in bonds
between the family and community – showing a strong link between families and
community based organizations such as churches, police and mental health agencies.
Demonstrates an emphasis on social inclusion of all children – where teachers promote
positive relationships and mentoring programs utilize outside volunteers to increase
opportunities to bond students with adults. Low violence schools tend to promote equal
treatment for all students – favoritism for athletes or other social classes does not occur.
Open communication about safety issues – identifying the dangers of weapons and
consequences for bringing them to school. Additionally, students should be educated on
anger management techniques and proper conflict resolution skills. Low violence
schools encourage a climate where students can share concerns with adults - having
confidence they will be taken serious and without concern of retribution. Low violence
schools tend to support extended day programs – including tutoring, mentoring,
community service or other clubs or activities that allow youth a continuation of a
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positive learning environment. Finally, schools with less violence likely assist students in
transitioning from the school to adult life and the workplace – including apprenticeships,
vocational skills, internships etc. that provide opportunities for students to find their niche
in society. (Dwyer et al. as cited in Fast, 2008, pp. 241-242)
Additional guidance for creating a safe and connected school environment was jointly
provided by the United States Secret Service and United States Department of Education. Threat
Assessments in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe
School Climates contained the following recommendations (Fein et al., 2002);
An assessment of the school’s emotional climate should be performed. There should be
an emphasis on the importance of listening in schools. An adoption of a strong yet caring
stance against the code of silence. Prevention of and interventions in bullying conducted.
An inclusive school community approach towards planning, creating and sustaining a
school culture of safety and respect. Ensure development of trusting relationships
between at least one adult and student. Lastly, a creation of mechanisms for developing
and sustaining safe school climates. (p. 13)
School safety and security are dependent on two conditions: a predictable and orderly
environment characterized by school staff establishing consistent, dependable supervision and
disciplinary procedures and the climate being rooted in students feeling they are connected to the
school and supported by their teachers and support staff (Cornell, 2006).

Crisis Plans

In the late 1990s, school officials/administrators expanded their school safety resources to
include crisis management techniques similar to those utilized by big business. Brinkman’s
(2003) practical guide for school safety encouraged teachers, students, and administrators to use
threat assessment as a preventive measure for predicting targeted violence (Brickman et al., 2004
as cited in Reddy, 2001).
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According to Seeger and his colleagues (2001), insufficient pre-crisis communication
results in the possibility of a surprise event, inadequate precautions and serious harm occurring
within an institution (Collins, 2007). They recommended an organization should investigate,
develop, and institute a crisis management plan to ameliorate these problems. Seeger et al.
(2001) identified three important phases of an effective crisis management plan: 1) determining
the composition and structure of the crisis management team; 2) formulation of checklists,
decision-making guides, procedures for mitigating harm; and 3) ongoing maintenance of the
crisis management plan. Maintenance of the plan was the most often ignored phase. Seeger et
al. (2001) found the lack of preparedness was sometimes the result of an organization failing to
develop a crisis plan (Collins, 2007). However, more often organizations failed to keep crisis
plans updated. During the 2013-14 school year, eighty-eight percent of public schools reported
having written procedures for responding to shootings/active shooters (USDOE, 2014).
Crisis planning team membership should not be restricted to only school staff. Daniels
(2007) recommended community and religious leaders also be included (see also Barton, 2000;
Brock et al., 2001; D’Andrea, 2004; Daniels, 2007). Plans should also include crisis counseling
and referral resources for both students and staff. Daniels (2007) also recommended school
officials should develop and annually update a list of local qualified psychologists.

Crisis Planning/Training

Penrose (2000) noted the importance of training staff to view a crisis as an opportunity by
reframing a potential negative incident. Penrose suggested the greater the autonomy provided to
an organization’s lower levels, the more responsive the organization will be should a crisis occur.
Penrose’s quantitative study of perception’s effect on crisis management planning found viewing
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a crisis as an opportunity induced greater proactive institutional crisis planning efforts (Penrose,
2000 as cited in Collins, 2007). Penrose explained, “A crisis management plan is…of limited use
if it does not coincide with an organization’s philosophies, values, attitudes, assumptions, and
norms” (as cited in Collins, 2007, p. 160). During the 2013-14 school year, seventy-four percent
of public schools trained their employees on crisis prevention and intervention (USDOE, 2014).
Looking at student preparedness, seventy percent of public schools drilled students on the use of
a written procedural plan for shootings/active shooters (USDOE).
The Virginia Model for Student Threat Assessment was developed as part of the Youth
Violence Project of the Curry School of Education at the University of Virginia (Cornell, 2006).
This project involved a group of educators studying how school principals handled threats and
identifying procedures consistent with FBI and Secret Service recommendations. As a result of
this study, a seven-step decision-making model was developed.
Step 1 of the model was an evaluation of the threat. At this step interviews using a
standard set of questions take place with the individual who made the threat, the recipient of the
threat, and any relevant witnesses (Cornell, 2006). At this stage, the threat’s context is as
important as what the person who made the threat either said or did.
Step 2 involves determining whether a threat is transient or substantive (Cornell, 2006).
O’Toole (2000) and the FBI developed several characteristics of substantive threats to help
school staff make this determination. Threats that are specific or repeated multiple times tend to
be substantive (Cornell). Transient threats, e.g., an outburst of anger or frustration, are of less
concern but may require parental notification and/or disciplinary action (Cornell).
Step 3 addresses transient threat. Transient threats are usually handled quicker and do not
necessitate convening the full assessment team (Cornell, 2006). When the threat is substantive,
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or unconfirmed as a transient threat, step four becomes necessary and step three is omitted. Step
4 entails assessing the severity or seriousness of the threat. A serious threat predicts either an
assault or physical violence without the use of a weapon. A very serious threat may include the
use of weapon or a threat of death or rape (Cornell).
Step 5 occurs if the threat is less severe (Cornell, 2006). Step five involves
implementation of precautions to protect potential victims, notifying the offending student’s
parents, disciplining the student who made the threat, referring the student who made the threat
to counseling and/or other appropriate interventions, and, if necessary, contacting a law
enforcement agency (Cornell). Notification of the intended victim of the threat should also take
place (Cornell).
Step 6 includes use with more severe or very serious substantive threats (Cornell, 2006).
In these cases, the team omits step 5 and conducts a safety evaluation. In addition to the
precautions suggested in step five for a less serious substantive threat, law enforcement should
be contacted, and a mental health evaluation of the student making the threat should also be
conducted (Cornell). Administration should suspend the student from school pending a complete
investigation and assessment (Cornell).
Step 7 involves implementation of a safety plan designed to protect potential victims and
a determination of how the educational needs of the student who made the threat will be met
(Cornell, 2006). The building principal should decide if, and when, the student who made the
threat may return to school or if an alternative educational placement is necessary. In either case,
school should implement potential supports or conditions to monitor the student (Cornell). In a
field test of the Virginia Model for Student Threat Assessment, the threat assessment process
yielded positive outcomes (Cornell).
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Crisis/Threat Assessment Teams
Langman (2015) stated, “The best way for schools to prevent rampage attacks is to have
threat assessment teams to evaluate and respond to potential threats of violence” (p. 183). The
threat assessment team’s role is to differentiate between credible student threats and false alarms
by examining the student who made the threat from multiple perspectives (Langman).
Assessment teams are responsible for investigating information about the student’s past
academic, legal, and social histories; determining whether the student has access to weapons; and
assessing the student’s interactions with fellow students and school staff (Langman).
O’Toole’s (2000) report noted that the FBI had recommended school officials should
establish multidisciplinary teams to manage student threats of violence (O’Toole as cited in
Cornell, 2004). O’Toole recommended, at minimum, the inclusion of a mental health
professional and law enforcement expert, but specific backgrounds of other team members were
not prescribed. The Department of Justice (2002) recommended the principal or assistant
principal direct the assessment team’s activities, and a school resource officer (SRO) would
assume the role of a legal or law enforcement expert on the team. The school psychologist or
mental health professional should act as a consultant to the principal for determining whether the
threat should be treated as either a transient or a substantive threat (Cole, 2003; Furlong,
Morrison, & Pavelski, 2000 as cited in Cornell et al., 2004). Additionally, the mental health
professional should aid in determining if the student may have a mental health issue requiring
treatment (Barnhill, 2003; Sandoval & Brock, 1996). The FBI recommended that because of
their primary instructional role classroom teachers should not be included on the assessment
team. Further, while the threat assessment team’s size and composition are limited, all school
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staff need to be trained to identify potential warning signs that may lead to violence and know
how to notify the assessment team of the threat (Langman, 2015). Langman noted office
workers, cafeteria staff, and maintenance workers are often on the “front line of violence
prevention,” so training for all staff is necessary (p. 184).
As part of the Virginia Threat Assessment Study, a decision tree model was developed to
guide efficient and practical decision-making (Cornell, 2004). In the decision tree model the
Principal gathers information about the threat and either resolves the issue or determines further
research and intervention are required (Cornell). This is a key decision. Schools should call the
crisis team into action if further research is required. Principals should utilize student interviews,
including witnesses of the threat, to corroborate the story. Principals should have a high degree
of autonomy in the process, not unlike their role in responding to student behavioral issues
(Cornell, 2004).
Chronology of Prior School Shooting Prevention Studies

The following delineate the primary studies related to rampage school shooting research.
The researcher organized the studies listed below in chronological order with the exception of
the Newman et al. (2004) study that will be utilized as the current study’s theoretical framework.
Newman et al.’s study is presented last as a transition to the case studies and methodology
section.
Classroom Avenger

McGee and DeBernardo (1999) were among the early researchers who attempted to
provide a profile of school shooters. Until their research, other than basic profiling techniques,

32
school officials had limited resources to employ in responding to threats. McGee and
DeBernardo defined the Classroom Avenger as “a depressed and suicidal, usually Caucasian,
adolescent male from a rural, suburban or small community who perpetrate[d] a non-traditional
multi-victim homicide in a school or classroom setting” (p. 1). Their study noted Classroom
Avengers seek notoriety or personal vengeance through violence. Studies included in their
meta-analysis did not involve drug or gang related incidents. McGee and DeBernardo developed
specific characteristic categories for school shooters by examining fourteen youth mass
murderers who had planned school/classroom shooting incidents between 1993 and 2001. They
used individual psychological evaluations to create a sample profile. McGee and DeBernardo’s
study created a Classroom Avenger profile that examined the perpetrator using the following:
demographic and dispositional factors, historical factors, clinical features, and contextual
variables. Their study utilized tables to delineate characteristics as either exclusionary criteria or
inclusionary criteria. Each list included over thirty characteristics representing a broad array of
personality traits. The study concluded the examined school shooting incidents “revealed an
evolutionary pattern with these crimes developing in the direction of greater complexity and
sophistication over time” (p. 14). This conclusion suggested simple profiling may not be
sufficient and a more specific assessment technique was needed.
While McGee and DeBernardo (1999) were doing their research, an alternative study
focused on assessing violent school threats was conducted.

Four Prong Threat Assessment

In 2000, the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime developed a four-pronged
approach for assessing a potentially violent school threat. This study was a more sophisticated
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framework than previous research in the field as it was the first study to identify groupings and
establish a holistic approach to identifying characteristics of potential threats that extended
beyond the personality and appearance of the perpetrator. The study included fourteen school
shooting cases as well as four averted shooting incidents. The four-pronged approach identified
several common characteristics among the shooters, including narcissism, bigotry, alienation,
poor anger management, and fascination with violence, low self-esteem, and lack of empathy
(O’Toole, 2000). These characteristics yielded an initial threat assessment framework for school
officials to use in identifying a potential threat in a school setting. Four prongs emerged from this
study. The four prongs included the student’s personality, family dynamics, school dynamics,
and social dynamics.
Prong One: The Student’s Personality

O’Toole’s (2000) first prong considers both nature and nurture, i.e., the combination of
inherited characteristics along with influences from one’s environment. O’Toole notes it is
important to be aware that adolescent personalities are dynamic and are still developing.
O’Toole noted by observing the student their personality might also be understood. These
observations include how the student copes with challenges, failures, rejection or other stressors;
how they exhibit expressions of disappointment, anger, embarrassment, frustration, or similar
feelings; how they use resilience or the lack of resilience after a loss, failure or other negative
experience; how they demonstrate self-perception (i.e., how they feel they are perceived by
others); how they respond to authority figures, rules, or directions; how they demonstrate
desire/need for control, respect, attention and other needs; how they show or fail to show
empathy for others; and how they demonstrate a particular attitude toward others (O’Toole).
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O’Toole (2000) posits that in general people do not snap or move instantly toward
violence when they have previously not shown a propensity for such behavior. Violent behavior
generally evolves over time with observable warning signs. For example, these observable
signals may include verbal comments evincing frustration, destruction, or an intent to get back at
someone. Precursors to violent behavior may also appear in the form of writings or drawings.
Prong Two: Family Dynamics
The ability to understand the student’s family dynamics is important. Knowing a
family’s structure, values and behavior patterns provides valuable context when assessing a
threat (O'Toole, 2000). Examined areas related to family dynamics include turbulent parentchild relationships, acceptance of a child’s pathological behavior(s), parental apathy to behavior
typical parents would find disturbing, access to weapons in home, lack of intimacy, the child
rules the roost, the family structure lacks limits or discipline, and lack of parental monitoring of
the child’s use of media and communication devices such as television and the Internet.
Trump (2010) suggests parental characteristics may increase the likelihood their offspring
may pose a threat to other students. First, a parental focus on material items may yield a child
who seeks a high level of money and lacks discipline. A family’s increased mobility may also
create opportunities for the child to engage in inappropriate or dangerous behavior.
Additionally, parents who substitute time with or affection toward their children by providing
material items (e.g., toys, video games, etc.) may have children who demonstrate a higher level
of risk inappropriate behavior (Trump). Second, parental denial or neglect of potential early
warning signs of youth behavioral issues may result in the child engaging in high-risk behaviors.
Parental neglect may also manifest itself in the family failing to utilize available resources such
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as mental health or counseling services. Third, parents who do not allow their children to fail or
to learn from their mistakes may limit a child’s opportunity to develop coping skills for use in
challenging situations. Finally, overscheduling their children, thereby limiting opportunities for
children to have unstructured time and enjoy family time, may place children at greater risk for
anti-social behavior (Trump). Trump also points out many of these potential parental tendencies
are more prevalent in white urban communities.
Prong Three: School Dynamics and the Student’s Role in those Dynamics
Prong three examines the school’s culture, values, beliefs, and structure and the daily
roles students play within the learning environment. It is important to know how potential school
shooters may perceive themselves or how they are portrayed among other students and/or staff
within the school culture. It is important to recognize students, teachers, and administrators may
all have different perceptions of a school’s dynamics. These variances are important. School
dynamics include student attachment to the school; staff tolerance for disrespectful behavior;
application of inequitable disciplinary consequences; inflexible school culture; the presence of a
pecking order among students; a code of silence among students; and unsupervised student
access to and use of computers (O'Toole, 2000).

Prong Four: Social Dynamics

This prong looks beyond family and school boundaries to examine the broader
community as a whole. Considerations include the community’s roles, beliefs, and values. Also
important is the context of how potential school shooters perceive themselves with friends and
what activities they participate in, such as what entertainment they consume and how they view
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weapons and drugs (O’Toole, 2000). Areas examined under this prong include media,
entertainment, technology, peer groups, drugs and alcohol, outside interests, and the copycat
effect. O’Toole (2000) notes the community’s significance. “School shootings and other forms
of school violence are not just a school’s problem or a law enforcement problem. They involve
schools, families and the communities” (p. 4). When a student demonstrates the potential for
violent behavior, community institutions (including schools) have both the ability and
responsibility to assist in preventing that possibility from becoming a reality.
O’Toole (2000) acknowledged many characteristics associated with potential student
violence but stressed evaluating a long-term baseline view of student behavior was a better
predictor than one bad day. O’Toole’s study concluded school shooters manifest significant
psychopathic and narcissistic traits. O’Toole developed a list of twenty-eight traits and
behaviors often associated with violence, as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1
Traits/Behaviors Associated with Violence
Item
#
1
2
3
4

Trait / Behavior potentially associated with violence

Leakage-revealing clues or intentions. Possibly recruiting others to help
Low tolerance for frustration. Student is easily hurt or insulted
Poor coping skills. Struggles to deal with criticism or failures
Lack of resiliency. Setbacks are not handled well, student does not bounce back
quickly
5
Failed love relationship
6
Injustice collector. Does not forget or forgive the wrongs. May keep a hit list.
7
Signs of depression
8
Narcissism
9
Alienation. Feeling of isolation
10
Dehumanizes others. Views people as objects
Table continued on next page
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Table cont. from previous page
11
Lack of empathy
12
Exaggerated sense of self entitlement
13
Attitude of superiority
14
Exaggerated or pathological need for attention
15
Externalizes blame
16
Masks self-esteem. Despite arrogance….may avoid school activities
17
Anger management problems
18
Intolerance
19
Inappropriate humor
20
Seeks to manipulate others
21
Lack of trust
22
Closed social group
23
Change of behavior
24
Rigid and opinionated
25
Unusual interest in sensational violence
26
Fascination with violence-filled entertainment
27
Negative role models
28
Behavior appears relevant to carrying out a threat

Risk Factors in School Shootings

Verlinden et al. (2000) examined nine school shooting incidents that occurred in
American schools from 1996-1999. Similar to O’Toole (2000), this study analyzed several
domains, including individual, school/peers, family and societal factors.
Verlinden et al. (2000) found the most predictive characteristic of violent behavior to be
an early pattern of aggressive behavior occurring between the ages of six to thirteen. “Schools
are highly vulnerable to interpersonal violence” (Verlinden et al., p.13). Unsafe schools were
characterized by subpar supervision, student alienation, overcrowding, strict disciplinary
procedures lacking in compassion, student alienation and anger, rejection of at-risk students by
peers and teachers, and insensitivity to multiethnic factors (Walker, Irvin, & Sprague 1997, as
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cited in Verlinden et al., 2000). From a societal perspective, access to guns was identified as the
most important factor (Verlinden et al.), and exposure to violence in the the form of media,
games, or online content was described as being dependent on the state of mind and perspective
of the individual experiencing the content. Verlinden et al. (2000) noted that in about half the
studied shooting cases a significant decline in the shooter’s functioning (e.g., mood, academics,
behavior at home or school) occurred during the weeks or days preceding the violent attack.
Verlinden et al. (2000) concluded the key indicators of potential school shooters included anger
issues, depression and suicidal ideation, aggression, history of discipline, and feelings of
rejection/isolation. Additionally, the study affirmed the notion that school shooting incidents
contain a unique set of risk factors.

Typology Studies
Muschert’s (2007) and Langman’s (2009a) research on school shootings focused on
typology studies, which identify a category of behavior or characteristics. Muschert was among
the first to examine school shootings using a typological approach. He endeavored to understand
what he could learn about school shooters to prevent future incidents. Muschert (2007)
examined five categories of school shootings: rampages, mass murders, terrorist attacks, targeted
attacks, and government shootings (defined as being politically motivated). Muschert’s research
indicated a variety of factors, rather than a single factor, contribute to school shootings. The
study discussed several causes of school shootings, including mental illness, identity of shooters
(e.g., gender, race, etc.), peer relationships (e.g., bullying, romantic rejection, etc.), family
neglect or abuse, community context, social and cultural context, and access to guns. Muschert
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found access to guns was a key antecedent for a school shooting to occur but acknowledged
other factors could also contribute.
Unlike Muschert (2007), Langman (2009a) focused his typology research on rampage
school shootings. Langman’s background in psychology provided a lens for categorizing
rampage shooters. His primary goal was to identify a better mental health assessment technique
to prevent future incidents. Langman categorized incidents by diagnosing perpetrators as a
traumatized, psychotic, or psychopathic shooter and noted identifying factors for each type. The
researcher has compiled specific definitions of the diagnoses under definition of terms found in
Chapter 1.
Sequential Model

Levin and Madfis (2009) utilized existing criminology theories to formulate a sequential
model theorizing the events or factors combining in a cumulative manner to precipitate a school
massacre. These stages, also known as “cumulative strain”, include chronic strain, uncontrolled
strain, acute strain, the planning stage, and massacre at school (p. 1229).
According to Levin and Madfis (2009), school shootings may be culminating result of a
series of events. Their rampage school shooting research found that frequently the incident was
a result of years of incremental setbacks that built up as opposed to a brief period of depression
or struggle. Additionally, Levin and Madfis noted a lack of recognition from staff and peers
could lead to increased frustration and further struggle. The absence of a supportive adult or
peer may also lead to violence.
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Rampage: Social Roots of School Shooting

Newman et al. (2004) described rampage shootings as being both essentially random and
involving an attack on multiple parties. While shooters may have an initial target, they may also
expand their range of targets in an arbitrary or erratic way, suggesting they may often be
unaware of their targets until the incident is over. Newman et al.’s (2004) study used two specific
incidents: Heath, Kentucky, (1997) and Westside, Arkansas, (1998) to analyze possible reasons
for rampage school shootings. Newman et al. presented a variety of explanations for why school
shootings occur and analyzed the validity of each explanation. The explanations included mental
illness, “he just snapped”, family problems, bullying, peer support, changing communities, a
culture of violence, gun availability, violent media, and the copycat effect. Newman et al.’s
theory asserted a single behavior or incident was never sufficient to indicate the likelihood of a
potential attack. Rather they found a combination of indicators are present when violent
rampages occur. The study proposed five “necessary but not sufficient” indicators were needed
for the occurrence of a rampage school shooting (p. 229).
Indicator One

The first required indicator is the shooter maintains a perception of himself as being
extremely marginalized within the social worlds that matter to him. For example, the shooter
could have been the target of bullying, considered to be a social outcast, or have a low level of
connectedness with the school community (Newman et al. 2004). Newman et al. point out that,
especially in tight knit, homogenous communities where anonymity is scarce, individual
differences often get pushed to the community’s fringe. This poses a greater risk under indicator
one.
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Few rampage shooters are loners. Newman et al. (2004) found many rampage shooters
had a small number of friends who also typically held affiliations with outcast cliques. Four out
of five shooters in Newman’s study experienced some degree of marginalization. Using CDC
data, Newman et al. compared suicide-only incidents occurring at schools to multiple-victim
incidents. They found approximately twenty-five percent of students who committed suicide
were at the top of the school’s social hierarchy, whereas only five percent of those who harmed
others at school came from this social class. Newman et al. cautioned the sample size was small,
but nonetheless, the data demonstrated a sizable difference.
Bullying, harassment, and attacks on masculinity are often associated feelings of
marginalization (Newman et al., 2004). Newman et al. noted three out of five cases in the study
indicated there had been attacks on the shooter’s masculinity, such as being referred to as either
gay or as a faggot. It is common for an adolescent who has been subjected to attacks on their
masculinity to have projected the impression of being unaffected by the comments; however,
internally they feel distraught (Newman et al.). While rampage school shooters were not usually
loners and had not been bullied, they usually had experienced social isolation or marginalization.
Indicator Two
The shooter’s feelings of marginalization are often magnified by the presence of a
psychological problem, including depression, anxiety, or more serious mental health issues such
as trauma, psychotic behavior, and psychopathological behavior (Newman et al., 2004).
Newman et al. noted while school shooters may have appeared to be accepted, they often felt
alone, isolated, and rejected.
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Rampage school shooters often have some form of mental illness. Newman et al.’s
(2004) study did not include an independent analysis of the presence of mental illness.
Assessments of mental health in the study were reliant on one or more of the following: 1) news
coverage that referenced court testimony from psychiatrists, 2) commentary from judges and/or
defense attorney’s, and 3) in some cases a plea of insanity. Due to the lack of reliable
information, Newman et al. could not conclusively determine how pervasive mental health issues
were. The U.S. Secret Service reported one-third of school shooters had received a mental health
evaluation but less than one-fifth received a diagnosis with mental health issues before the
shooting incidents (Newman et al.). Media accounts indicate over half of the school shooters
suffered from a serious mental illness at the time of the shooting. In many of the cases both
testimony and media claims that prosecution challenged the school shooters suffered from
mental illness. Newman et al.’s study did not attempt to determine whether the school shooters
were criminally insane, but the majority of the school shooters Newman et al. (2004) studied had
a history of severe depression and suicidal impulses. The CDC found twenty percent of all
adolescents seriously consider suicide and eight percent actually attempt suicide (as cited in
Newman et al., 2004). Of the school shooters in Newman et al.’s study, nearly four out of five
school shooters either had suicidal ideations or had attempted suicide, but most had never been
diagnosed or evaluated (Newman et al.).
In some cases, family problems magnify the issues of socially marginalized youth and
increase the severity of whatever struggles the youth may be encountering outside the home.
Two-thirds of the school shooters Newman studied lived in two-parent households. Newman et
al. (2004) pointed out this was counter to the predictions of most. Newman et al. suggested the
quality of family life may be a better indicator than the family structure. The CDC noted one in
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five school shooters came from homes with suspected family problems. However, media
accounts indicate fifty percent of the school shooters came from homes with suspected family
problems. Eighty-five percent of the school shooters in Newman et al.’s study indicated issues
with home life, suicide, depression, or mental health. These are key Indicator Two markers.
School shooting cases studied after 1990 indicate that one hundred percent of the school shooters
suffered from at least one of Indicator Two’s key markers (Newman et al., 2004).

Indicator Three

Newman et al. (2004) noted the importance of having an example or plan for how violent
behavior can resolve a child’s problems. Newman et al. contend cultural scripts, defined as a
prescription for behavior, must be in place to show a template for what the shooter can be or can
accomplish through the violent act. The school shooter must believe carrying out an attack will
resolve his problems. Newman et al. recommend examining violent television, movies and
violent video games as well as how media coverage may provoke copycat. The media provide
the general population a template for what a masculine man should be. Pressures to live up to a
media image of a strong, capable male may lead a school shooter to direct his anger or
dissatisfaction outward toward the society the perpetrator feels failed him. However, while
Newman et al. contend that influences may be drawn from movies, lyrics, and/or books, such
sources cannot be blamed for school shooting incidents. “Watching and listening to violent
media does not brainwash otherwise happy and healthy teenagers so they murder teachers and
peers. That is why millions of youth ingest countless hours of bloody films and come out none
worse for wear” (p. 252-253).
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Newman et al. (2004) note that “if marginalization and individual vulnerability motivate
the shooters, cultural scripts delimit the options for reactions” (p. 245). They argue that prior to
1990; a cultural script for a rampage school shooting had not been presented to the troubled,
angry, and desperate youth who sought to resolve their feelings of oppression. While Newman
et al. assert the importance of cultural scripts, they also note this is the “hardest element to ‘test’
because a shooter’s thought process and motivation are difficult to recover” (p. 246). Often
school shooters either commit suicide or are inaccessible due to incarceration. Therefore,
researchers must rely on qualitative media accounts to formulate a blueprint for school shooting
incidents.
Rampage school shooters often attempt to insulate themselves from teasing and public
ridicule by developing an alternative identity. The school shooters examined in the current study
– Kip Kinkel (Springfield, Oregon), Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris (Columbine, CO), and
Michael Carneal (Heath, Kentucky) – did not possess the social skills required for them to be
able to adapt and rise above the taunting (Newman et al., 2004). Because our society tells young
males it is not masculine to seek adult help, fearing they may be called a “wimp,” it is common
for school shooters to attempt to live with teasing and public ridicule (p. 247). A rampage
shooting is often not a school shooter’s first attempt to resolve problems, but it is usually the last.
In an effort to achieve a masculine escape from despair, a troubled youth may perceive a
rampage school shooting as a viable option for reclaiming his standing among his most important
social groups.
A rampage school shooter’s intent is to send a final message, not just to the victims, but
to a society believed by the shooter to have excluded him (Newman et al., 2004). School
shooters have learned from the media that violent acts yield fame and notoriety. Additionally,
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shooters tend to feel they are forced to follow through with their plans since, in some cases, they
have alerted peers of their plans are challenged to carry out the attack. This type of peer response
often causes the shooters to believe they have reached a point of no return. From a school
shooter’s perspective, failure to follow through with the threat could be considered a weakness,
and for many shooters this would be too much additional humiliation to endure.

Indicator Four

The fourth essential factor is a failure of surveillance systems to identify troubled youth.
This area considers more than technology hardware such as video surveillance. This factor
includes school climate, staff training, the use of student resource officers (police) and a school
crisis team (Newman et al., 2004). Often the most vulnerable students function below the radar.
Newman et al. (2004) noted that in many cases, the warning signals were weak and
school officials may have dismissed these cues due to the shooter’s contradictory behavior such
as good behavior and apologies. School officials may not have proper surveillance systems put
in place to handle the complex responsibility of understanding the subtle messages
communicated to them (Newman et al.). For example, Evan Ramsey (Bethel, Alaska)
encountered numerous setbacks throughout his youth. However, Bethel High School officials
observed a decrease in Evan’s disciplinary infractions during the year of the shooting. Evan’s
behavioral upswing and school officials’ lack of information about Evan’s personal challenges
produced mixed signals (Newman et al.).
When compared to disciplinary infraction history of prior rampage school shooters,
Ramsey’s case was not consistent with the prior history. The Secret Service reported two-thirds
of school shooters had limited school disciplinary records (Newman et al., 2004). Newman et
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al.’s dataset showed only fifteen percent of school shooters had extensive school disciplinary
records.
One might anticipate school shooters would have histories of poor academic grades.
However, the Secret Service, reported five percent of school shooters had received failing grades
and the majority were doing well academically at the time of the attack; some were even on their
school’s academic honor roll (Newman et al., 2004). Downward spirals in academic
performance seldom occurred prior to the shooting incidents, and in some cases, academic
improvement occurred (Newman et al.). Additionally, school counselors were generally
unaware of issues taking place in school shooters’ lives. CDC data indicated only approximately
twenty-five percent of school shooters were receiving school-based psychological services
(Newman et al.).
Additionally, most school shooters had no prior record of criminal behavior. In some
cases, criminal issues never surfaced due to the criminal conduct either taking place out of state
or the shooter successfully completing a diversion program with an accompanying record
expungement (Newman et al., 2004).
In more than four out of five cases in Newman et al.’s (2004) study, the school shooter
revealed his violent intentions in advance, but Newman et al. indicated that despite at least one
other person having knowledge, this information seldom went further than the shooter’s peers.
In some of Newman et al.’s cases, the shooter’s peers were so concerned about the seriousness of
the shooter’s threat, they either stayed home from school or intentionally avoided the area in
which the shooter indicated the shooting would take place. Additionally, nine out of ten parents
in Newman’s study claimed they had concerns about the shooter’s behavior prior to the shooting
incident (Newman et al.). In some cases, school shooters revealed their violent thoughts through
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school writing assignments. Newman noted approximately forty percent of the shooters had
written violent essays prior to the attack.

Indicator Five
Newman et al.’s (2004) final indicator considers the potential shooter’s ability to access
guns and/or other weapons. The researcher examined the impacts of parental, peer and
community involvement. Newman et al. discussed whether the gun was accessed from a relative
and the extent of the shooter’s experience using guns prior to the shooting incident.
Newman et al.’s Approach

In testing the viability of the approach of their framework, Newman et al. (2004) relied
on several data sources: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Safe School
Initiative report by the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Department of Education. Newman et
al. also created a dataset based on prior case studies and media accounts of rampage school
shootings. Newman et al. acknowledged media reports often proved to be unreliable and
incomplete sources of information, which led the team to confirm information from additional
sources such as school, court, law enforcement, and mental health records.
By applying the model to rampage school shootings that occurred from 1974-2002,
Newman et al. (2004) concluded the five indicators were reliable in testing the validity of the
theory. Fellow researchers (Langman 2009; Levin & Madfis, 2009; Muschert 2007; Rocque
2012) have cited the resulting framework as a reliable theory in evaluating the risk of potential
rampage school shootings. Newman et al.’s model is also straight forward and direct, pointing
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out the factors school officials and their assessment teams should consider when evaluating
threats school violence.

Case Studies

A comprehensive analysis of every school shooting incident occurring over the past
century would necessitate a considerable allocation of both time and resources. Additionally, the
type of school shooting and each incident’s contextual place in time could produce varying
implications for school officials to consider. Therefore, this study focused solely on rampage
school shootings occurring in U.S. K-12 schools.
The shooting incidents reviewed in this study constitute the most serious incidents that
have occurred within the last two decades. The shooting incidents selected for review had to
have resulted in multiple victims and at least one death. All cases had to meet the same level of
standards to ensure results were consistent.
The study grouped incident information into sections to delineate the critical facts of each
shooting incident in a manner designed to allow the reader to follow without advanced
understanding of the incident(s). The following subheadings are used within each section and
will be used to code information based on Newman et al.’s (2004) framework;
1. Overview of Incident
2. School and Community Profile
3. Profile of Shooter
4. Mental Health or Social Disorder Implications
5. Access to / Experience with Firearms
6. Family Environment
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Later in this study, the researcher analyzed each shooting incident meeting the criteria
established in the methodology section. In total, twelve shooting incidents matched the criteria
and yielded a manageable and useful sample size. The researcher provided an expanded
explanation of the process used to select the twelve shooting incidents in Chapter 3.
Incident #1 Barry Loukaitis: Moses Lake, Washington (February 2, 1996)

Overview of Incident

On Friday morning, February 2, 1996, Barry Loukaitis did not attend school. Just before
2:00 p.m., he walked to Frontier Middle School wearing a wild-west outfit that included a black
trench coat (Fitten & Santana, 1997). Loukaitis entered the school through a side door carrying a
rifle and two handguns (Tizon, 1997). He entered his algebra classroom and shot and killed
fellow student Manuel Vela, his apparent primary target (Tizon). Two other classmates, Arnold
Fritz and Natalie Hintz, also were shot, along with algebra teacher, Leona Caires. Fritz was shot
in the chest and later died, while Hintz survived. The teacher, Caires, was shot in the back while
attempting to stop Loukaitis and eventually died as a result of her gunshot wounds. Classmates
implored Loukaitis to allow the wounded victims to receive medical attention. However,
Loukaitis was determined to take hostages and exit the building (Tizon).
Jon Lane, a physical education teacher, was two rooms away and heard loud noises. He
went to the algebra classroom to investigate and dove behind the teacher’s desk when he saw
Loukaitis holding the rifle (Tizon). Loukaitis directed Lane to stand up, but Lane said he was
too frightened. After convincing Loukaitis to point the rifle toward the ceiling, Lane stood up
(Tizon) and persuaded Loukaitis to take him as his hostage instead of a student. Loukaitis
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agreed to depart the school with Lane as his hostage. Subsequently, Lane was able to subdue
Loukaitis by pinning him on the ground until police arrived (Tizon).

School and Community Profile

Moses Lake, Washington, located 179 miles east of Seattle, is a small town with a
population of approximately 16,000 (Tizon, 1997). According to the 2000 census, the median
household income was $36,467 and the violent crime rate was 3.9 incidents per 1,000 residents
in the community (United States Census Bureau, 2014). In the decade prior to the shooting, the
community’s violent crime rate had increased substantially. Two violent crimes were reported in
1987, but by 1996, 289 violent crimes were reported. During this time, the community’s
economy also worsened, creating a new class of working poor (Tizon).
School data from 1996 are unavailable. Therefore, data from the earliest available school
year, 1999-2000, were used. In 1999, Frontier Middle School enrolled 650 students. The Moses
Lake School District student population was comprised of 65.6% White, 30.1% Hispanic/Latino,
and all other students (Black/African American, Asian/Pacific Islander and American
Indian/Alaskan Native) accounted for less than 6% of the total student enrollment
(Superintendent, Washington State, 1999-00). Male and female students comprised 48% and
52% of the population, respectively (Superintendent). Approximately 46.1% of the Frontier
Middle School students were eligible for free and reduced lunch, and 11.3% were eligible for
special education services (Superintendent). Historic academic data were also difficult to access,
especially at the individual school level. According to seventh grade test results, 27.6% of
Frontier Middle School students met the state’s reading, math, and writing performance
standards (Superintendent).
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Profile of Shooter

Barry Loukaitis, a fourteen-year old Caucasian male, was an only child. His family
moved to the community prior to Loukaitis’s fifth grade year (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas,
2000). Previously the family had lived in Iowa and Minnesota. Research did not indicate why
the family moved to Moses Lake, but it was not until moving to Moses Lake that signs of
Loukaitis’ social issues, such as withdrawing from peers, began to emerge (Verlinden et al.).
Loukaitis was an honor student who excelled in math. His peers described him as a shy
nerd who was bullied and teased (Kimmel & Matthew, 2003). Before the shooting, Loukaitis
submitted a poem for his English class about murdering classmates. Loukaitis also remarked to a
friend it would be “pretty cool” to carry out a killing spree similar to the one depicted in the
movie Natural Born Killers (McGee & DeBernardo, 1999 p.2).
Loukaitis’ apparent target, Manual Vela, reportedly had repeatedly teased him (McGee &
DeBernardo, 1999). However, during a police interview, Loukaitis said although he intentionally
killed Vela, he denied having been a target of Vela’s teasing. According to a classmate,
Loukaitis was bullied at school, but it was unclear whether Vela was one of the students who
bullied Loukaitis (Tizon, 1997). Loukaitis’ trial testimony indicated he had only targeted Vela
and the other deaths were accidental (Associated Press, 1996). A psychiatrist’s trial testimony
suggested Vela was a gang member. However, there was no evidence supporting this claim.
Loukaitis stated he thought Vela had nothing to live for and, therefore, he had nothing to lose if
he was killed (Associated Press).
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Mental Health or Social Disorder Implications

Verlinden et al. (2000) noted that Loukaitis became isolated and increasingly withdrawn
prior to the shooting. Two years before the shooting incident, Loukaitis began exhibiting
psychiatric symptoms, such as frequently pacing and showering multiple times daily.
Occasionally he fell asleep in the shower. During the trial, psychiatrists suggested Loukaitis may
have been suffering from an undiagnosed bipolar disorder (Wold, 1997, as cited in Verlinden et
al, 2000).

Access to / Experience with Firearms
There were firearms in the home during Loukaitis’ childhood (Verlinden, Hersen, &
Thomas, 2000). At the time of the shootings, Loukaitis was carrying 78 rounds of ammunition
and three types of firearms: a .30-30 caliber rifle; a 357-caliber pistol; and a .25 caliber pistol.
All firearms belonged to family members and were kept in the home (Fitten & Santana, 1997).
Specifics about the storage of guns was not available.

Family Environment

Terry and Joann Loukaitis owned and managed an ice cream and sandwich shop. During
the trial, it was noted the family had experienced financial stress, but it was unclear the impact
this stress had on the family’s stability (Fitten & Santana, 1997). No other information regarding
the careers of Loukaitis’ parents was available.
The Loukaitis family reportedly experienced parental conflict prior to the shooting
incident (Fitten & Santana, 1997). After moving to Moses Lake, his parents regularly had loud
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arguments in front of Loukaitis. These parental disputes often included cursing and physical
contact (Fitten & Santana, 1997). In the year prior to the shooting, Loukaitis' parents separated
after his mother discovered her husband was having an affair. She filed for divorce in January
1996 (Andersen, 1997). Mrs. Loukaitis testified she had told her son about her plan to confront
her husband and his lover, tie them up, force them to listen to how much pain they had caused
her, and then kill herself in front of them. Loukaitis made attempts to talk his mother out of this
plan. She never followed through with her threats to take her own life, but her threats led to
Loukaitis becoming sad and withdrawn in the days following her disclosure (Verlinden, Hersen,
& Thomas, 2000).

Incident #2: Evan Ramsey: Bethel, Alaska (February 19, 1997)

Overview of Incident

On February 19, 1997, just minutes before morning classes began, Evan Ramsey entered
the Bethel Regional High School lobby carrying a concealed 12-gauge shotgun (Verlinden,
Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). Ramsey chased students through the halls, eventually stopping in the
commons area where he shot and killed fellow student Josh Palacios and wounded two other
students. A teacher unsuccessfully attempted to convince Ramsey to surrender. Ramsey left the
commons area and entered the main lobby, where he shot and killed Principal Ron Edward.
When Ramsey returned to the commons area police had arrived. Ramsey fired one shot at the
police before holding the shotgun under his chin, suggesting his intent to commit suicide.
However, he did not pull the trigger. Instead, he dropped the gun and surrendered (Langman,
2009b).
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School and Community Profile

Bethel, the main port for the Kuskokwim River, is located approximately 400 miles west
of Anchorage, Alaska. Based on the 2000 U.S. Census data, the population was 5,471 compared
to the 1990 population of 4,674 (United States Census Bureau, 2014). Bethel is accessible only
by air or water. It is a rural community with only one paved road (Tizon, 2007). In 2000, the
median household income was $57,321, compared to the national average of $41,994. Bethel’s
1997 violent crime rates were not available, but in 2001, the violent crime rate was 1.5 incidents
per 1,000 residents (City-Data, 2014).
Bethel Regional High School was the largest high school in the Lower Kuskokwim
School District. According to the State of Alaska Department of Education, on October 1, 1997,
the high school enrolled 446 students, and the Lower Kuskokwim School District’s total student
population was 3,662 (State of Alaska, 2010).
The 1997-98 Alaska School Ethnicity Report showed 73% of the high school students
were Alaska Native/American Indian, 23.7% were White, and the remaining students were either
Black, Hispanic/Latino, or other (State of Alaska, 2010). During the 2009-2010 school year
(earliest available data), Bethel Regional High School male and female student enrollments were
listed at 54.5% and 45.5%, respectively (State of Alaska, 2010).

Profile of Shooter

Evan Ramsey, a 16-year old white male, was the second of three boys in his family.
When Ramsey was seven years old, his childhood became traumatic because he and his brothers
were shuffled in and out of a series of foster homes (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000).
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According to a psychiatrist hired by Ramsey’s defense attorneys, Ramsey felt humiliated and
abused as a consequence of living in foster homes (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000).
Described as an outsider, Ramsey was unpopular among his peers. His glasses and acne made
him a target of ridicule (Fainaru, 1998). When insulted, Ramsey often responded with racial
slurs. One of these encounters involved the student Ramsey later killed (Toomey, 1998b as cited
in Verlinden et al, 2000). Ramsey had an active social life that included a girlfriend. However,
prior to the shooting, the girlfriend broke up with Ramsey and her family moved out of the
community (Langman, 2009b). Ramsey’s small group of friends encouraged his antisocial
behavior toward other classmates. In fact, they helped Ramsey plan the school attack and were
later convicted as accomplices (Verlinden et al.).
A couple of years before the shooting incident, Ramsey was beaten up by a fellow
student, Josh Palacios, who was shot and killed during shooting incident. After Palacios beat up
Ramsey, his temper emerged as an issue (Langman, 2009b). For example, Ramsey once
punched a hole in the wall of his foster home. During fits of rage at school, he threw garbage
cans and pushed adults (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). During the 1995-1996 school
year, he was responsible for approximately a dozen disciplinary infractions (Langman). The
week prior to the shooting, the Dean of Students confiscated Ramsey’s CD player (Langman).
Notwithstanding this disciplinary history, Ramsey was an honor student.
Ramsey’s attack was partially related to retribution against his principal for previously
imposed disciplinary consequences on Ramsey. Ramsey murdered a popular student athlete who
had reportedly teased and picked on him (McGee & DeBernardo, 1999). Ramsey had initially
planned to commit suicide, but the suicide did not come to fruition (Fainaru, 1998). Ramsey
alerted friends of his intent to kill himself at school. Upon hearing about Ramsey’s plan, two
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friends encouraged him to kill others. One of Ramsey’s friends showed him how to use a
shotgun and along with other peers identified the people Ramsey should shoot (Langman,
2009b). Langman suggested Ramsey’s friends encouraged this shooting incident by telling him
the attack would make him famous. This goading may have triggered a murder that otherwise
would not have occurred (Langman, 2009b). Langman described this incident as “the
intersection of two issues: anger at mistreatment and envy regarding differential status”
(Langman, 2009b, p. 117).

Mental Health or Social Disorder Implications

From a young age, both Ramsey’s physical and emotional health were concerns.
Because of the poor care provided by both his mother and foster parents, Langman (2009b)
considered Ramsey traumatized (Langman, 2009b). This exploitation included the foster
parents’ biological son physically and sexually abusing both Ramsey and his younger brother.
This abuse included urinating in their mouths (Langman).
Although acknowledging preadolescent suicide was rare, Langman (2009b) reported that
when Ramsey was ten years old, he attempted to drown himself by walking into the ocean. It is
unknown whether Ramsey changed his mind or if the attempted suicide was thwarted by a third
party (Langman, 2009b). There is no indication Ramsey suffered from either psychopathy or
psychosis. Ramsey was a traumatized child who had planned to kill himself and was encouraged
and inﬂuenced by classmates to commit murder (Langman, 2009b).
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Access to / Experience with Firearms

The 12-gauge shotgun Ramsey used during the school shooting was kept in an unlocked
area near the front door of his foster home (Fainaru, 1998). Five days before the shooting,
Ramsey had unsuccessfully attempted to fire the shotgun. Thereafter, James Randall, one of the
classmates who had encouraged Ramsey to carry out the shooting, taught him how to shoot a
shotgun (Langman, 2009b). Even though Ramsey may not have fired a weapon until just prior to
the incident, he witnessed firearms at a young age, as evidenced by his father’s assault on the
local newspaper office. Mr. Ramsey’s inappropriate modeling likely provided a script for how a
gun could resolve disputes (Langman, 2009b).

Family Environment

Ramsey’s father was convicted on violent assault charges and sentenced to prison when
he was seven years old (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). Until this time, Ramsey lived
with both parents and his two brothers. After Ramsey’s father began serving his prison sentence,
his mother had a series of violent domestic partners. One winter evening during this time,
Ramsey and his brother escaped the home and school officials later found them sleeping in the
entryway of another home (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas). Thereafter, Ramsey and his brothers
separated from one another, and were placed in foster care. At the time of the shooting,
Ramsey’s foster care home reportedly lacked both supervision and family support (Verlinden,
Hersen, & Thomas).
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Limited information is available regarding the biological parents’ occupations and family
income. Due to Ramsey and his brothers often living in foster care, Ramsey likely experienced
low socio-economic living conditions.
When Ramsey was about five years old, there was a fire in the family’s apartment.
Ramsey’s father believed local politicians had been responsible for the fire (Langman, 2009b).
After the fire, Ramsey’s father submitted a letter to the editor of the Anchorage Times, but the
paper refused to print the letter. Enraged by the refusal, Mr. Ramsey went to the newspaper
ofﬁce armed with guns. Mr. Ramsey chained the newspaper building doors shut, ignited smoke
grenades, ﬁred his weapons, and took the newspaper publisher hostage. The incident resulted in
Mr. Ramsey receiving a ten-year prison sentence (Langman, 2009b).
The father’s incarceration exacerbated the mother’s alcoholism. In 1995, the mother was
cited for being drunk on a roadway. She was charged with public intoxication the following year
(Langman, 2009b). Subsequently, she lived with a series of abusive and harmful men. Because
of this disruptive home situation, Ramsey and his brothers were removed from the home. Over
the next two years, Ramsey was placed in ten different foster homes. One placement reportedly
led to at least one incident of physical and sexual abuse (Langman, 2009b).
Ramsey’s life prior to the incident was unstable (Fainaru, 1998). About a week before the
shootings, Mr. Ramsey telephoned his son and told him he would soon be released from prison.
Police arrested Ramsey’s older brother for armed robbery just prior to the attack. (Langman,
2010a).
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Incident #3: Luke Woodham: Pearl, Mississippi (October 1, 1997)

Overview of Incident

Wednesday morning, October 1, 1997, after using a knife to murder his sleeping mother,
16-year old Luke Woodham drove his mother’s car to Pearl High School. Upon entering the
school, Woodham opened fire with a hunting rifle, killing two female students, including his exgirlfriend, and wounding seven other students (McGee & DeBernardo, 1999). After the
shootings, Woodham tried to escape by returning to his mother’s car, but the road was blocked
and his attempt to drive across an open field resulted in the car becoming stuck in the mud
(Langman, 2010b). The shooting rampage ended when an assistant principal retrieved a pistol
from his own car and subdued Woodham (McGee & DeBernardo).
School and Community Profile
Pearl, Mississippi, is located in Rankin County, just outside Jackson, Mississippi. Pearl’s
population was 21,961 (United States Census Bureau, 2014). The median household income was
$37,617, below the national average of $41,994. According to the 2000 U.S. census, the
community’s violent crime rate was 9.25 incidents per 1,000 residents.
Pearl High School is Pearl Public School District’s only high school. According to the
2003-2004 Mississippi Department of Education State Report (oldest available data), Pearl High
School enrolled 975 students. The 9th grade enrollment (280) was substantially higher than the
12th grade enrollment (190), suggesting the total high school student enrollment was slightly
lower at the time of the shooting (State of Missississippi, 2014).

60
Ethnicity data for the 2003-2004 school year indicated that 74% of the students were
white, 23% were Hispanic/Latino, and the remaining 1% were Black /African American (State of
Missississippi, 2014). Male and female students were listed at 50.1% and 49.9%, respectively,
for Pearl High School (State of Missississippi, 2014).

Profile of Shooter

Luke Woodham struggled to fit in with a peer group and had difficulty interacting with
girls. His brief relationship with Christy Menefee, one of the shooting victims, reflected his
controlling and intrusive behavior (Langman, 2010b). Several of Woodham’s friends reported
his behavior was unusual and he was sometimes hard to understand (Fast, 2008).
As a sophomore at Pearl High School, Woodham was an honors student (McGee &
DeBernardo, 1999). Woodham’s teachers described him as being both odd and disagreeable, and
a few indicated they feared him (Langman, 2010b).
Woodham’s apparent motive for the shooting was the product of two factors. First, the
date of the shooting marked the one-year anniversary of Woodham’s girlfriend breaking up with
him. This chronology led to a presumption the shooting had been premeditated (Langman,
2010b). Second, Woodham reported his fellow classmates frequently picked on him (McGee &
DeBernardo, 1999). The cult Woodham belonged to, The Kroth, allegedly played a major role in
encouraging him to follow through with his plan. At his trial, Woodham testified on the day
before the shooting, Grant Boyette, a fellow cult member, had spent hours on the telephone using
insults and name calling to encourage Woodham to follow through with the attack (CNN, 1998).
The attack had reportedly been under discussion since the beginning of the school year (Hewitt,
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1997). Because of their roles in planning the shooting incident, several classmates were later
charged with conspiracy to commit murder planning the shooting incident.
Mental Health and Social Disorder Implications

According to Langman (2010), Woodham was not traumatized. Although he felt he was
picked on, he did not experience either physical or sexual abuse, as is often the case with other
school shooting perpetrators. Existing evidence suggests Woodham exaggerated his sense of
victimization (Langman, 2010b). During his childhood Woodham reportedly killed his dog by
beating her, putting her in a garbage bag, setting the bag on fire, and tossing the bag into a pond
(McGee & DeBernardo, 1999). While this incident could be described as psychopathic behavior,
Langman (2010b) suggested the abuse of the dog occurred under the guidance and influence of
Woodham’s friend, Grant Boyette. Reportedly, Woodham had never harmed a pet nor
demonstrated a pattern of criminal or violent behavior earlier during his adolescence. This led
Langman to conclude Woodham should not be classified as a psychopath (Langman).
Though inconclusive, Langman’s research (2010) suggested Woodham should be
characterized as either psychotic or a schizotypal personality. Woodham claiming he heard
voices and saw demons made it challenging to confirm a diagnosis. Schizotypal personality
disorder involves serious interpersonal difficulties, including superstition and a self-perception
the individual has powers over others (Fast, 2008). The individual may also be preoccupied with
paranormal phenomena (Fast, 2008). Langman’s suggested psychotic diagnosis was questioned
because after the murders, Woodham did not indicate demons or voices had motivated his
actions. Rather he referenced being picked on and frustrated over his ex-girlfriend (Fast, 2008).
Nevertheless, Woodham’s interpersonal struggles combined with his belief he possessed magical
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powers and his perception of being influenced by demons are recognized indicators of a
psychosis (Langman, 2010b).

Access to / Experience with Firearms

Luke Woodham and his peer group bragged about having access to assault weapons, but
it is unknown whether Woodham had access to weapons in his home (Verlinden, Hersen, &
Thomas, 2000). Woodham was interested in both weapons and war tactics and discussed these
topics with his friends (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). Woodham also had a map on a
wall in his house with the caption “One Nation Under My Gun” (Cloud/Springfield, 2001 para.
9).
Family Environment
It was unclear whether Woodham’s older brother, age 24, was living in the household at
the time of the shooting incident (Cloud/Springfield, 2001). Woodham’s parents had divorced
five years prior to the incident. Woodham lived with his mother, Mary Ann, who was 50 years
old. According to Langman (2010), information about Woodham’s family life is contradictory,
especially with respect to Woodham’s relationship with his mother. Some evidence suggests his
mother was uninvolved in his life, to the point of being neglectful. On the other hand, she has
been characterized as being overbearing and intrusive with respect to Woodham’s personal life
(Langman, 2010b). Woodham, however, felt isolated from his family. In his confession after the
shootings, Woodham said his mother frequently said he would not amount to anything and called
him stupid, fat and lazy. Police believed Woodham’s characterization of his mother exaggerated
the abuse she inflicted on him (Cloud/Springfield, 2001).
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Woodham’s father refused to speak to police and reporters about either his son or the
shooting incident (Cloud/Springfield, 2001). Woodham appeared to have a poor relationship
with his older brother and indicated he had beaten and picked on him (Cloud/Springfield, 2001).
Limited information was available about the Woodham family’s socioeconomic status.
However, McGee and DeBernardo (1999) reported the Woodham family was middle-class. Mary
Ann Woodham worked as a receptionist at a food company (Hewitt, 1997).

Incident #4: Michael Carneal: Heath, Kentucky (December 1, 1997)

Overview of Incident

On December 1, 1997, the Monday following Thanksgiving, freshman Michael Carneal
entered the Heath High School lobby at 7:42 a.m. and opened fire with a .22 caliber pistol on a
student prayer group (Moore, 2003). Earlier that morning, Michael Carneal had wrapped two
shotguns and two .22 caliber pistols in a blanket and told his family they were props for an
English project (Moore, 2003). Michael’s sister, Kelly Carneal, drove him to school. Carneal
entered the school through the back door. A teacher asked him what he was carrying and
Carneal again indicated they were props for an English project (Moore).
Carneal arrived in the lobby and walked through the prayer group consisting of 25-30
students. The prayer group assembled each morning in the lobby before classes. The group’s
membership included a cross-section of students, including athletes and band members (Moore,
2003). Carneal placed both the bundle and his backpack on the floor, put in earplugs, and
withdrew the pistol from his backpack just as the prayer group’s session was concluding
(Moore). Carneal began by slowly firing three shots and then rapidly fired five additional shots
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in an arc around the lobby, each shot hit a student (Moore). Carneal stopped shooting when he
noticed a female student on the floor covered in blood (Moore). He dropped the gun and the
student leader of the prayer group angrily approached him. Carneal pleaded for the student
leader to kill him. The principal rushed to separate the two students and took Carneal to his
office and waited for the police to arrive (Moore).

School and Community Profile

Heath, home to approximately 25,000 people, is located in McCracken County, just
outside of Paducah, Kentucky (Moore, 2003). Heath is located between the Ohio and Tennessee
Rivers and serves as a transportation hub (Moore). Heath is a small, tightly knit community
where people know each other by name (Moore). The median household income, according to
the 2000 census report, was $33,865, below the national average of $41,994. The census
reported the 2000 violent crime rate to be approximately 12.8 incidents per 1,000 residents
(United States Census Bureau, 2014).
Heath High School was considered the community hub where residents and past
graduates regularly attended extracurricular activities (Moore, 2003). With approximately 550
students, Heath was the smallest of three county high schools. The Heath High School student
body represented diverse economic backgrounds, with students on the lower end of the economic
continuum living in trailer parks and wealthy students living in million-dollar homes (Moore).
The Heath High School student body was ninety percent Caucasian, with Black, Asian,
Indians and Hispanics making up the remaining student population (Moore, 2003). Data from
2002 (earliest available) indicated male and female students were listed at 53% and 47%,
respectively (City-Data, 2014).
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Discipline issues at Heath High School were minimal, with tardiness, unexcused
absences, and classroom disruptions being the most commonly reported student transgressions
(Moore, 2003). According to the principal, school safety was not an issue. The school had an
emergency plan in place for firearms, but the plan was not designed to prevent a shooting by a
student (Moore).

Profile of Shooter

Michael Carneal was a 14-year old freshman. Although not a loner, Carneal was on the
fringe of many groups and did not have one identified peer group (Moore, 2003). While he had
friends, he lacked close friendships. This might explain his attempts to steal material items, such
as compact discs, in an effort to make friends with a group known as the Goths (Moore). The
Goths wore long black jackets and were described by Carneal’s sister as being purposefully
antisocial (Moore). The Goths rejected the high school’s recognized social order and exhibited
disdain for the school’s social norms. Heath High School administrators were concerned about
the Goths (Moore).
Carneal did not have difficulty talking to female students and, as such, was an anomaly
among freshmen boys. He had a girlfriend with whom he broke up after he became interested in
Nicole Hadley, one of the shooting victims (Moore, 2003). Apparently, female classmates’
interest in Carneal was primarily motivated by their desire to convert him to God. However,
Carneal had no interest in being converted (Moore).
Within his home setting and around his family, Carneal appeared like any other high
school freshman. While interacting in both the high school and other social circles he generally
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appeared anxious and self-conscious and often sought approval and respect from both peers and
adults (Moore, 2003).
Prior to the shooting Carneal had attended Heath High School for less than a semester.
Carneal’s small stature made him a target for bullying and teasing (Moore, 2003). However,
Carneal was not just a victim; he teased other students and was known as a prankster who sought
attention to win friends (Moore). Carneal stole items, sometimes from his family, and gave them
away in an effort to garner approval from classmates. Carneal also accessed and printed both
pornography and pages from the Anarchist Cookbook (Moore).
Teachers described Carneal as intelligent, forgetful, restless, compliant to authority, and
lacking in social skills. However, they acknowledged he did have a few friends (Moore, 2003).
Despite Carneal’s intelligence (i.e., an IQ of 120), during eighth grade Carneal received poor
grades, but his academic performance improved in the fall of his freshman year when he received
A’s and B’s (Moore, 2003). Notwithstanding this improvement, Carneal’s parents did not believe
his academic performance was commensurate with his intellectual potential (Moore).
During Carneal’s 71 days of attendance at Heath High School, he was involved in five
minor discipline infractions (Moore, 2003). Carneal used a school computer to access Playboy
magazine; chipped paint from a wall; scratched another student on the neck while they were
marking each other with pens; stole a can of food from the life skills classroom; and was found
in possession of a pair of plastic numchucks. Middle school administrators indicated Carneal did
not experience behavioral problems and were surprised to learn he was the perpetrator of a
school shooting (Moore).
Outside school, Carneal spent late night hours on the internet where he played video
games and participated in chat rooms (Moore, 2003). After the shooting incident, police seized
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Carneal’s home computer and found he had frequently visited pornographic websites (Moore).
Carneal exhibited an interest in violence. This interest included conducting research on how to
make weapons (Moore).
Carneal warned friends to stay away from the prayer group the day of the shooting,
indicating “something big” was going to happen (McGee & DeBernardo, 1999 p. 3).
Additionally, Carneal had casually discussed with his classmates how he planned take over the
school and kill others (McGee & DeBernardo). Carneal referenced a scene from the movie The
Basketball Diaries, in which the main character used a shotgun to fire at students in a school
classroom (McGee & DeBernardo). Carneal brought a .38 special pistol to school a few weeks
before the shooting, and days before the shooting he brought a .22 pistol to school in an attempt
to impress his friends (Moore, 2003). His classmates apparently were not impressed because
they told him the gun was too small. These students later reported they did not tell school
officials about the gun because they neither believed Carneal had ammunition nor thought he
would use the gun (Moore, 2003).
It is believed that Carneal’s motives were connected to his inability to live up to his
sister’s reputation for academic excellence, lack of acceptance by the Goth group, unreturned
romantic interest, and exclusion from the marching band all contributed to Carneal’s lack of
connection to the social worlds that mattered most to him (Moore). Carneal had experienced
teasing and bullying, especially after rumors suggested he had a romantic interest in another boy
in the school. The mistreatment by his peers, while hurtful to Carneal, was not considered the
true motive for the shooting incident (Moore). The shooting itself was not designed to target the
students or the social groups they represented. Instead, Carneal believed publicly asserting
power might engender respect from the various groups from which he felt marginalized (Moore).
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Mental Health and Social Disorder Implications
Prior to the shooting, Carneal’s mental illness was undiagnosed. Discovered after the
shooting incident, a history of mental illness existed on his father’s side of the family (Moore,
2003). The prosecution’s psychologists indicated Carneal was not mentally ill at the time of the
shootings; however, multiple psychologists retained by Carneal’s defense team testified Carneal
had a schizotypal personality and suffered from depression (Moore). Carneal also exhibited
paranoid behavior. He often covered the air vents with towels when he showered, believing he
was being watched (Moore). Carneal also leaped on his bedroom furniture to avoid touching the
floor because he believed assailants were hiding under the floor and would harm him (Moore).
At school, Carneal believed student prayer group members frequently talked about him and
indicated he sometimes heard imaginary voices calling him stupid (Moore).
After the shooting and Carneal’s incarceration, his treating psychologist stated Carneal’s
mental illness had developed into full-blown paranoid schizophrenia (Moore, 2003). The
psychologist also reported that after the Columbine shooting, Carneal had blamed himself for
that incident. The Columbine shooting caused Carneal to fall into a deep psychosis, and during
this period, he attempted suicide twice (Moore). The psychologist opined the Heath shootings
were partially a product of Carneal’s undiagnosed mental illness (Moore).

Access to / Experience with Firearms

Carneal became fascinated with firearms after he first learned to shoot a gun at summer
camp (Moore, 2003). His parents kept a gun in the home, and a few weeks prior to the shooting,
Carneal stole his father’s .38 caliber pistol from a locked box in his parent’s bedroom (Moore).
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Carneal reported prior the shooting he had considered using the pistol to kill himself but did not
want to harm his family (Moore). Instead, Carneal showed his classmates the gun and attempted
to sell it while at school. An upperclassman heard Carneal had the gun and threatened to tell the
police if he did not give it to him. Carneal gave the student the pistol, and although the student
told Carneal he would pay him for the pistol, the payment was never provided (Moore). Within
the Heath community access to guns was common. Carneal amassed an arsenal of nine weapons
and thousands of rounds of ammunition by stealing them from his father’s bedroom and a
neighbor’s garage (Moore).
Family Environment

The Carneal family appeared to be typical within the Heath community. Considered
genuine and giving people, Carneal’s parents frequently opened their home to their children’s
friends for meals and after-school activities (Moore, 2003).
Carneal’s older sister, Kelly, participated in several school activities. She was a member
of the choir, the marching band, and the school newspaper. Additionally, she was an outstanding
student and earned recognition as class valedictorian (Moore, 2003). As a result of Kelly’s
activities, Carneal’s parents were well-known and active within both the school and community.
Carneal’s family was very involved at their church and viewed religion as being highly valued.
(Moore).
Carneal’s mother was a homemaker, and his father made a living as an unemployment
compensation lawyer (Moore, 2003). The Heath community generally held the professions in
high regard. Mr. Carneal’s law firm was not generally perceived to be one of the community’s
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premier local firms, but nonetheless, Mr. Carneal enjoyed a reputation of being reliable and
hardworking (Moore).

Incident #5: Johnson & Golden: Westside, Arkansas (March 24, 1998)

Overview of Incident

On March 24, 1998, 11-year old Andrew Golden dressed in camouflage and pulled the
Westside Middle School fire alarm at 12:35pm, just minutes into the fifth period (Moore, 2003).
Despite at least two students telling their teachers what Golden had done, students exited the
building using their assigned emergency exits (Moore). Both Golden and 13-year old Mitchell
Johnson were hiding in a wooded location near the school. The pair fired approximately 30
rounds at nine teachers and 87 students as they exited the school wounding ten and killing four
female students and a teacher (Newman et al., 2004). It was unclear why Golden and Mitchell
stopped shooting and fled the scene (Moore). Within minutes of the shooting, police
apprehended them coming out of the woods (Moore).
Earlier that morning, both Golden and Johnson were absent from school (Moore, 2003).
Johnson told his mother that his step-father had promised him a ride to school, but his step-father
had already left for work. Golden’s parents, who had left for work, assumed Golden would catch
the bus on his own, as was his routine (Moore). Instead, Johnson drove a van and picked up
Golden. They parked the van on a cul-de-sac one half-mile from the school and walked to the
wooded area near the school property (Moore). It is believed the boys had planned to do the
shooting during lunch recess, but rain during the previous night resulted in the cancellation of
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outdoor recess. This cancellation prompted Golden to enter the school and pull the fire alarm
(Moore).
School and Community Profile

Westside, with a population of 55,000, is located near Jonesboro in the northeast part of
Arkansas (Moore, 2003). Situated 130 miles from Little Rock, Westside is located in the Bible
belt, and the community is proud of its religious roots (Moore). The area has a thriving economy
with rich farmland, diverse manufacturing, and quality service and retail sectors (Moore). People
generally believed Jonesboro was a great place to live (Moore).
According to the 2000, U. S. Census Report the median household income was $32,896,
below the $41,994 national average. As of the 2000 census, the violent crime rate was listed at
approximately 3.73 incidents per 1,000 residents.
Formed in the late 1960s, Westside School District included the consolidation of the
Bono, Cash, and Egypt communities. The elementary, middle and high school buildings are
located on one large property (Moore, 2003). Westside Middle School had approximately 250
students during the 1997-98 school year when the shooting occurred. The total school district
student enrollment was 1,600 students (Moore). The school district student population was
comprised primarily of Caucasian students, most of whom were middle-class and Christian.
Approximately 33% of the student population qualified for free or reduced school lunch
(Moore).
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Profile of Shooters

Mitchell Johnson was reportedly not popular among his peers, but he did have friends
and was very close to his younger brother (Moore, 2003). Often teased about being overweight,
Johnson was sensitive about his appearance (Moore). Johnson bullied others, frequently picked
fights and was often beaten up by his peers for talking too tough (Booth, Schwartz, & Mencimer,
1998). He bragged about smoking marijuana and being part of a gang (Jeter, 1998). Johnson
talked about bringing a gun to school, but it is unknown if he ever brought a gun to school prior
to the shooting incident. He once threatened another student with a knife (Verlinden, Hersen, &
Thomas, 2000). However, Johnson had an interest in the Bible and regularly attended Central
Baptist Church in Jonesboro (Moore, 2003). He enjoyed music, including singing in the church
choir on the weekends (Moore). He also participated in athletics, including baseball, basketball,
and football (Moore).
According to Westside teachers, Johnson was an above-average student who earned A
and B grades (Moore, 2003). Many Westside employees described Johnson as a charming,
polite and respectful student who received commendations for his good behavior and had earned
a reputation as a real pleaser (Moore).
Conversely, Johnson was described by one of his teachers as sneaky and manipulative
(Heard, 1998a as cited in Verlinden et al, 2000). Johnson’s record of prior school behavior
incidents included fighting with peers, angry outbursts, threatening others, and arguing with
teachers. Johnson expressed high levels of anger when receiving school discipline. The teacher
who was killed in the shooting had placed him in school suspension just prior to the incident
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(Jeter, 1998). Johnson was suspended a total of three times during the school year prior to the
shooting (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000).
Angered over a recent school suspension, Johnson wrote an essay about shooting
squirrels. In retrospect, the essay could have been interpreted as a veiled threat to his peers
(Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). At that time, Johnson’s girlfriend rejected him and ended
their brief relationship. The day before the shooting, he had openly discussed shooting her and
killing everyone else in the school building (Associated Press, 1998c as cited in Verlinden,
Hersen & Thomas, 2000). Many of his peers heard these threats but did not take them seriously
(Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). In hindsight there were signs indicating Johnson was
angry, sad, and feeling desperate; however, he lacked someone either at home or at school to
notice and respond to these warning signs (Moore, 2003).
Andrew Golden had a short temper and a vulgar mouth (Jeter, 1998). Golden typically
wore camouflage outfits and had a hunting knife strapped on his leg. At school, he once shot
another student in the eye with a popgun loaded with sand (Harris, 1998 as cited in Verlinden et
al., 2000). During the trial neighbors reported Golden had sometimes struck little girls and used
obscene language when interacting with both children and adults. Golden often threatened his
peers at school (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000).
Although Golden had friends, he was not considered popular at school. He was an
average student, described as being apathetic about his grades (Moore, 2003). Golden often
earned A’s and B’s but also had been placed in remedial math and reading classes while in
elementary school (Moore).
Golden did not receive a suspension and school discipline was not a problem (Moore,
2003). Similar to his father, Golden had a reputation as a class clown (Moore). Overall, Golden
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blended into the middle school scene and was known for being polite and often having a smile
on his face (Moore).
A potential warning sign occurred in October 1997 when a student reported he had told
his father about Golden’s threat to bring guns to school to kill people (Moore, 2003). This
student and his father both indicated they informed a Westside school counselor about Golden’s
threat. School officials stated the only reported threat did not involve killing others, but rather
the possibility of Golden harming himself (Moore). When the counselor asked Golden about his
reported comments, he stated he was only kidding. Golden’s mother told school officials she
would discuss the matter with her husband and said they kept all guns in the house locked up
(Moore). No further action was taken and school officials denied a threat was reported to them
involving either Johnson or Golden (Moore).

Mental Health and Social Disorder Implications

Mitchell Johnson had talked about killing himself since he was ten years old. About a
year before the shooting incident, Johnson had received psychiatric counseling (Moore, 2003).
When he was in elementary school, he reportedly was sexually abused by an older neighborhood
boy (Moore). At the time of the shooting, charges of sexually molesting a two-year old girl were
pending against Johnson (Moore). Johnson was classified as a traumatized youth and Golden was
considered to be psychopathic (Langman, 2009b). During the trial, attorneys did not raise
concerns of mental illness for Golden or Johnson (Moore). Psychological evaluations were
performed while the trial was in progress; however, evaluation findings were not released
(Moore).

75
Johnson’s and his father continued their troubled relationship after he moved to the
Jonesboro area (Moore, 2003). Trips to Minnesota to see his father at Christmas and during the
summer created a substantial amount of anxiety for both Johnson and his brother. Most of these
visits did not go well, with his father often threatening to send him home early (Moore). During
one trip, Johnson and his younger brother became stranded in a Chicago bus terminal due to
weather issues. Two days passed before anyone realized where the boys were (Moore). One
month prior to the shooting, Johnson’s father caught him charging hundreds of dollars on his
father’s credit card for call sex-talk lines. His father was furious and threated to move Johnson
back to Minnesota (Moore). After this incident Johnson spiraled downward emotionally and
reportedly felt hopeless, stating there was no point in living any longer (Moore).
There is not sufficient information to suggest why Golden participated in the shooting
(Moore, 2003). Golden had a reputation as a menace who was cruel to animals in his
neighborhood. Peers may have teased Golden at school, but nothing indicated severe bullying or
harassment during his time at Westside (Moore).

Access to / Experience with Firearms

Both Golden and Johnson had access to firearms and both were fascinated with weapons
and violence (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). Golden began using handguns and rifles at
the age of six and his father trained him to shoot moving targets (Harris, 1998 as cited in
Verlinden et al., 2000). A photograph of Golden as a toddler shows him dressed in camouflage
and posing with a rifle. Members of the Golden family were gun enthusiasts and their home
served as the Jonesboro Practical Pistol Shooters Association’s office (Moore, 2003).
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Just prior to the shooting, Johnson and Golden broke into Golden’s grandfather’s house
and stole three rifles and four handguns from a wall gun rack. The boys used cable cutters to
access the guns (Moore, 2003). They also took three other unsecured guns from Golden’s father
(McGee & DeBernardo, 1999).

Family Environment

Johnson was born in Minnesota and lived for a short time in Kentucky prior to moving to
Bono in 1995 (Newman et al., 2004). While in Minnesota, Johnson’s parents worked long hours,
resulting in Johnson’s grandmother often watching him and his younger brother. While in the
care of his grandmother, an older boy in the neighborhood reportedly repeatedly sexually
assaulted Johnson (Moore, 2003). Johnson never told anyone because the attacker threatened to
kill his grandmother. However, he felt shame as a result of this abuse and feared that if his father
found out, he would be angry (Moore). Johnson’s father was known to have an explosive
temper. He had frequent fits of rage and punched holes in the walls of his home. However, he
reportedly did not physically abuse his sons (Moore).
Golden was born in Jonesboro and had lived with both of his parents since birth
(Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). His father, Dennis, had lived his entire life in Jonesboro
as well and had gone to school with many of Andrew’s teachers (Moore, 2003). Golden’s
parents both worked as postmasters in a nearby town and were perceived by others in the
community as hard-working (Moore). Neighbors reported Golden’s parents often left him home
alone due to working long hours (BBC News, 1998 as cited in Verlinden et al., 2000). Golden
was his parents’ only biological child. However, he had two half-siblings from his mother’s
previous marriage. The Golden’s were avid hunters, and Andrew learned how to shoot before
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turning six years old (Moore). No additional information could be found regarding the Golden
family’s socioeconomic status.
Johnson’s biological father, Scott, worked long hours in a meat packing plant in
Minnesota (Moore, 2003). His father held an irregular work pattern and had been convicted for
theft. Two years prior to the shooting, Johnson lived in Westside with his mother Gretchen and
her new husband, Terry Woodard, who worked at a heavy equipment hauling company (Moore).
Terry earned enough money so Johnson’s mother, a former prison guard while in Minnesota,
could stay home and raise Johnson and his younger half-sister (Moore). Their home and
earnings were modest but sufficient (Moore).
Johnson’s parents separated when he was eight years old due to escalating conflict in the
household. A year later they divorced (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). Johnson and his
younger brother dealt with substantial disagreement among their parents over where the boys
should live (Verlinden et al.). At one point during the divorce, both boys lived with their
grandmother for a few months. During this time, they slept on either a couch or the floor (Booth,
Schwartz, & Mencimer, 1998). Following the divorce, Johnson’s mother moved and began
working long hours as a federal prison corrections officer. She eventually met and married one
of the prison inmates (Associated Press, 1998b, as cited by Verlinden et al. 2000). Johnson’s
family life consisted of conflict, inconsistent guidance and supervision, and parental antisocial
conduct (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). Being his parents’ only biological child, Golden
was the center of their world (Moore, 2003). Prior to the shooting Golden’s half-siblings left the
home to live with other relatives (Moore).
Although Johnson and Golden’s family backgrounds were quite different, the two shared
the characteristics of a Jekyll and Hyde personality (Moore, 2003).

78
Incident #6: Andrew Wurst: Edinboro, PA (April 24, 1998)

Overview of Incident

On April 24, 1998, Andrew Wurst attended a school dinner-dance with approximately
240 other students at a banquet hall located just south of his middle school (Moore, 2003). Prior
to leaving his home, he wrote a suicide note and departed with his father’s pistol (Langman,
2009b). Approximately 20 minutes before the end of the dance, science teacher John Gillette
asked Wurst and several other students to come inside from the banquet hall’s patio area. As
Gillette walked inside, Wurst fired the pistol twice (Moore). The first shot hit Gillette in the
face, and the second shot hit the teacher in the back. Gillette died (Moore).
One of Wurst’s friends was standing nearby. Wurst reportedly told him not to worry and
assured him he would not be shot (Moore, 2003). Wurst proceeded into the banquet hall calling
out for a student named Eric Wozniak. The school principal told Wurst, Eric was not present.
Wurst threatened to shoot the principal, but instead he approached the dance floor (Moore).
Frightened classmates yelled and scurried to take cover. Wurst warned his classmates to
keep quiet or someone else would die (Moore, 2003). Wurst fired two more shots hitting a
teacher and a student and then approached a student named Justin Fletcher who was known to be
one of the toughest students in the eighth grade (Moore). Fletcher told Wurst if he was going to
shoot anyone else, he should shoot only him and leave everyone else alone (Moore). Wurst fired
a shot and the bullet grazed Fletcher’s shirtsleeve before hitting another classmate in the foot.
Wurst fled on foot with the banquet hall owner in pursuit with a shotgun. The owner subdued
Wurst and held him until the police arrived (Moore).
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School and Community Profile

Edinboro is located 18 miles south of Erie, Pennsylvania, and was home to just under
7,000 people (United States Census Bureau, 2014). Edinboro is a middle to upper middle class
community with a relatively large percentage of professionals compared to the surrounding rural
area (Moore, 2003). Edinboro is known to be a good place to raise a family and is generally
considered classic small town America (Moore, 2003). Edinboro is also home to Edinboro
University, with an enrollment of approximately 8,000 undergraduate and graduate students
(Moore).
The median household income according to the 2000 census report was $26,652, below
the national average of $41,994 (United States Census Bureau, 2014). The cost of living was
considered both low and affordable (Moore, 2003).
The 2000 census reported the community’s violent crime rate to be 1.7 incident per 1,000
(United States Census Bureau, 2014). According to the Edinboro Police Department, there had
been a large increase in drug violations between 1994 and 1998 (Moore, 2003); however, a
survey indicated Wurst’s school, Parker Middle School, had fewer drug violations than the
national average (Moore).
Parker Middle School is within the General McLane School District. The school district
served the borough of McKean, Franklin Township, McKean Township and Washington
Township and had a reputation for academic excellence (Moore, 2003). In October 2000,
Parenting Magazine ranked the General McLane School District as one of the nation’s top 100
school districts (Moore). The school district’s math and writing scores exceeded those of
Pennsylvania schools within the same socioeconomic grouping (Moore). According to the
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Pennsylvania Department of Education during the 1998-99 school year, Parker Middle School
served approximately 900 students in fifth through eighth grades (Moore, 2003). Class sizes
were lower than the state average, and attendance rates were above the state average (Moore).
Prior to the shooting incident Parker Middle School had not experienced major student
disciplinary problems. Student cliques existed within the school, but no more than typically
found in other middle schools (Moore, 2003). The General McLane School District was among
nine area school districts that shared a single resource officer assigned by the Pennsylvania State
Police (Moore). In 1998, the McLane School District did not receive a visit from the State
trooper (Moore).
Approximately five years prior to the shooting incident, the fifth grade assimilated into
Parker Middle School. Parent interviews reported a decreased level of contact and interaction at
Parker than had previously occurred at the elementary school level (Moore, 2003). Wurst’s
eighth grade class contained approximately 50 more students than the other grade levels at
Parker Middle School (Moore).

Profile of Shooter

Andrew Wurst was average size for an eighth grade male student. He had worn glasses
since the second grade and had talked about getting contact lenses (Moore, 2003). He liked
sports but was not athletic and wished he was stronger so he could help his dad by working in his
father’s landscaping company (Moore). His grades slipped as he entered the eighth grade when
he received mostly D and F grades (Moore).
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Wurst enjoyed reading Stephen King novels, watching television, playing computer
games, and listening to heavy metal music. Marilyn Manson and Nine Inch Nails were among
his favorite bands (Moore, 2003).
The Wurst family was Catholic; Andrew Wurst attended religious classes at his church
but did not go to services. After the shooting incident, Wurst told a psychiatrist he did not
believe in either God or Satan (Moore, 2003). Wurst dated a classmate until about three months
before the shooting when she broke up with him (Moore). He had long telephone conversations
with her after school that resulted in high phone bills. Wurst indicated the break up only slightly
bothered him (Moore). Wurst admitted he regularly drank alcohol but stated he did not become
drunk. He reported occasional marijuana use starting during eighth grade (Moore).
Wurst received poor grades and showed a lack of interest in school (Salters, 1998 as cited
in Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). Wurst did not fit in among his peers because his dark
interests and threats of violence isolated him from his classmates (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas,
2000). Notwithstanding his social and academic problems, Wurst did not have a disciplinary
record and there was no indication he was bullied (Moore, 2003). His science teacher described
Wurst as reserved but indicated he was not a loner. Overall, prior to the shooting Wurst was not a
student who raised concerns among his teachers (Moore).
Wurst did not have a history of violence or bullying, nor did he display outbursts of
anger. His grades were poor, but he did not have school disciplinary problems. Wurst’s
behavioral changes prior to the incident did not raise concerns with either his parents or school
staff. Wurst reportedly argued with his parents over his grades during the week prior to the
shooting and told his parents the teacher he eventually killed had embarrassed him at school
(Hays, 1999a as cited in Moore, 2003).
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The timing of the incident followed the national news media’s coverage of a succession
of similar school shooting incidents. Wurst was familiar with these incidents and talked
regularly with his friends specifically about the Westside, Arkansas, shooting incident suggesting
someday he might be responsible for a similar school shooting (Moore, 2003). The Westside
incident may have provided the script Wurst employed for carrying out his attack (Moore).
In the year preceding the shooting, Wurst formed a new group of friends and began using
the nickname of Satan. Some of Wurst’s friends refuted this portrayal saying Wurst was not a
loner and recalled they called him “Brown Bag” referring to the reusable bag he brought for
lunch (Moore, 2003 p. 86)
Prior to the attack, Wurst made multiple references to the possibility of a shooting at the
upcoming dance. Most students interviewed indicated Wurst’s sick sense of humor was the
reason they failed to notify either their parents or school officials of Wurst’s remarks (Moore,
2003 p. 82). Preceding the shooting Wurst’s classmates had opportunities to intervene. Wurst
bragged to the student that he was carrying a gun. While in the bathroom at the dance, a fellow
classmate declined Wurst’s invitation to feel under his shirt where the weapon was concealed
(Moore). Additionally, several of Wurst’s friends showed concern about his erratic behavior and
surrounded him on the patio just prior to the shooting (Moore). However, none of these students
notified a chaperone or a school official (Moore).

Mental Health and Social Disorder Implications

Prior to the incident, Wurst did not take any medications and was not receiving treatment
from a physician (Moore, 2003). Robert L. Sadoff, a well-known forensic psychiatrist, examined
Wurst after the shooting incident and concluded he suffered from “a major mental illness with
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psychotic thinking and delusions of persecution and grandeur” (Moore, pp. 74-75). Dr. Sadoff
indicated these conditions necessitated both medication and long-term inpatient treatment
(Moore).
Wurst reported he regularly took an hour or two to fall asleep and at times had
nightmares of monsters chasing him (Moore, 2003). Wurst’s mother confirmed most nights she
left a light on in his bedroom and looked in the closet and checked under his bed to help her son
fall asleep (Moore). Additionally, until he was nine years old Wurst’s brothers teased him for
frequent bed-wetting (Moore).
Wurst indicated he had suicidal ideations when he was ten years old, often thinking about
hanging or shooting himself, but he was never able to follow through with these ideations
(Moore, 2003). On the night preceding the shooting incident, Wurst reportedly planned to kill
himself. During an interview with the forensic psychiatrist, Wurst indicated he had no reason to
kill Mr. Gillette, and he shot at Justin Fletcher only because he had been staring at him. Wurst
stated he had no issues with Eric Wozniak and his motivation for calling out his name was a
backup plan anticipating Wozniak would kill him if he did not kill himself with a single bullet
shot (Moore). Following the incident, Wurst told the psychiatrist he had feared being shot but
not killed and did not want to be in a coma (Moore).
Wurst reported prior to the shooting he often heard voices. He believed people were like
robots, programmed to have different personalities and levels of intelligence (Moore, 2003).
Wurst had delusions and felt that people were only real in his presence. When people physically
left his location, Wurst believed they ceased to exist (Moore). For example, Wurst stated killing
Mr. Gillette was not wrong because he was “already dead or unreal” (Moore, p. 77). Wurst
recalled he began first having these thoughts when he was eight years old following an incident
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when he became caught between two swings and lost consciousness. Wurst also told his
psychiatrist he had returned from the future with a mission to prevent something terrible from
happening (Moore).
Dr. Sadoff’s post-incident psychiatric evaluation noted Wurst was too young to be
labeled a schizophrenic, but he manifested pre-schizophrenic ideations. Dr. Sadoff also opined
Wurst was psychotic at the time of the shooting and neither understood nor appreciated the
wrongfulness of his behaviors.
Two months after Dr. Sadoff’s examination, John S. O’Brien, Erie County prosecutor,
stated Wurst did not manifest symptoms of any major psychiatric illness or possess delusional
disorders (Moore, 2003). O’Brien further suggested that while Wurst’s history of emotional
distress indicated “depressed moods with aggressive and suicidal ideation,” Wurst was
competent to stand trial (Moore, p. 79). Moore noted the conflicting opinions in cases such as
Wurst’s were not uncommon. Moore explained, psychiatrists observing individuals possessing
delusional characteristics often noted the individual being observed at times demonstrated
normal behaviors but would reveal their true selves to those who were not likely to show
disapproval. This may account for Wurst having shared his perspective in one manner with Dr.
Sadoff and in a different manner with O’Brien (Moore). While there are varying expert opinions
regarding whether Wurst was legally insane, Moore (2003) observed “there is little doubt that
Andrew Wurst was mentally ill” (p. 97).
Wurst’s parents indicated they were not aware of their son’s suicidal thoughts prior to the
shooting, but following the shooting, they noted his behavior had changed in the months leading
up to the incident (Moore, 2003). Mrs. Wurst reported her son lost his enthusiasm and appeared
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emotionally flat. Mr. Wurst said he had never seen his son angry, but before the shooting, he had
a dark look and appeared to be daydreaming (Moore).
A history of depression was reported on both sides of the Wurst family (Moore, 2003).
Additionally, Mr. Wurst’s sister had been previously placed in a psychiatric hospital in nearby
Warren (Moore).

Access to / Experience with Firearms

Wurst was reportedly fascinated with guns and death. He was a fan of music with lyrics
about killing and death (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). The gun used in the shooting
attack belonged to Wurst’s father who kept the pistol and a box of bullets in his unlocked dresser
drawer. Wurst seemingly discovered the pistol one afternoon while his parents were at work
(Moore, 2003).

Family Environment
Wurst had two older brothers, ages 19 and 16. Both were from Mr. Wurst’s previous
marriage and neither of these siblings were actively involved in Wurst’s life. Mr. Wurst owned
and operated his own landscaping business and typically worked long hours seven days a week
(Moore, 2003). Mr. Wurst was considered a strict disciplinarian, but no evidence of abuse or
neglect existed (Moore). Wurst’s mother was twenty years younger than her husband. She was
described as a typical mother who was very involved in her children’s lives (Moore). As the
children became older, she returned to working at the nursery in the afternoons. This resulted in
Wurst regularly spending time alone after school (Moore).
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At the time of the shooting, tension existed within the Wurst household. This tension was
evidenced by Mr. and Mrs. Wurst’s frequent fights in front of the children (Moore, 2003). The
parents moved into separate bedrooms three years prior to the shooting (Moore). Wurst’s friends
were aware of his unhappiness about his parent’s issues (Moore). Apparently, Wurst was the
focal point of the parents’ frequent arguments. The father did not believe Wurst worked as hard
as his other sons (Moore). Mrs. Wurst defended her son and this caused conflict with her
husband. Mr. and Mrs. Wurst often disagreed over disciplinary consequences for Wurst
(Moore). Confirming her previously held suspicion, Wurst’s mother caught him drinking
whiskey in the home with friends (Moore, 2003). One of Wurst’s brothers reportedly caught him
smoking marijuana in the home and beat him up but did not tell the parents (Moore).

Incident #7: Kip Kinkel: Springfield, Oregon (May 21, 1998)

Overview of Incident

On Monday, May 21, 1998, just prior to the start of the school day 16-year old Kipland
“Kip” Kinkel opened fire on his classmates in the Thurston High School cafeteria (Verlinden,
Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). The attack killed two students and left 25 others injured. After
Kinkel’s arrest, police discovered his parents had been murdered the previous day (Verlinden,
Hersen, & Thomas).
The day before the shooting, Kip Kinkel purchased a stolen gun from another student.
The stolen gun had been reported to the police, and a detective came to the school to question
students (PBS, 2000). Other students named Kinkel and when questioned by the detective he
admitted the gun was in his locker. Both Kinkel and the student who sold him the gun were
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escorted off the premises in handcuffs, arrested and suspended from school pending an expulsion
hearing (PBS).
Kinkel received a stolen weapon felony charge. Detective Al Warthen questioned
Kinkel, who was reportedly scared and worried about what his parents would think (PBS, 2000).
Kinkel’s father picked him up at the police station at around 11:30am. Kinkel’s confession
revealed that after arriving home from the police station at approximately 3:00pm he secured a
.22 rifle from his room, took ammunition from his parents’ room, went down stairs to the kitchen
and shot his father in the back of the head (PBS). Kinkel’s mother arrived home at
approximately 6:30pm. Kinkel recounted he had met his mother in the garage. After telling her
he loved her, Kinkel shot her twice in the back of the head, three times in the face and once in
the heart (PBS).
Kinkel left his house the next day at 7:30 a.m. dressed in a trench coat and armed with a
backpack full of ammunition, three guns, and a hunting knife taped to his leg (PBS, 2000). He
drove his mother’s Ford Explorer, parked one block from the school, walked on a dirt path to the
back school parking lot, and entered the building at 7:55 in the morning (PBS).
Kinkel walked to the cafeteria where he shot two students, emptied the remainder of a 50
round clip of a .22 caliber semi-automatic rifle, and fired one shot with a 9mm Glock handgun
before being wrestled to the ground by five students (PBS, 2000). Officers arrived shortly after
8:00 a.m., and the police took Kinkel to the Springfield police station. While locked in an
interview room, Kinkel accessed the knife he had previously taped to his leg and when a
detective entered the room, he rushed at him with the knife shouting for the detective to shoot
and kill him (PBS). The detective backed out of the room and closed the door. Kinkel sat down
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and attempted to use the knife to cut his wrists. At that point, the detective entered the room with
another detective and subdued Kinkel with pepper spray (PBS).
School and Community Profile

Springfield, Oregon, is located in Lane County five miles outside of Eugene, Oregon.
The 2000 census reported Springfield’s population to be 52,800 (United States Census Bureau,
2014). The median household income was $33,031, below the national average of $41,994. The
2000 census reported the violent crime rate was 12.9 per 1,000 (United States Census Bureau).
Data from the 1999-2000 school year was used to gather demographic information about
the school district. Springfield School District 19 included 26 schools and had a total student
enrollment of 11,062 in kindergarten through 12th grade (Oregon Department of Education,
1999-00) Thurston High School served 1,465 of those students. Thurston High School’s
enrollment consisted of 5.3% minority students compared to the School District’s 10.3% overall
minority enrollment and the State’s 18.1% minority student population (Oregon Department of
Education, 1999-00)
Approximately 16.4% of Thurston High School students were eligible for free and
reduced lunch. Springfield School District and State of Oregon free and reduced lunch eligible
percentages were more than double Thurston’s rate at 39.9% and 34.2%, respectively (Oregon
Department of Education, 1999-00).
Student performance data were available for Thurston High School 10th grade students in
reading, writing, math, and math problem solving categories. Thurston High School students
scored slightly below the State in reading and writing assessments and slightly above the State in
math categories (Oregon Department of Education, 1999-2000).
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Profile of Shooter

Kinkel was a member of the football team but rarely played as a result of his poor attitude
that was manifested by Kinkel cursing at his coaches (Dodge, 1998, as cited in Verlinden et al.,
2000). Kinkel was suspended from school multiple times as a consequence of behaviors such as
kicking a student in the head, throwing a pencil at a classmate, and bringing a gun to school
(Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). Prior to the shooting incident Kinkel’s parents told their
friends he had recently started hanging out with the wrong crowd at school (Dodge, 1998, as
cited in Verlinden et al., 2000).
Kinkel was also upset with his parents because they planned to send him to a residential
facility for students with conduct disorders (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). Kinkel’s
declining grades also compounded tension in the Kinkel household prior to the shooting (Dodge,
1998, as cited in Verlinden et al., 2000). Kinkel’s interest in violence and weapons coupled with
communications about his violent intentions should have alerted others that his threats should
have been taken seriously (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). However, Kinkel’s lack of
positive relationships with peers decreased opportunities for others to attempt to prevent the
shooting (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000).
In English class, Kinkel routinely read from his journal about his plans to kill his fellow
classmates (Green & Filips, 1998, as cited in Verlinden et al, 2000). Although he shared details
of his plan to kill people, fellow students did not take him seriously because they had become
accustomed to this type of talk (Green & Filips, 1998, as cited in Verlinden et al, 2000). On the
day of the shooting Kinkel was upset and embarrassed over being suspended the previous day,
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and some classmates believed Kinkel was angry and might do something stupid (Verlinden et al,
2000).
Neighborhood children reported Kinkel bragged about killing and torturing animals. For
example, he talked about beheading cats and displaying the heads on sticks and using explosives
to blow up a cow (Green 1998, as cited in Verliden et al, 2000). Kinkel engaged in activities
such as covering neighborhood houses with toilet paper, throwing rocks at cars from an overpass,
and giving a friend a tool to break into cars (Channel 6000, 1998a). Additionally, Kinkel
enjoyed music and videos portraying graphic violence (Green & Filips, 1998, as cited in
Verlinden et al, 2000).

Mental Health and Social Disorder Implications
Middle school classmates once voted Kinkel “Most Likely to Start World War III”
(Kaiser & Haynes, 1998) His coping and social skills were subpar, and his peers noted Kinkel’s
bad temper and odd sense of humor (Channel 6000, 1998a). Kinkel had a reputation for
alternating between being a class clown and being socially withdrawn (Brandon, 1998, as cited
in Verlinden et al., 2000).
Kinkel resisted authority and was frequently involved in fights with other students
(Brandon, 1998 as cited in Verlinden et al. 2000). He was an oppositional child who struggled
socially from an early age (Brandon, 1998 as cited in Verlinden et al. 2000). Kinkel’s history of
angry outbursts dated back to age five. As an adolescent, doctors diagnosed him with depression
and prescribed Prozac (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000).
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Kinkel stopped taking Prozac eight months before the attack because his parent believed
his behavior had improved (Langman, 2009b). Kinkel described the summer he was on Prozac as
the best summer he ever had (2009b).

Access to / Experience with Firearms

Firearms and explosives were easily accessible to Kinkel within his home. His parents
had full knowledge of their son’s firearms and even bought some of the guns for him as gifts
(King & Murr, 1998, as cited in Verlinden et al, 2000). Peers were aware of Kinkel’s fascination
with guns because he had previously talked about suicide, and on one occasion, he gave a class
presentation about how to build a bomb (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000).

Family Environment

Kinkel was the youngest child of Bill and Faith Kinkel. Kinkel had one older sister who
excelled both academically and socially. Both parents were teachers who worked to provide
structure and educational enrichment opportunities at home but struggled with their son’s
behavioral issues (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). Kinkel’s sister told friends her parents
had given up attempting to discipline her brother.
Kinkel’s behavior wore his parents down (Barnard, 1998, as cited in Verlinden et al.,
2000). The parents attempted to channel Kinkel’s fascination with explosives and weapons by
buying him guns and training him how to shoot properly (Brandon, 1998, as cited in Verlinden et
al., 2000). While abuse was not a problem in the Kinkel household, the large number of
weapons and bombs he accumulated and dispersed around the home should have been cause for
concern (Channel 6000, 1998b). At the time of the shooting, Kinkel was angry because his father
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had confiscated some of his guns. However, the father relented and gave one of the guns back to
his son so he could shoot bats in the attic (Kaiser & Haynes, 1998). Kinkel’s father told others
he had never been able to get close to his son. Kinkel did not believe his parents were
supportive. However, community members generally viewed the parents as being conscientious
and concerned (Brandon, 1998, as cited in Verlinden et al., 2000).

Incident #8: Eric Harris & Dylan Klebold: Columbine, CO (April 20, 1999)

Overview of Incident

On April 20, 1999, 17-year old Dylan Klebold and 18-year old Eric Harris carried out an
attack on Columbine High School. Harris and Klebold had planned the attack during the
previous year (Salvatore, 1999). On the morning of the attack, Harris and Klebold used large
duffel bags to bring two bombs into the school and placed the bombs near tables in the cafeteria
where the school’s athletes usually sat. The twenty-gallon propane tank bombs were attached to
a detonator and set to ignite at 11:17 a.m. Harris and Klebold assembled the bombs the day
before the attack (Larkin, 2007). Both boys parked their cars in the school parking lot. Harris
parked in the junior student parking lot, and Klebold situated himself in the senior lot. These
positions were both located at forty-five degree angles from the building’s south entrance and
were selected because both locations allowed Harris and Klebold to shoot fleeing students
without either of them being at risk of being shot in the anticipated cross-fire (Larkin). Both
students’ cars were also set to explode later in the day at a time when it was anticipated
emergency responders would be in the parking lot (Larkin).
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Harris and Klebold both wore combat boots and black trench coats to conceal the
numerous weapons they carried (Larkin, 2007). Klebold wore a black t-shirt inscribed with the
word “Wrath” and was armed with an Intratec TEC-DC-9, a 9-mm semiautomatic handgun,
slung over his shoulder and concealed under his trench coat (Larkin). In his cargo pants,
Klebold, carried a partially concealed cut down Stephens 12-gauge double-barreled shotgun
(Larkin). Harris’s t-shirt read “Natural Selection.” Strapped under Harris’ coat was a cut down
Hi-Point 9-mm carbine rifle (Larkin). He also carried a duffel bag containing a Savage
Springfield 12-gauge pump shotgun, ammunition, and a variety of explosive devices (Larkin).
Both students carried multiple knives, including a nine-inch kitchen knife, a dagger, and two
combat knives (Larkin).
At 11:19 a.m., the bombs had not yet detonated. As a result, Harris and Klebold revised
their attack plan and met at the stairs leading to the west entrance of the school. One of the boys
yelled “Go, go!” (Larkin, 2007 p. 3). This triggered the shooting attack. When two students
exited the building to eat lunch on the lawn, Harris and Klebold opened fire killing one of the
students and seriously injuring the other. Harris and Klebold continued to shoot students outside
the school who had gathered in the “smoker’s pit” and on a nearby grassy incline (p. 3). A
police officer was dispatched at 11:22 a.m. and pulled into the south parking lot. Upon seeing the
officer, Harris opened fire. The officer returned fire and Harris and Klebold both fled inside the
school where they wandered the halls haphazardly firing at students and staff (Larkin, 2007). At
11:29 a.m. the pair stopped at the library entry doors. A library staff member told the students
who were in the library to hide under the desks as she called 911 (Larkin). Harris and Klebold
shouted for the athletes to stand up telling them, “Today is your day to die” (p. 6). When no one
stood up, Harris said, “Fine then I’ll just start shooting” and fired his shotgun across the counter
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(p. 6). Klebold shot and killed a student at close range. Harris and Klebold then shot at fleeing
students and the police through the library window. When police returned gunfire, Harris and
Klebold backed away from the window and began shooting people who were inside the building
(Larkin).
Over the next seven or eight minutes, ten students were killed and twelve were injured
(Larkin, 2007). Shortly after 11:35 a.m. Harris and Klebold left the library and began randomly
firing into empty classrooms. However, at times they did nothing when they saw students hiding
(Larkin). They walked to the cafeteria and attempted to ignite the propane bombs they had left
in the duffle bags. After failing to detonate the bombs, they returned to the library at
approximately noon. In the library both Harris and Klebold committed suicide, shooting
themselves in the head. Their suicides ended the shooting rampage after approximately forty-five
minutes (Larkin). However, the police were unaware Harris and Klebold were dead and did not
secure the building and grounds until nearly five hours later. Overall 12 students, one teacher,
and both Klebold and Harris died, while 24 other students suffered life-threatening wounds
(Cullen, 2003). The Columbine rampage is not only the deadliest attack included in this study; it
also lasted significantly longer than any of the other researched rampage school shootings.

School and Community Profile

Columbine, Colorado, is located in Jefferson County, 11 miles outside of Denver. In
2000, Columbine had a population of 24,000 (United States Census Bureau, 2014). The median
household income was $71,319, above the national average of $41,994 (United States Census
Bureau, 2014). The violent crime rate was 4.2 per 1,000.
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Columbine was unincorporated and, according to Larkin (2007), had no collective
identity. Media reports often incorrectly referred to the location of the shooting as Littleton since
it was a nearby town. Columbine High School was the community’s unifying force (Larkin).
Columbine was described as “God’s country” and was considered openly and
aggressively religious (Larkin, 2007 p. 17). Columbine was a relatively new community, being
the product of urban sprawl that began in the 1970s (Cullen, 2003). At the time of the shooting,
over 90 percent of the community was white, five percent was Hispanic and the remaining
residents were classified as Asian, black, or other (Larkin).
Columbine High School was part of the Jefferson County School District that included
148 schools in Jefferson County and portions of the County of Broomfield. During the 19992000 school year, Columbine High School served approximately 1,900 students in grades 9-12
(Colorado Department of Education, 2015). The high school boasted high performing academic
programs, but the school’s visibility derived primarily from its athletic programs, particularly
football (Larkin).

Profile of Shooters

Harris was small as a child; born with physical defects, a doctor treated him for leg issues
more than a dozen times prior to his second birthday. According to Langman (2009b), these
medical problems at a young age impacted Harris’ identity and resulted in him having feelings of
shame and inadequacy. Harris also had a sunken chest that required surgery when he was twelve
years old (Langman, 2009b). To attempt to resolve the depressed appearance of Harris’ chest, a
steel piece was inserted for six months. The results of this procedure were not entirely
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successful. Langman indicated the chest appearance was a significant issue for Harris because
he believed this part of his body was an indicator of manliness.
Notwithstanding these physical issues, Harris had multiple groups of friends during both
middle and high school (Langman, 2009b). He enjoyed an active social life and both boys and
girls liked him. Less than two weeks before the attack a group of Harris’ friends had taken him
out to celebrate his eighteenth birthday (Langman).
Harris was a bright student who took pride in the recognition he received he from his
teachers (Langman, 2009b). However, Harris had poor spelling skills. This deficiency caused
him to be self-conscious. His image of himself as an individual with a superior intellect who
could not spell evoked feelings of insecurity and vulnerability. As a result, he rejected the
importance of spelling, describing this skill as “stupid” (Langman, 2009b, p. 27).
In contrast to Harris, Klebold was tall and thin and considered to be shy (Langman,
2009b). As a youth, Klebold lived in a home located in a canyon with few neighbors in the area.
As a result, Klebold was physically isolated from other children. Play dates had to be scheduled
for Klebold to have opportunities to socialize with other children (Larkin, 2007). In third grade,
Klebold entered into a gifted program. This placement further distanced him from other students.
While Klebold had friends and participated in recreational sports such as baseball and soccer, he
struggled to make new friends (Larkin). The middle school Klebold attended drew its students
from several district elementary schools. As a result, Klebold’s transition to middle school
required adjustment to an altered set of peer groups. His shy and immature nature made it
difficult for Klebold to adapt (Larkin). Klebold participated in recreation league sports that were
considered secondary to the Columbine Sports Association. His participation in recreation
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league sports likely partially contributed to his perceived low status in the middle school
(Larkin).
As a result of being the child of a religiously mixed marriage, Klebold struggled with his
identity. Harris idolized Hitler and was not aware of Klebold’s Jewish heritage until just weeks
before the shooting incident (Larkin, 2007). This seemingly did not impact on the boys’
relationship and did not change Klebold’s behavior as he embraced Harris’s anti-Semitic beliefs.
For example, during a bowling class Klebold shouted, “Heil Hitler” when he bowled a strike
(Larkin).
Klebold’s teachers described him as being easily agitated and prone to overreacting to
small irritations. One teacher recalled Klebold transformed from being a shy and intelligent
ninth grader into a “repugnant character” and a “slacker” (Larkin, 2007, p. 141). Klebold wrote
about violence in assignments for English class. Klebold’s writings were influenced by his
fascination with Charles Manson and his belief that oppressed students needed to revolt against
bullies (Larkin). Klebold perceived his peers rejected him. As a result, he evolved from having
no reputation among his peers to being a person fellow students viewed negatively (Larkin). In
school social interactions, Klebold generally responded negatively to his peers. For example, if
he was bumped into or jostled in the hallway, he threatened to kill others (Wilgoren & Johnson,
1999 as cited in Verlinden et al. 2000). Peers considered Klebold to be a clumsy, oafish,
immature nerd, who was “less than a nobody” (Larkin, p. 144).
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Mental Health and Social Disorder Implications
According to Langman (2009b), Harris was a psychopath. Harris’ paranoia was
characterized by an “intense fear of losing identity and, more importantly, powers of selfdetermination” (p. 34). Harris was preoccupied with status and hated people he felt had any
degree of control over him. At the time of the shooting, a doctor diagnosed Harris with
depression and prescribed him Luvox. However, planning for the attack pre-dated the Luvox
prescription (Langman). Harris stopped taking Luvox shortly before the shooting. Harris also
drank bourbon whiskey. Whiskey consumed with Luvox creates a risk of severe agitation
(Briggs & Blevins, 1999, as cited in Verlinden et al., 2000). Harris was known for his short
temper and threats to kill others. He had narcissistic and sadistic traits that supported Langman
classifying him as a psychopath.
While others did not like Klebold, he likely did not like himself either (Larkin, 2007).
Langman (2009b) believed Klebold had a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder characterized by
psychotic symptoms ranging from strange thoughts and abnormal obsessions to delusions and
hallucinations. Langman (2009b) explained that the symptoms of schizophrenia-spectrum
disorder could include a lack of emotional expression and often resulted in feelings of isolation
and a lack of intimate relationships. Langman further suggested Klebold had an avoidant
personality disorder, a socially debilitating and exaggerated form of shyness characterized by
fear of rejection, inadequacy and social anxiety (Langman). Klebold sought peer acceptance but
never felt like he achieved it (Langman). He felt lonely and depressed and was preoccupied with
finding love (Langman). Langman noted Klebold’s “extreme insecurity” was noticeable because
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he was not isolated (p. 53); to the contrary, many boys and girls liked him and he experienced an
active social life.
Klebold’s social anxiety and loneliness led to deep depression and suicidal ideation. He
self-mutilated, also known as cutting (Langman, 2009b). Klebold believed others’ achievements
were things he could never do, and he believed God had persecuted him. Klebold’s detachment
from reality culminated with his poor self-perception and feelings of pre-destined doom
(Langman). In his journal, Klebold described himself as a devalued human form who also had a
separate form that was more God like (Langman). Langman described Klebold as “an enigmatic
killer” (p. 50).
Klebold first met Harris in middle school when Harris’ family moved to the area from out
of state. The friendship apparently evolved as a result of their mutual lack of status among their
peers (Larkin). Others described Klebold and Harris as “outsiders who were pushed to the fringe
of high school society” (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000, p. 40). Klebold and Harris
regularly endured taunts and slurs from the popular students. Columbine administrators were
aware of the taunting directed at the so-called “trench coat mafia,” a group to which Klebold and
Harris were thought to be members (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, p. 40). The trench coat
mafia was considered to be a small antisocial group that held pro-gun views and was against
religion, society, and minorities (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas). Klebold and Harris both
wanted to be part of this group and had friends who were members, but characterizations of their
affiliation were inaccurate and were due to the fact they dressed similarly to members of the
Trench Coat Mafia (Cullen, 1999). Regardless of Klebold and Harris’ actual social affiliations
within Columbine High School, school officials took no action to mitigate the bullying (Collins,
2007).
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Both Harris and Klebold felt rejected and persecuted by their peers and, as a result,
sought refuge with others who shared similar feelings. They played the video game Doom, a
game where a lone marine’s objective was to save the human race by eliminating subhuman
monsters (Larkin, 2007). They may have viewed themselves in a role similar to the lone marine
and believed vanquishing their classmates was a mission to save the human race (Larkin).
Harris aspired to become a Marine. In fact, a recruiter interviewed Harris the week prior
to the shooting. However, Harris’ parents informed the recruiter their son was taking Luvox.
The parental disclosure created a discrepancy in Harris’ application resulting in the Marine Corp
rejecting him (Achenbach & Russakoff, 1999 as cited in Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000).
The rejection devastated Harris (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000).
Klebold and Harris had prior incidents with the law. A year before the attack, Klebold
and Harris were arrested for breaking into a car and placed into a youth diversion program
(Cullen, 2009). The police also received reports on Klebold and Harris for igniting pipe bombs.
Additionally, a complaint was filed with the local sheriff against Harris because of internet
postings threatening a classmate with death.
Klebold and Harris were frequently in trouble at school as well. Klebold received a
suspension for hacking into the school’s computer system and defacing a student’s locker
(Langman, 2009b). On another occasion, Klebold and Harris vandalized the school and stole
computer equipment (Langman). Additionally, both Harris and Klebold worked on a school film
production portraying themselves shooting down athletes in the school hallways (Wilgoren &
Johnson, 1999, as cited in Verlinden et al., 2000). Klebold and Harris warned classmates they
would no longer tolerate being harassed and threatened, “We are going to shoot you” (Verlinden,
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Hersen, & Thomas, 2000, p. 40). Although their peers believed Klebold and Harris were capable
of a violent attack, they did not know Klebold and Harris planned go through with their threats.
Harris’ diary indicated he and Klebold had begun planning the attack a year in advance.
An extensive planning process was believed to have occurred as a map of the school with notes
on lighting conditions and potential hiding places was found (Verlinden et al., 2000). Klebold
and Harris observed the school lunchrooms to determine the time when the greatest number of
students occupied the cafeteria.
Together, Harris and Klebold formed a personality capable of violence (Larkin, 2007).
Harris was bright, social, articulate and attractive. Klebold believed he had a swagger and felt
tough when he was around Harris. Harris enjoyed that Klebold acted like his disciple. Klebold
validated Harris’ anger and hatred and reciprocated these feelings (Larkin). According to several
FBI profilers, neither Harris nor Klebold could have acted alone to carry out the shooting; each
needed the other’s reinforcement (Larkin). Together they created an alternative world, a
contradiction to reality, in which they were god-like avengers of social injustice (Larkin). Larkin
(2007 p. 63) summarized Klebold and Harris’ motives by stating, “Even though Eric drew up a
hit list, their primary target was the peer structure, the secondary target was the community at
large, and the tertiary target was American society.”
Access to / Experience with Firearms

Harris and Klebold loved rock music that glorified killing and death, and both were
fascinated with violent video games, war, and military paraphernalia (Verlinden, Hersen, &
Thomas, 2000). Harris and Klebold were fascinated by weapons and spent a significant amount
of the time preceding the attack practicing with weapons (Larkin, 2007).
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One of Harris’ friends provided the duo access to firearms (Verlinden et al., 2000).
Harris and Klebold acquired their weapons at a local gun show (Cullen, 2009). Their initial
attempt to buy guns was unsuccessful because they did not have valid identification to make the
purchase. Thereafter, Harris sought out Robyn Anderson, a classmate who was reportedly
infatuated with Klebold to purchase the guns on their behalf (Cullen). She bought three guns. In
December, Klebold and Harris sawed the barrels off the shotguns and used them for target
practice. Mark Manes, a drug dealer who ran a gun business on the side, also purchased a gun
for Harris and Klebold in January (Cullen). A couple of months later Manes bought 100 rounds
of ammunition for them at Kmart. Manes was later sentenced to six months in prison for his role
in the incident (Larkin, 2007).
Because Harris and Klebold were able to amass and store a large amount of weaponry in
both of their bedrooms, parental supervision of their activities was presumed to be lacking
(Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). Since the attack was planned to include a large scale
bombing rather than simply a shooting, the pair spent time familiarizing themselves with
explosives. Harris posted pipe bomb making instructions on the Internet and kept bomb making
components in his bedroom (Verlinden et al., 2000).
Family Environment
Harris’ parents appeared to have a good life. The family of four included Harris’ older
brother, who was three years older. Both brothers were bright and successful in school
(Langman, 2009b). The Harris’ were a middle-class family with no known incidents of violence,
child abuse, or parental alcoholism (Langman).
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Wayne Harris, a military man, moved his family several times. This may have been a
stressor in Harris’ childhood. Harris complained about being pulled away from friends and
indicated how difficult it was for him to start over in new communities (Langman, 2009b). Prior
to relocating to Jefferson County, Colorado, in 1993, Harris’ father was stationed at eight
different bases in Kansas, Ohio, Michigan, and New York. In Colorado Harris’ father obtained a
job with the Flight Safety Services Corporation in nearby Englewood (Larkin, 2007). Harris’
mother was employed as a part-time caterer, but when her children were young she was a stayat-home mom. Both of Harris’ parents had been raised in the area, so for the parents Jefferson
County was a return to a familiar place (Larkin). The Harris family was described as a loving
family and considered to be good neighbors (Larkin).
Klebold was also the second son in a family of four children. Like the Harris family, the
Klebold’s first son was three years older than Dylan Klebold (Larkin, 2007). Mr. and Mrs.
Klebold were originally from Ohio but moved to Englewood, Colorado, before the boys were
born (Larkin). Unlike Harris, Klebold spent his entire life in Southern Jefferson County.
The Klebold’s marriage was not without problems. Mr. Klebold came from a Protestant
background, and Mrs. Klebold was Jewish (Larkin, 2007). As a result, the family celebrated
both Jewish and Christian holidays (Culver, 1999 as cited in Larkin, 2007). During a postshooting interview Mr. Klebold stated he was not in favor of celebrating Jewish holidays, but he
acquiesced because his wife insisted (Larkin). Mr. Klebold apparently had a problem with
organized religion, and the family had not attended church in the five or six years prior to the
shooting (Larkin).
Mr. Klebold worked from home and enjoyed spending time with his children. However,
the relationships within the family were not nurturing (Larkin, 2007). Klebold and his brother
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fought regularly. His parents lacked warmth and were not expressive with their feelings for their
children (Larkin). Klebold’s choice in friends, clothing, interests, and rebellious behavior
created conflict between him and his parents (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000). Although
conflict was frequent in the Klebold home, the parents were not physically violent (Larkin).
Despite the reports of frequent conflict in the household, post-shooting testimony described the
parents as a stable, loving couple (Langman, 2009b).

Incident #9: Charles Andrew Williams: Santee, California (March 5, 2001)

Overview of Incident
On March 5, 2001, freshman Charles “Andy” Williams entered Santana High School in
Santee, California. At around 9:20 a.m. Williams joined friends and other students arriving for a
late start of their school day in the Santana High School quad, a campus gathering spot (Gold &
McDermott, 2001). Williams entered a bathroom stall (just off the quad) with a yellow backpack
containing a .22 caliber pistol (Dickey, 2013). After loading the pistol, Williams opened the
bathroom stall door. He recognized two students at the urinals and shut the stall door. He reopened the stall door and once again closed the door. After a few seconds, Williams opened the
stall door and fired at 14-year-old freshman Bryan Zukor and 17 year-old junior Trevor Edwards.
Next, he wounded student teacher, Tim Estes, while others in the bathroom fled (Dickey). A
school security officer entered the restroom to investigate and Williams shot him three times.
Williams reportedly reloaded the pistol, left the bathroom and fired at groups of students outside
the restroom (Dickey). He reloaded the pistol four times, firing 40 rounds of ammunition. In
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approximately six minutes, Williams killed two students and wounded 13 other individuals
before surrendering to police (Dickey).

School and Community Profile

Santee, California, is located in San Diego County, 10 miles outside of San Diego.
Santee was home to approximately 52,000 people as of the 2000 US census. The median
household income, according to the 2000 census report, was $53,624, above the national average
of $41,994. As of the 2000 census, the violent crime rate in the community was listed at 2.4 per
1,000.
Santana High School was part of the Grossmont Union High School District in San Diego
County and served approximately 1,900 students in grades 9-12. At the time of the shooting
Santana High School comprised one of 12 schools in the Grossmont Union High School District
(Grossmont Union School District, 2015).
Santana High School served primarily Caucasian students, as 84.0% of the students
identified their race as White, 9.2% as Hispanic, and 2.0% Asian, 1.3% Black, and the remainder
were identified as either Filipino, American Indian, Pacific Islander, or no response/multiple
ethnicities (Ed-Data, 2000-01).

Profile of Shooter

Williams grew up in Brunswick, Maryland, home to approximately 5,700 residents
(Langman, 2014a). His parents divorced when he was four years old, and Williams remained in
Brunswick with his father. After the divorce, Williams’ older brother lived with his mother.
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However, at the time of the shooting, his brother lived in Georgia, while his mother lived in
South Carolina (Langman).
According to his brother, other kids picked on Williams in Maryland. However, most
accounts indicated peers and adults liked Williams (Langman, 2014a). Williams had a
reputation as a class clown, an athlete, and an honor roll student. His former guidance counselor
described him as a typical adolescent (Langman). However, away from school, Williams had a
reputation as a “mischievous prankster” (p. 4). He reportedly jumped off roofs, acted as a
daredevil and experimented with drugs, including cocaine. Williams and a friend reportedly set
fire to a wooded area, which required a fire department response. As a result of this behavior, at
least one mother prohibited her son from playing with Williams.
In December 1999, Williams moved with his father from Maryland to Twentynine Palms,
California (Langman, 2014a). The transition apparently went well, and both his peers and school
officials embraced Williams’ funny and sarcastic attention-seeking personality (Langman).
However, less than two years later Williams and his father moved to Santee, California. The
move to Santee occurred just months prior to the shooting (Langman).
Upon moving to Santee, Williams’ behavior changed as he became acquainted with a
group of troublemakers (Langman, 2014a). Years after the shooting, a reporter followed up with
Williams’s Santee friends and found two of his closest friends were serving time in prison (one
for unknown reasons and the other for murder) and a third had died at age 23 while on parole.
Williams was short, skinny, and pale. Williams claimed others tormented and bullied
him during his time at Santee. Classmates reportedly called him “anorexic” and “albino”
(Langman, 2014a p. 7). Classmates indicated peers called Williams a faggot and burned him
with cigarette lighters (Langman). Williams’ friends, some of whom were accused of bullying
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him, claimed others exaggerated the extent. One peer explained, “all of us joke around with each
other, it’s a thing we do…it’s kind of all of us showing our love” (Langman, p. 6). Several
classmates characterized Williams as a popular, well liked, funny, and happy student who did not
appear to be on the receiving end of chronic harassment (Langman). Evidence of others bullying
Williams was inconclusive.
While living in Santee, Williams performed poorly academically and his school
attendance was an issue. In October 2000, the school informed Williams’ father his son’s grades
were falling. Additionally, the school informed Mr. Williams his son received several detentions
and was often either tardy or skipped school (Langman, 2014a).
Three days prior to the shooting, Williams’ drama teacher reprimanded him for not being
prepared for class. Although Williams indicated he planned his attack after this reprimand,
reports revealed he had begun talking about the shooting well in advance of this incident with his
teacher (Langman). Williams talked about his plan to attack the school with several classmates.
When they questioned him, he reportedly responded by saying “I’m just messing around”
(Langman, 2014a, p. 3). Because of Williams reputation as a jokester among his friends, many
did not believe he would follow through with it; notwithstanding his claim that one day he would
“pull a Columbine” (p. 3). Friends thought he was joking but were concerned enough on the
morning of the shooting that they had patted him down before school to see if he had a gun
(Langman). The gun was in his backpack, and his friends did not check there. While as many as
20 students were alerted to Williams’ intentions, this information was never communicated to an
adult (Figueroa & Rogers, 2005 as cited in Langman 2014a).
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Mental Health and Social Disorder Implications
Twelve years after the shooting, Williams claimed the boyfriend of one of his mother’s
friends sexually abused him (Langman, 2014a). He reported many of his friends suffered similar
abuse. However, none of these claims were substantiated (Langman). Langman (2014a) did not
view Williams as a traumatized youth, but rather classified him as a psychopathic shooter,
providing examples of this psychopathic behavior such as substance abuse, truancy, theft, lying
and dishonesty. While living in Santee, Williams and his friends reportedly paid a 12-year-old
girl to steal a bottle of tequila. Williams, after becoming drunk, allegedly either molested the girl
or attempted to do so (Langman).
Williams’ behavior both during and immediately following the shooting were described as
calm and casual (Langman, 2014a). Those who observed Williams during the shooting recalled
he was smiling. After police took Williams into custody, Deputy Jack Smith stated he “never
chaperoned a boy so expressionless – almost to the point of nonchalant” (p. 5).

During

interrogations, Williams showed no signs of remorse (Langman).

Access to / Experience with Firearms

Firearms were present and used legally by the Williams family (Langman, 2014a). His
mother and other family members had served in the military, and his father once worked for the
Naval Medical Center in San Diego (Langman, 2014a). Williams reportedly had expressed
interest in joining the Navy and wore a U.S. Navy sweatshirt on the day of the shooting.
Williams stole his dad’s key to his gun case to access a .22 revolver and bullets (Dickey,
2013). Years after the shooting Williams told his psychiatrist he had not intended to hurt anyone
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and claimed he thought .22 bullets could not kill anyone (Langman, 2014a). Williams’ statement
seemed unusual considering his experience with firearms (Langman). Langman noted Williams
had attended a gun safety class, shot skeet, and hunted with his father. Immediately following
the shooting, Williams stated in an affidavit he had “considered that he would be hurting people
and that he might be punished for this behavior but had decided to do it anyway” (Langman, p.
2).

Family Environment
Williams lived with his father following his parents’ divorce (Dickey, 2013). His mother
and half-brother moved out of state shortly after the divorce. Williams’ mother served in the
military, and as a result, he reportedly saw her infrequently, typically at Christmas (Dickey). Mr.
Williams was believed to be a loving and supportive father, and Williams reported he had
enjoyed a normal childhood with loving parents (Dickey). When Williams moved to
Twentynine Palms, California, he lived near his grandparents. This provided him with additional
structure and values (Dickey).
Williams left Twentynine Palms for Santee when his father accepted a job as a
laboratory-animal technician at the San Diego Naval Medical Center (Dickey, Killer recounts
Santana High School Shooting, 2013). While Mr. Williams was a supportive father, his son did
not avoid the temptations attendant to living in a single parent home. Many hours of Williams’
day were unsupervised and spent using drugs and drinking alcohol with his friends (Dickey).
Mr. Williams planned to move with his son again to a nearby location (Langman, 2014a).
Despite his claims of others bullying him at school, Williams requested to continue attending
Santana High School (Langman). The day before the shooting, Williams visited his new home
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and appeared to be pleased. His father recalled his son smiled and calmly picked out the
bedroom he wanted (Langman).

Incident #10: Jeffrey Weise: Red Lake, Minnesota (March 21, 2005)

Overview of Incident

The setting of this incident is unique as compared to others reviewed in this study. This
rampage shooting is distinguished by having occurred on an Indian Reservation closed to outside
or uninvited residents (Sevcik, 2005). The town operated under the authority of tribal law,
including the police and emergency responders (Sevcik).
On March 21, 2005, 16-year-old Jeffrey Weise stole his grandfather’s .22-caliber gun and
used it to kill both his grandfather and the grandfather’s girlfriend (CNN.com, 2005). Weise
then drove to Red Lake High School with his grandfather’s police-issued shotgun, two handguns,
and a protective vest. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Weise entered the school via an entrance
equipped with a metal detector where he shot and killed an unarmed security guard (CNN.com).
Weise forced his way into a classroom where he shot and wounded seven students and killed five
students and one teacher (Newman & Fox, 2009). Weise continued the rampage into the school
hallway. Four Red Lake tribal council police officers responded and Weise fired upon them.
One of the police officers fired a shot that struck Weise. Thereafter, Weise retreated into a
classroom where he ended the rampage by shooting himself in the head (CNN.com, 2005).
Weise had spent less than ten minutes inside the school according to FBI special agent Michael
Tabman (CNN.com, 2005). However, when the rampage ended Weise injured seven people and
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ten, including Weise, were dead. As a result, the Red Lake shooting became the deadliest school
shooting since Columbine High School (Newman & Fox, 2009).

School and Community Profile

Red Lake, Minnesota, is located in the remote region of Red Lake County, 109 miles
northeast of Fargo, North Dakota, and 240 miles northwest of Minneapolis. Red Lake is
geographically isolated, with the closest town being Bemidji, Minnesota, 30 miles away (Sevcik,
2005). At the time of the shooting, the Red Lake Indian Reservation was home to just over
5,000 Native Americans (Newman & Fox, 2009). The Red Lake Indian Reservation consisted of
880 square miles of land and was home for members of the Chippewa band of the Ojibwa tribe
(Newman & Fox). Red Lake received little federal aid and was one of only two Indian
reservations in the nation classified as closed, meaning no one other than Ojibwas lived on the
reservation (Sevcik). Police, courts, and all crimes other than murder or capital offenses were
handled within the tribal community (Sevcik).
According to the 2000 census, the median household income for reservation families was
$23,224, well below the national average of $41,994 at that time. As of the 2000 census, the
violent crime rate in the community was listed at 1.4 per 1,000.
Red Lake Senior High School was home to approximately 300 students during the
2004-2005 school year and was part of Red Lake School District #38. The school served the
Indian reservation; therefore, ethnicity data for the 2004-2005 school year showed 100% of the
students were Native American (Pioneer Press, 2015). Seventy-seven percent of the students
were eligible for free and reduced lunch subsidies. Student proficiency on the Minnesota
Comprehensive Assessment was in the lowest quartile in all academic areas (Pioneer Press).
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Profile of Shooter

Weise, a 16-year-old Native American, was six-foot-tall and weighed 250 pounds
(Newman & Fox, 2009). Mr. Weise’s death and mother’s impairment had resulted in him being
shuffled between many schools throughout his childhood (Langman, 2015). Due to changes in
living circumstances, Weise attended two schools during his fourth grade year and a different
school for fifth grade before moving to the Red Lake Indian Reservation (Langman, 2014b). He
failed eighth grade and the school held him back. He was both physically larger and older than
his sophomore classmates (Newman & Fox). Weise considered himself a loner, but classmates
thought Weise and his cousin Louis Jourdain constituted a “tight, but marginalized clique”
(Newman et al. & Fox, 2009 p. 1290). Weise and his cousin dressed in black and had spiked
and/or dyed hair and preferred heavy metal music in contrast to their classmates who preferred
country or rap music (Burcum, Shah, & Collins, 2005).
Weise was well spoken and enjoyed reading classic literature (Wilgoren, 2005). Weise
frequented the internet where he created and published violent animated videos depicting blood
and his own suicide (Davey & Harris, 2005, as cited in Newman & Fox, 2009).
Some believed Weise might have used the rampage as the means of achieving fame and
notoriety that had eluded him (Newman & Fox, 2009). Weise and Jourdain played out school
shooting scenarios over a yearlong period prior to the attack, discussing potential logistics and
repeatedly watching movies depicting the Columbine rampage (Channen, Louwague, Meryhew,
& Von Sternberg, 2005, as cited in Newman & Fox 2009). Weise shared disturbing drawings of
violent shootings with classmates and posted comments on the Internet under his real name.
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These postings discussed weapons and violence, including a claim that he had lived as a German
soldier during World War II in a past life (Johnson, 2005).
Weise spent considerable time selecting a date to enact the assault. He considered April
20 since it was the anniversary of both the Columbine massacre and Adolf Hitler’s birthday
(Newman & Fox, 2009). Weise also considered prom night and the first day of school since
these were times the school would be crowded.
Weise had threatened to shoot up the school on the fifth anniversary of the Columbine
shooting. Because of this threat, the school canceled afterschool activities and police
investigated Weise, but was cleared of charges related to the threat (Newman & Fox, 2009). As
many as 39 people received advanced warning of Weise’s potential attack, but no one alerted the
authorities (Newman & Fox).

Mental Health and Social Disorder Implications

Weise had suicidal ideations. During the summer prior to the shooting, Weise attempted
suicide and entered a psychiatric facility (Hufstutter, 2005). A month before the attack, Weise
had been barred from attending Red Lake High School due to an incident with a teacher and
concerns about his medical condition (Hanners, 2005 as cited in Langman 2009b). A doctor
prescribed Prozac, but it is not clear if Weise was taking the medication at the time of the attack
(Langman, 2009b). The impact of the Prozac on Weise was inconclusive (Langman). In January
of 2005, Weise became depressed, noting in one of his web postings, “I’m living every man’s
nightmare and that single fact alone is kicking my ass, I really must be (expletive) worthless”
(Langman, 2015, p.75).
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Access to / Experience with Firearms
The weapons used in the rampage shooting belonged to Weise’s grandfather who was a
police officer on the Ojibwa reservation. Weise accessed his grandfather’s .22-caliber gun in
order to murder grandfather and the grandfather’s girlfriend (CNN.com, 2005). Research did not
indicate where the weapons and ammunition were stored, nor was it clear if Weise had
previously fired a gun prior to the shooting incident. Weise also accessed his grandfather’s
police-issued shotgun, two handguns, and a protective vest which he used in the shooting
rampage (CNN.com).

Family Environment
Weise’s parents never married, and when he was three months old, Weise lived with his
father, Daryl Lussier, Jr., on the Ojibwa reservation in Red Lake, Minnesota (Langman, 2009b).
When he was three years old, Weise began living with his mother Joanna Weise. Mrs. Weise lived
in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and was reportedly an abusive alcoholic (Langman). During Weise’s
youth, his mother and the men she became involved with physically abused him (Zenere, 2005).
Joanna Weise subsequently bore two additional children with another man, Timothy DesJarlait. It
was unclear whether or not Weise permanently lived with them for any period of time (Langman).
When Weise was eight years old, his father committed suicide during a police standoff.
During this same time period, Weise’s mother was involved in a serious car accident and
sustained a severe brain injury that resulted in her living in a rehabilitation facility (Langman,
2009a). Following the incident, Weise’s stepfather left with Weise’s step-siblings, leaving
Weise on his own and his mother incapacitated (Hanners as cited in Langman 2009b). Weise
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was forced in and out of foster care placements for several years. Weise eventually lived with his
maternal grandfather and his female companion; however, at the time of the shooting he was
living with his paternal grandmother (Langman, 2009b).
Weise’s closest family member and friend was his cousin Louis Jourdain. After the
attack, law enforcement discovered emails between Weise and Jourdain revealing their
discussions of a larger scale attack on the school (Newman & Fox). Because of this discovery,
police arrested Jourdain and charged him for his role in planning the attack.
Incident #11: Thomas “T.J.” Lane: Chardon, Ohio (February 27, 2012)

Overview of Incident
On the morning of February 27, 2012, 17 year-old Thomas “T.J.” Lane rode the school
bus to Chardon High School. Lane entered and exited the bathroom three times as he considered
shooting students (State v. Lane, 2014). At 7:30 a.m., he entered the cafeteria where students
were eating breakfast and waiting for the start of first period classes. Lane wore a long-sleeve
pullover shirt emblazoned with large bold letters reading “Killer” (State v. Lane, 2014). Lane sat
down at a table and watched a group of eight or nine students talking to each other. He
continued to watch the students as he moved to a table directly behind the group of students and
placed his book bag on the table. A few minutes later Lane pulled a .22 caliber handgun and a
knife from his bag (State v. Lane, 2014). He rose and began shooting the boys at the table, while
students fled the cafeteria. Lane shot four boys at the table. Lane also fired at two other students
as a teacher chased him from the building. Three students were killed, one student was
paralyzed, and two others were injured in the rampage (State v. Lane, 2014).
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A deputy on patrol in the area was advised of the shooting, and at approximately 8:30
a.m., he spotted Lane sitting near a car on the side of the road about a mile from the school with
his knife and gun. The deputy read Lane read his rights. Thereafter, Lane told the deputy he had
just shot people at the high school.

School and Community Profile

Chardon, Ohio, is located in Geauga County, 25 miles outside of Cleveland, Ohio. It was
home to approximately 5,000 people in 2012. The median household income, according to the
2000 census report, was $46,074, above the national average of $41,994. The violent crime rate
in the community was listed at 1.8 per 1,000.
Chardon High School served grades 9-12 and enrolled approximately 1,100 students
during the 2011-12 school year. Chardon was the only high school in the Chardon School
District, which served kindergarten through grade twelve (State v. Lane, 2014). Approximately
96% of the students were Caucasian, with Hispanic, Black, and Asian races making up the
remaining 4% (U.S. News & World Report, 2015). Students eligible for free and reduced lunch
represented approximately 19% of the student body. Male and female students were listed at
49% and 51%, respectively.

Profile of Shooter

Lane had attended Chardon High School for the first half of ninth grade before
transferring to Lake Academy, an alternative high school (State v. Lane, 2014). Lake Academy
provided students the option of working while enrolled in school. Lane took the bus to Chardon
High School each day, where he waited in the cafeteria for about 30 minutes until another bus
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came to transport him to Lake Academy (State v. Lane, 2014). Lane described himself as being
more mature than other students his age. He indicated during the 11th grade, he was enrolled in
12th grade courses and that he had planned to graduate from high school early, attend college,
and study psychology (State v. Lane, 2014).

Mental Health and Social Disorder Implications

Following the shooting, Lane underwent a psychological exam and his answers were
reportedly deceitful. During a post-shooting competency evaluation, Lane stated he heard voices
and experienced delusions (State v. Lane, 2014). During a follow-up competency exam
conducted by a different psychologist, Lane admitted he had previously lied about hearing voices
and experiencing delusions. He also admitted to other fabrications, such as never having
experienced anxiety, confusion, or depression. Lane acknowledged his claim of being sexually
abused was also false. Lane stated he could force himself to cry when necessary to convince
school staff he was depressed (State v. Lane, 2014). The second psychologist concluded Lane
had invented these symptoms to avoid prosecution. The second psychologist concluded Lane
showed no signs of either a mental condition or defect.
Lane did not offer a motive for the rampage shooting, but research reviewed for this
study revealed possible reasons. Lane’s sister, Sadie, told the media in November, their 19 yearold half-brother, Adam Nolan, had died and the family struggled to cope (Pinckard, 2013).
Another potential motive may have been connected to one of the victims who reportedly was
dating Lane’s ex-girlfriend at the time of the shooting (Langman, 2015). Following the incident,
Lane did not reference either of these occurrences as potential motives.
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Lane claimed he had neither experienced problems with any of his victims nor had he
been bullied or provoked (State v. Lane, 2014). Lane claimed the shooting victims had been
randomly chosen and he did not know them. Two of the victim’s parents refuted this claim,
stating their sons had socialized with Lane.
According to Lane, he first considered going on the shooting rampage two weeks prior to
the attack. Lane felt he needed to “accomplish something” and believed once conceptualizing
the attack he was committed to follow through (State v. Lane, 2014, p. 6). Counter to the other
incidents included in this study, there was no evidence indicating Lane had shared his plan to
attack the school with any of his friends or classmates (Langman, 2015).

Access to / Experience with Firearms

The night before the shooting, Lane loaded a magazine into the gun and packed two
additional magazines into his school backpack. Lane claimed he had stolen both the gun and
ammunition used in the shooting from his uncle the day before the attack (State v. Lane, 2014).
Other reports indicated Lane had stolen the gun and ammunition from his grandfather, with
whom he lived (State v. Lane, 2014).

Family Environment

Lane had lived with his maternal grandparents, Jack and Carol Nolan since he was three
years old (State v. Lane, 2014). His parents, Thomas Lane and Sarah Nolan, never married and a
court had declared them unfit to raise their son. The court awarded custody to his maternal
grandparents. Lane visited his paternal grandparents on the weekends (Langman, 2015).
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Police charged Lane’s father with multiple crimes, including domestic violence, assault,
kidnapping, and theft. His father spent nearly a year in jail after being convicted of attempted
murder and felonious assault in April 2002. Lane’s mother had been charged with domestic
violence and convicted of disorderly conduct in 1995. It was not clear whether Lane had
witnessed parental domestic violence (Langman, 2015)
Lane’s home life at his grandparents’ house was not without incident. In 2009, Lane’s
half-brother Adam Nolan was involved in an altercation with his uncle. Lane reportedly
restrained the uncle while Nolan beat him. Police charged Nolan with assault. Nolan had a
substance abuse problem that resulted in several arrests for a variety of offenses (Glasier, 2012).
Less than a month after this incident, Lane punched a boy in the face and put him in a chokehold.
It was not clear whether Lane received punishment for this incident.
Lane also had a biological sister, Sadie. Little information about Sadie was available
other than an indication she had attended Chardon High School and was in the cafeteria on the
morning of the shooting. However, Sadie did not know Lane was the perpetrator until after the
incident had concluded (Pinckard, 2013).

Incident #12: Jose Reyes: Sparks, Nevada (October 21, 2013)

Overview of Incident

On Monday, October 21, 2013, Jose Reyes, a 12-year old middle school student, stole
one of his father’s guns (Langman, 2014b). Thereafter, Reyes’ mother dropped him off at
Sparks Middle School at 7:08 a.m., as was her normal routine. Shortly after 7:12 a.m., Reyes
entered the school grounds near the basketball courts (Langman). Reyes withdrew a Ruger 9mm
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handgun from his backpack and shot fellow student Kaelin Guerrero. Reyes then walked toward
the basketball court where teacher Michael Landsberry approached Reyes with his hands raised,
attempting to persuade Reyes to turn over the weapon (Langman). Reyes shot Landsberry in the
chest. Students fled and Reyes pointed the gun at a small group of female students who were
huddled in one of the school’s entry alcoves. Reyes did not fire at the female students, but
instead moved toward a larger group of students (Langman). Reyes fired two shots at Eric Perez,
a teacher, but Reyes’ shots did not connect. Reyes reversed his course, and another student,
Mason Kamerer, not knowing Reyes was the shooter told Reyes to get into the building
(Langman). Reyes shot Kamerer in the stomach. Kamerer exited school property where a
passerby helped him until medical personnel arrived (Langman). At this point Reyes walked
along the exterior wall of the gymnasium and shot himself in the head. The shooting incident
lasted approximately five minutes (Langman). Police arrived several minutes later to find both
Reyes and Landsberry, a teacher, dead. Reyes wounded two students. At age 12, Reyes was the
youngest rampage school shooter to take his own life (Langman).

School and Community Profile

Sparks, Nevada, is located in Washoe County and in 2012 was home to approximately
92,000 people. The median household income, according to the 2000 census report, was
$45,745, slightly above the national average of $41,994. The violent crime rate was listed at 4.7
per 1,000 in the community.
Sparks Middle School was part of the Washoe County School District. The middle
school was one of three middle schools in Sparks, with an enrollment of approximately 775
students. Approximately 70% of the students were Hispanic, 20% Caucasian, 2% Black, and 4%
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Asian, and 4% listed as two or more races (Nevada Report Card, 2014) Students eligible for free
and reduced lunch comprised nearly 75% of the student body. Male and female students were
listed at 52% and 48%, respectively.

Profile of Shooter

Jose Reyes nearly died at birth when his umbilical cord became wrapped around his neck.
Some reports indicated Reyes did not speak until he was five, but reports also indicate he was
able to say individual words at age three (Langman, 2014b). He was late in developing language
skills, and Spanish was the primary language in his home (Langman). Reyes received speech
therapy in kindergarten and struggled academically. He had fallen several grade levels behind
his peers in math and reading by the sixth grade (Langman). As a seventh-grader, Reyes had
spent only two months at his new school prior to the shooting incident (Mason, 2013) . The
previous year Reyes had attended an elementary school in the district. Reyes possessed 47 first
person shooter video games and frequently conducted online searches for multiple violencerelated topics such as “school shooting”, “murder,” and “top 10 evil children” (Langman,
2014b). Reyes viewed information on perpetrators of previous school shootings, e.g., Kip
Kinkel, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, and T.J. Lane. He also watched the video game Super
Columbine Massacre and online videos of the song “Pumped up Kicks”, a video portraying a
child shooting other children with his father’s gun (Langman).
In a note to his parents written just prior to the attack, Reyes referenced the ability to go
back in time to change things in the past. He wrote about how he was a bad kid and stated, “I
can be a smart and better kid so I can be the better son in our family” (Langman, 2014b, p. 3).
His belief that he could go back in time to change things may have resulted from him watching
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an anti-bullying film shown at his school. The film depicted a bullied student who shot a fellow
student and later wished he could go back in time to reverse his actions. As a result of Reyes’
cognitive issues, he may have believed by killing himself he could go back in time and prevent
past inappropriate behavior (Langman).
While Reyes had social interests and was helpful to others, he had a variety of social and
behavioral issues that created questions regarding whether he was on the autism spectrum.
Reyes struggled with social cues and was poor at making friends. Being corrected in front of his
peers and transitioning to and from activities frustrated Reyes. Reyes was eligible for special
education services, and as a result, he had an Individual Education Plan (IEP). Reyes’ January
17, 2013, IEP specifically stated “Jose will become frustrated when things go too fast, change in
schedule, or his daily routines. It is hard for him to accept a poor grade on assignments, and it
can take a half an hour to an hour for him to calm down” (Langman, 2014b, p.1).

Mental Health and Social Disorder Implications

Reyes often appeared to others as if he was in his own world and often laughed or made
noises as if he were reacting to a thought or internal conversation taking place in his head
(Langman, 2014). One teacher noted that he “sometimes loses his temper too easily, worries
about things that can’t be changed, is nervous, is fearful, seems lonely, is easily upset, is negative
about things, is pessimistic…. often cries easily” (Langman, 2014b p.2). A local psychotherapist
had prescribed a generic form of Prozac for Reyes three days before the shooting (McAndrew,
2014). It was unknown whether Reyes’ parents planned to have the prescription filled.
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Access to / Experience with Firearms
Limited information regarding Reyes’ access and experience with firearms was available.
According to police records, Reyes’s father received a 9mm Ruger pistol as a gift from a friend
of the family (Langman, 2014). Reyes’s father had an interest in firearms but neither had the
money nor the need to purchase a firearm himself. The same friend gave a .357 Smith &
Wesson revolver as a gift to Reyes’s dad (Dach & Triplett, 2013). Reyes’ parents believed they
hid the guns well within the home and were not aware their son had knowledge of the gun that he
took (Dach & Triplett). However, reports indicated at one point Mr. Reyes had pointed a gun at
Mrs. Reyes in front of their son. Seeing his father improperly use a firearm may have adversely
influenced Reyes (Langman, 2014b).

Family Environment

Information about the Reyes family was difficult to attain. Reyes had two younger
sisters, ages seven and eight. Reyes’ father purchased and operated a restaurant. While the
restaurant improved the family’s financial situation, it increased the father’s stress level
(Langman, 2014b). Mr. Reyes reportedly yelled at his son when he helped in the restaurant.
Reyes told one of his teachers when he was working at the restaurant his father was very hard on
him and was sometimes physically violent with him (Langman). A cousin who worked at the
restaurant reported he had witnessed Mr. Reyes slap his son when he made mistakes (Langman).
On one occasion when his father struck him, Reyes received a black eye that remained visible for
several days. Following this incident police arrested Mr. Reyes and charged him with child
abuse (Langman).
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The parents’ marriage was unstable. Mr. Reyes reportedly exhibited violence toward his
wife, and according to relatives, he once put a gun to her head during an argument (Langman,
2014b). According to a 2007 school report, Reyes witnessed his father’s violence to his mother
(Langman). Additionally, Mrs. Reyes had reportedly become aware of Mr. Reyes’s affair with a
waitress from his restaurant. Reyes’s parents separated for a brief period of time, and Mr. Reyes
avoided contact with his children during the separation (Langman). Mrs. Reyes considered
divorce and apparently feared for her safety since Mr. Reyes had a gun. Eventually the parents
reconciled (Langman).

Summary of Case Studies

The preceding twelve case studies represent a complete list of rampage school shootings
meeting the criteria referenced in Chapter One and further explained in Chapter Three. These
cases represent the most significant incidents from 1996-2013 in the United States and provide a
large enough sample size to test Newman et al.’s (2004) framework.

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

The current study utilized a historical case study methodology similar to the methodology
employed in a legal study. This research method was designed to analyze recent rampage school
shooting incidents to determine whether Newman et al.’s (2004) framework is a reliable tool for
identifying observable conditions for assessing future threats. Additionally, the current study
sought to identify steps school leaders can utilize in mitigating the risks associated with rampage
school shootings.
Newman et al.’s (2004) framework identifies five “necessary but not sufficient”
conditions for rampage school shootings (p. 229). This study utilized these five conditions;
1. Marginalization of the perpetrator in social worlds important to him or her
2. Presence of either a diagnosed or undiagnosed psychological issue
3. Either cultural scripts or a template for how carrying out an attack may resolve the
perpetrator’s issues
4. Failure of school surveillance systems to prevent the attack
5. Perpetrator access to guns or other weapons
The following research questions provided the framework for this study:
1. By examining past school rampage shootings, does Newman et al.’s (2004)
framework provide a viable lens for analyzing and evaluating the potential for lethal
student attacks within the public school K-12 environment?
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2. Do any of Newman et al.’s (2004) “necessary but not sufficient” conditions for the
occurrence of rampage school shootings demonstrate efficacy and reliability?
3. What components of Newman et al.’s (2004) framework should public K-12 school
officials include in their threat assessment or evaluation process to identify potential
school shooters?
Case study research sets forth a detailed account of one, or more cases, in a holistic reallife context (Johnson & Christensen, 2012). Therefore, to qualify for inclusion in this study, a
rampage school shooting incident must have met the following criteria;


The incident must have involved multiple victims with at least one fatality.



Since the study’s purpose is to guide school officials, the incident must have occurred
within a U.S. K-12 public school.



The perpetrator must have attended the school in which the incident occurred at least
a portion of the school year in which the shooting happened.



The incident must have occurred between 1996 and 2013. The starting period was
selected due to the increased frequency of rampage school shootings and 2013
concluded the study range due to the need for the researcher to have sufficient time to
gather credible and detailed information of each event. In selecting a date range, the
researcher reviewed incidents occurring in the early 1900s. Although there were
many individual incidents during the first ninety years of the century, school
shootings did not become commonplace until the late 1990s (Langman, Rampage
School Shooters: A Typology, 2009).

As a result of applying these criteria, twelve rampage school shooting incidents were
identified. The researcher was confident these incidents yielded an appropriate sample size for
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this study because the sample is not so large as to render a detailed analysis overwhelming, yet
not so small to confidently ensure the conclusions drawn from the data are representative of the
whole.

Triangulation

In an effort to both enhance confidence in the findings and to ensure the research was
appropriately robust, the current study examined prior research on threat assessments as well as
past rampage school shooting incidents. More specifically, the study employed investigator
triangulation, defined as “the use of more than one researcher in the field to gather and interpret
data” (Denzin as cited in Bryman, 2011, p. 1142). This study also examined peer reviewed
journal articles, published dissertations, national organization reports, U.S. government reports,
police reports, court findings, and other reliable news reports. Information from a variety of
resources was analyzed to ensure consistency and accuracy and yield triangulation.

Framework
The researcher considered several analytical frameworks for use in this study. O’Toole
(2000) provided a detailed examination of characteristics of potential school rampage shooters,
but O’Toole’s study was impractical for educational leaders in a K-12 setting. O’Toole’s list of
characteristics did not sufficiently focus on the specific concerns administrators could use to
differentiate a rampage school shooter from other threats of potentially violent incidents. The
researcher found Newman et al.’s (2004) model to be more prescriptive and appropriate for the
use of a study on rampage school shootings. Specifically, Newman et al.’s model identified five
discrete indicators school administrators have the ability to assess when engaging the available
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resources with the school staff, the parents, and the community. While the assessment of each
indicator would require a well-coordinated effort, it would be attainable in a K-12 setting.
Additionally, Newman et al.’s (2004) model has been cited and supported by multiple
researchers over the past decade.
As such, cases included in this study were analyzed using Newman et al.’s (2004) model
and focused on school shooting incidents from 1996 through 2013. Newman et al. (2004) noted
each of the indicators are essential, but not sufficient on its own, to create reason to suspect
anyone might engage in a rampage school shooting. However, Newman et al. contended the
indicators work interdependently to create a more reliable and valid approach for evaluating
potential threats. It is this concept of interdependent conditions the current study was designed
to examine. If Newman et al.’s framework is shown to be reliable; this finding could provide
implications for threat assessment teams within K-12 school districts and will help education
leaders identify improved or enhanced threat assessments to prevent future incidents.

Data Collection

Information on the shooting incidents included in this study were gathered from
numerous sources. Online research focused primarily on peer reviewed resources to ensure
information was credible. In some shooting incidents information was only available through
court testimony, police records, and newspaper coverage. School and community profile
information was gathered from each respective state or school website, along with additional
demographic data obtained from census-based sources. The researcher grouped the information
to explain the critical facts of each shooting incident in a manner the reader can logically follow
without advanced understanding of the incident(s). The researcher consistently used
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subheadings among all incidents researched. The subheadings of each section represent factors
for consideration/coding based on Newman et al.’s (2004) framework


Overview of Incident



School and Community Profile



Profile of Shooter



Mental Health or Social Disorder Implications



Access to / Experience with Firearms



Family Environment
Data Analysis

This is a hybrid study; therefore, the data collection process differed from the methods
employed in study’s using traditional qualitative or quantitative analysis. The researcher applied
the indicators from Newman et al.’s (2004) framework to the individual cases in the study and
created a table to summarize the results.
The table lists the five indicators across the top in columns and the individual case across
the rows. For shooting incidents in which sufficient evidence demonstrates the presence of an
indicator is positive, the researcher labeled it a Y for yes. A label of N for no was used when
evidence of a particular indicator was not sufficient or was not present at all. It is possible as a
result of this procedure, certain indicators for a particular case may not clearly demonstrate
sufficient evidence due to a lack of credible information or due to inconclusive or conflicting
information from the available research. In these instances, a third category of U for
undetermined was used. The table was completed based on the answers to the following five
questions embedded in the components of Newman et al.’s (2004) framework:
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1. Did the evidence demonstrate the perpetrator felt marginalized in social worlds
important to him or her?
2. Did the evidence indicate the presence of either a diagnosed or undiagnosed
psychological issue with the perpetrator?
3. Did the evidence conclude the presence of cultural scripts or a template for how the
perpetrator’s issues may have been resolved by committing the attack?
4. Did the evidence demonstrate a failure of school surveillance systems to prevent the
attack?
5. Did the perpetrator have access to guns or other weapons?
In each incident, question five was confirmed or labeled as Y for yes. Since the study did
not consider rampage school shootings in which the incident was averted, this indicator became
less relevant. While the summative of the indicator for access to guns was certain to be yes, the
researcher found the method in which the guns were accessed was important for learning more
about prevention. Additionally, the researcher found value in noting individuals’, including
parents’ and classmates’, knowledge of the perpetrators’ access to guns prior to the shooting
incident.
The risk of researcher bias was present in this research methodology. Researcher bias is
a threat to validity, defined as “obtaining results consistent with what the researcher wants to
find” (Johnson & Christensen, 2012, p. 264). To account for the risk of researcher bias, multiple
labeling processes occurred. For example, the first round of labeling was done with the full case
study write up available to inform the researcher in coding each indicator as Y, N, or U. In an
effort to remove extraneous information from the process, a second round of labeling was
conducted with only the case name and relevant indicator facts. The researcher then coded cases
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with a number and randomized. For example, chronologically, the researcher removed names or
identifying factors in the case, assigned it a number, and then reordered the cases. The only
information connected with each case was specifically the information summarized that
connected with the indicators. In the prior method, details and context about the event were
included, which might have swayed the researcher from keying in on the facts. The purpose of
this was to ensure the researcher was coding strictly based on facts.
When analyzing each indicator, the researcher checked facts to provide sufficient
evidence that the indicator criteria had been met. For example, indicator two involved the
presence of either a diagnosed or undiagnosed mental health issue. It was not necessary for the
perpetrator to have taken or have been prescribed medication to achieve a confirmatory response
for this indicator. A psychologist or mental health expert may have conducted interviews or
analyzed evidence after the incident and determined the presence of a mental health issue.
Conversely, it was not sufficient to simply have the perpetrator’s classmate or family member as
the sole source supporting the presence of an undiagnosed mental illness. Lack of an expert
opinion, such as a psychologist, would prevent labeling this indicator as present or positive.
At the conclusion of the labeling process, any area having a variance in coding from one
round to another was placed in the undetermined category.

Conclusion

Research on rampage school shootings is in its infancy, and the concept of having
discrete threat assessment procedures based on the type of violent behavior has existed for less
than two decades. This study sought to learn from prior rampage shooting incidents to inform the
constructs for future school threat assessment. Through the process of utilizing Newman et al.’s
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framework (2004) to examine twelve different school shootings over nearly two decades, the
researcher believes the results will demonstrate the model’s efficacy for future use.
Confirmation of a reliable model for use in a K-12 school setting may assist educators in
preventing future threats. All senior leadership members at a school district should be aware of
implications from this study. However, Principals of K-12 schools and the threat assessment
teams that support the schools are the primary audience for this study.

CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The current study examined the validity of employing Newman et al.’s (2004) five-prong
framework to analyze multiple victim K-12 public school shooting incidents. The goal of this
analysis was to identify patterns among the perpetrators in order to establish best practices for K12 public school officials to use in developing and conducting threat assessments.
The study sought to answer the following research questions:
1. By examining past school rampage shootings, does Newman et al.’s (2004)
framework provide a viable framework for analyzing and evaluating the potential for
lethal student attacks within the public school K-12 environment?
2. Do any of Newman et al.’s (2004) “necessary but not sufficient” conditions for the
occurrence of rampage school shootings demonstrate efficacy and reliability?
3. What components of Newman et al.’s (2004) framework should public K-12 school
officials include in their threat assessment or evaluation process for identifying
potential school shooters?
Chapter 4 contains the following sections; examination process, findings, research
questions, and additional demographic information. To minimize researcher bias, I examined
evidence for each of the 12 selected case studies, using Newman et al.’s (2004) five indicators as
a framework. Two independent reviews were conducted in an effort to ensure the researcher had
not intentionally affirmed an indicator
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that did not meet the necessary standard. The researcher conducted the first round of labeling to
provide a comprehensive picture for accurately establishing whether Newman et al.’s (2004)
indicators were present. The researcher isolated each case study incident and determined the
identifying factors that were present.
During the first round, the researcher created a table for each case (see Tables 4.5-4.16
for a representative sample) and entered the results based on answers to the following five
questions related to Newman et al.’s (2004) five indicators and the associated framework:
1. Did the evidence demonstrate the perpetrator felt marginalized in social worlds that
were important to him or her?
2. Did the evidence indicate the presence of either a diagnosed or an undiagnosed
psychological or social disorder with the perpetrator?
3. Did the evidence conclude the presence of either a cultural script or a template for
determining how the perpetrator’s issues may have been resolved by carrying out the
attack?
4. Did the evidence demonstrate a failure of the school’s surveillance systems that could
have prevented the attack?
5. Did the perpetrator have access guns or other weapons?
Using the available case study information that was presented in Chapter Two, the researcher
coded each indicator as Yes (Y), No (N), or Unable to Determine (U).
To remove extraneous information (such as demographic data) from the process, the
researcher conducted a second round of review. The researcher randomly assigned the
perpetrator’s names by case study (12) for each of the five indicators and utilized Microsoft
Word to capture the 60 lines of data. For example, the researcher began in reverse order with the
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assignment of indicator five (access to guns) and selected numbers 1-12 until all perpetrator
names were assigned a number. A reverse order process provided an alternative sequence of
review from the initial round of labeling. Each code used the initials of the perpetrator(s) along
with a two-letter code assigned to the category. For example, in Table 4.1, code “LW Ac”
represents Luke Woodham and access to guns, and “CAW Ac” represents Charles “Andy”
Williams and access to guns.
Table 4.1
Sample– Round Two Labeling Template Using Reverse Order Sequence #1-12
#
1

Code
LW Ac

Category/Indicator
Access to Guns

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

AW Ac
CAW Ac
BL Ac
EH & DK Ac
JR Ac
KK Ac
MC Ac
JW Ac
AG & MJ Ac
TJL Ac
ER Ac

Access to Guns
Access to Guns
Access to Guns
Access to Guns
Access to Guns
Access to Guns
Access to Guns
Access to Guns
Access to Guns
Access to Guns
Access to Guns

Result (Y/N/U)

After the researcher completed indicator five, the process of randomly drawing names
aligned to indicator four (failure of surveillance systems) was conducted. In Table 4.2, the code
of “Su” represented the indicator “Failure of Surveillance Systems.” The researcher assigned
numbers 13-24 to case studies in this category.
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Table 4.2
Sample – Round Two Labeling Template Using Reverse Order Sequence #13-24
#
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Code
JR Su
CAW Su
MC Su
BL Su
ER Su
ER & DK Su
LW Su
TJL Su
JW Su
KK Su
AG & MJ Su
AW Su

Category/Indicator
Failure of Surveillance Systems
Failure of Surveillance Systems
Failure of Surveillance Systems
Failure of Surveillance Systems
Failure of Surveillance Systems
Failure of Surveillance Systems
Failure of Surveillance Systems
Failure of Surveillance Systems
Failure of Surveillance Systems
Failure of Surveillance Systems
Failure of Surveillance Systems
Failure of Surveillance Systems

Result (Y/N/U)

The researcher deliberately drew each of the five indicators in a new random order and
continued the process through all five cycles until each indicator contained a unique set of
random case studies similar to Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The researcher assigned numbers 25-36 for the
indicator “cultural script,” numbers 37-48 for the indicator “presence of psychological or social
disorder,” and numbers 49-60 for “Marginalization of school shooter in social worlds important
to him”. Through the independent rounds of randomization, the researcher was no longer able to
discern any patterns. This outcome ensured only the facts of each case were considered.
Once the labeling sheet was ordered accurately and all 60 lines were completed, the
researcher went back to the evidence summaries and replaced the names of the perpetrators with
an “X,” removed identifying factors for each case study from the evidence, and marked it with
the assigned random number (1-60) described above. Table 4.3 shows an example of how the
researcher used one of the case studies with the identifying details removed. While the researcher
may plausibly have recognized some of the details listed for a specific case, this potential was
minimized when compared to the initial round of labeling. Given the researcher’s predisposed
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knowledge of each case, developing a process to completely eliminate the probability a case
could be identified was not possible.
Table 4.3
Sample Case Study without Identifying Details
Indicator #

Indicator Description

1

Marginalization of
school shooter in social
worlds important to him

Y/N

Evidence

Comments

X did not fit in among his
peers because his dark
interests and threats of
violence isolated him.

Unclear if this reached
the extent of feeling
marginalized at school.

X was not accepted in his
home as much as he
would have liked and his
parents argued regularly
about how to raise him.

2

3

Presence of
psychological or social
disorder problems

Cultural scripts or
template for how school
shooter’s issues may be
resolved by committing
the attack

Table continues on next page

X had suicidal ideations
when he was ten years
old. He reported prior to
the shooting he often
heard voices.
According to a
psychologist’s note, he
manifested preschizophrenic ideations.
“Psychotic thinking and
delusions of persecution
and grandeur” also
existed.
The Westside incident
may have provided the
script X employed for
carrying out his attack

X lacked the strength to
help more with his
father’s business. X’s
older stepbrothers
appeared to be in better
standing with his father
than he perceived
himself to be.
X’s mother confirmed
most nights she left a
light on in his bedroom
and looked in the closet
and checked under his
bed to help her son fall
asleep.
While there are varying
expert opinions
regarding whether X
was legally insane,
“there is little doubt that
X was mentally ill.”
X followed recent
school shooting
incidents and spoke
regularly with his
friends specifically
about the Westside,
Arkansas incident.
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Table cont. from previous page
4

5

Failure of surveillance
systems to identify
student issues

Access to guns

Reportedly X suggested
to his friends that he
someday might be
responsible for a similar
school shooting as the
one in Westside,
Arkansas
Prior to the attack, X
made multiple references
to the possibility of a
shooting soon.
X bragged about carrying
a gun the night of the
shooting.

His grades slipped as he
entered the eighth grade
when he received
mostly D and F grades.
He had also broken up
with his girlfriend
recently.
Additionally, X reported
he drank and had
recently tried marijuana.

Pistol and bullets used in
shooting were kept in his
parents’ room in an
unlocked dresser drawer.

X reportedly had a
fascination with guns
and death.

At no time did any
student notify an adult
about X’s remarks.

All 12 tables, following the pattern shown in Table 4.3, were printed and cut into sections
to separate each of the five indicators. The researcher handwrote the randomly assigned number
(1-60) and grouped each section in numerical order. Finally, to minimize the likelihood the
researcher would remember the identifying factors of the case study the documented evidence
grouped by indicator was set aside for one week.
The researcher then conducted the second labeling process. During this process the
evidence was sequentially analyzed. This second labeling process preserved the order of review
by indicator type. For example, evidence for the indicator “cultural script” was performed as a
group in order from numbers 25 to 36. Once complete, the researcher recorded and compared the
results of the second label process to the original results in round one. At the conclusion of the
second labeling process, the researcher coded any variance from the initial round in the
undetermined category, i.e., U.
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The use of multiple labeling rounds was important to provide consistency among the
labeling processes for each indicator. Additionally, the researcher sought to demonstrate an
alternate method of review during the labeling process to validate the consistency of the initial
labeling process. While it is not likely the order of review altered the results, an alternative
method of analysis provided no known negative consequence.
The multi-stage process helped the researcher avoid potential bias. In the initial labeling
process, the details and context for each event were included. This may have influenced the
researcher from focusing upon only the facts. The second round allowed the researcher to more
confidently conclude the results were from evidence only and not due to an unintentional desire
to confirm or refute Newman et al.’s (2004) framework. In addition, the second round provided a
second opportunity to objectively evaluate the facts in an alternate sequence.
The researcher analyzed evidence for each indicator to ensure Newman et al.’s criteria
were sufficiently met. For example, indicator two involved the presence of either a diagnosed or
an undiagnosed mental health issue. The perpetrator did not need to have taken, or been
prescribed, medication to achieve an affirmative response for this indicator. A psychologist or
mental health expert could have conducted interviews or analyzed evidence after the incident and
determined the presence of a mental health issue. Conversely, it was not sufficient to simply
have the perpetrator’s classmate or family member as the sole source to support the presence of
an undiagnosed mental illness. The lack of an expert opinion prevented this indicator as being
labeled as either present or positive.
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Findings

The overall results, represented in Table 4.4, provide support for the efficacy of Newman et
al.’s (2004) framework. In 11 of 12 cases, the researcher found sufficient evidence to confirm the
validity of indicator one (i.e., marginalization of school shooter in social worlds important to
him). Similarly, in 11 of the 12 cases, indicator two (i.e., presence of psychological or social
disorder) was also supported. Indicator three (i.e., presence of a cultural script—example of how
violence may resolve issues) was the least supported indicator, yet 9 out of the 12 cases
demonstrated support. Indicator four (i.e., failure of surveillance systems) resulted in 11 out of
12 cases where the evidence was affirmed. The only indicator with 100% supporting evidence
was indicator five (i.e., access to guns). Definitions and explanations of Newman et al.’s five
indicators were explained in detail in Chapter Two of this study.
Table 4.4
Summary of Results by Newman et al.’s (2004) Indicator
Indicator
#
1
2
3
4
5

Yes

No
11
11
9
11
12

Undetermined
1
0
3
0
0

0
1
0
1
0

Indicator
Affirmed
11
11
9
11
12

Total
12
12
12
12
12

%
Affirmed
91.7%
91.7%
75%
91.7%
100%

Tables 4.5-4.16 provide the evidence utilized in labeling each incident under the applicable
indicator in Newman et al.’s (2004) framework. The purpose of each table was to summarize the
specific evidence and demonstrate the rationale used by the researcher for coding all 60
indicators as described in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.5
Barry Loukaitis: Moses Lake, Washington (February 2, 1996)
Indicator #
1

Indicator Description
Marginalization of school
shooter in social worlds
important to him

Y/N
Y

2

Presence of psychological
or social disorder
problems

U

3

Cultural scripts or
template for how school
shooter’s issues may be
resolved by committing
the attack

Y

4

Failure of surveillance
systems to identify student
issues

Y

5

Access to guns

Y

Evidence
Withdrew from peers.
Described as a shy
nerd who was bullied
and teased (Kimmel
& Matthew, 2003).
During the trial, it
was suggested
Loukaitis had an
undiagnosed bipolar
disorder (Wold, 1997
as cited in Verlinden
et al, 2000).
Loukaitis referenced
how cool it would be
to execute a killing
spree like the one in
Natural Born Killers
(McGee &
DeBernardo, 1999).
Interactions with
mother discussed
violence as a
resolution.
(Verlinden, Hersen,
& Thomas, 2000).
Before the shooting,
Loukaitis submitted a
poem for his English
class about murdering
classmates (McGee &
DeBernardo, 1999).
Guns accessed from
parents’ home
(Verlinden, Hersen,
& Thomas, 2000).
No research about
specific location of
guns were found

Comments
Loukaitis was an only
child. The Loukaitis
family moved to Moses
Lake prior to his fifthgrade year.
Unable to confirm this
from any additional
source.

Mrs. Loukaitis testified
she had told her son
about her
plan to confront her
husband and his lover,
tie them up, force them
to listen to how much
pain they had caused
her, and then kill herself
in front of them.
Loukaitis attempted to
talk his mother out of
this plan.

Loukaitis was carrying
78 rounds of
ammunition and three
types of firearms: a .3030 caliber rifle; a 357caliber pistol; and a .25
caliber pistol.
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Table 4.6
Evan Ramsey: Bethel, Alaska (February 19, 1997)
Indicator #
1

2

3

4

5

Indicator Description
Marginalization of
school shooter in social
worlds important to him

Presence of
psychological or social
disorder problems

Cultural scripts or
template for how school
shooter’s issues may be
resolved by committing
the attack

Failure of surveillance
systems to identify
student issues

Access to guns

Y/N
Evidence
Y
Ramsey felt humiliated
and abused living in a
series of foster homes
throughout his youth
(Verlinden, Hersen, &
Thomas, 2000).

Y

Y

Y

Y

Fellow student beat
Ramsey up about two
years prior to shooting
incident (Langman,
2009b).
Langman (2009b)
presumes Ramsey to be
traumatized.
Ramsey’s foster parents’
biological son
physically and sexually
abused him (Langman,
2009b).
Ramsey’s father used
guns and other weapons
to attack a newspaper
office. Ramsey’s mother
had abusive domestic
partners (Langman,
2009b).
Multiple disciplinary
infractions; however, he
was an honor student
(Langman, 2009b).
At least two friends
knew about the attack
days in advance
(Langman).
Guns accessed from
foster parents’ home in
an unlocked safe near
front door. (Langman,
2009b).

Comments
Persons described Ramsey
as an outsider who was
unpopular among his
peers. Wearing glasses and
having acne made Ramsey
a target (Fainaru, 1998).
Just prior to the shooting
incident, Ramsey’s
girlfriend broke up with
him and moved out of the
community (Langman).
Ramsey attempted suicide
at the age of ten
(Langman, 2009b).

Ramsey’s father had been
convicted of violent
assault charges and
sentenced to prison.
Ramsey’s brother was also
arrested for armed robbery
(Langman, 2009b).
One of Ramsey’s friends
showed him how to use a
shotgun and along with
other peers identified the
people Ramsey should
shoot (Langman, 2009b).

Ramsey’s friend taught
him how to shoot the
weapon (Langman).
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Table 4.7
Luke Woodham: Pearl, Mississippi (October 1, 1997)
Indicator #
1

Indicator Description
Marginalization of school
shooter in social worlds
important to him

Y/N Evidence
Y
Classmates frequently
picked on him (McGee &
DeBernardo, 1999).
Shooting occurred on the
one-year anniversary of
his girlfriend breaking up
with him (Langman,
2010).

2

Presence of psychological
or social disorder problems

Y

3

Cultural scripts or template
for how school shooter’s
issues may be resolved by
committing the attack

Y

4

Failure of surveillance
systems to identify student
issues

Y

5

Access to guns

Y

He possibly suffered from
Schizotypal personality
disorder, a type of
psychosis (Langman,
2010).
Grant Boyette, the
reported leader of the
Kroth introduced him to
Satanism and magic.
Woodham followed
Boyette’s fascination with
Hitler as well (Langman,
2010).
Classmates encouraged
the attack from the
beginning of the school
year (Hewitt, 1997).

He used a hunting rifle
accessed from his
mother’s home in the
shooting incident.
Reportedly, the gun
belonged to his older
brother.

Comments
Woodham testified on
the day before the
shooting, that a fellow
cult member spent
hours on the telephone
using insults and name
calling to encourage
him to follow through
with the attack (CNN,
1998).
He claimed he heard
voices, possessed
magical powers and
believed he was
influenced by demons.
Boyette reportedly
assisted Woodham in
beating, torturing, and
killing Woodham’s dog
(McGee &
DeBernardo, 1999).

Teachers described him
as odd and
disagreeable, and a few
teachers indicated they
feared him (Langman,
2010).
No details were
available about the
specific location of the
weapon.

Table 4.8
Michael Carneal: Heath, Kentucky (December 1, 1997)
Indicator
#
1

2

3

Indicator Description

Y/N

Evidence

Comments

Marginalization of
school shooter in social
worlds important to him

Y

Carneal was not a loner. He was on the fringe of
several groups but not connected to any single
peer group (Moore, 2003).

While interacting in both the high school and
other social circles, he generally appeared
anxious and self-conscious and often sought
approval and respect from both peers and adults
(Moore, 2003).

Presence of
psychological or social
disorder problems

Cultural scripts or
template for how school
shooter’s issues may be
resolved by committing
the attack

Y

Y

Carneal had experienced teasing and bullying,
especially after rumors suggested he had a
romantic interest in another boy in the school
(Moore).
Carneal had a schizotypal personality and
suffered from depression (Moore, 2003).
After the shooting and Carneal’s incarceration,
his psychologist stated Carneal’s mental illness
had developed into paranoid schizophrenia
(Moore).
Carneal exhibited an interest in violence. This
interest included conducting research on how to
make weapons (Moore, 2003).

Carneal exhibited paranoid behavior. He covered
the air vents with towels when he showered,
believing he was being watched and leaped on
his bedroom furniture to avoid touching the floor
because he believed assailants were hiding under
it.
Accessed on the internet the Anarchists
Cookbook, a reference for making weapons.

Carneal referenced a scene from the movie The
Basketball Diaries in which the main character
used a shotgun to fire at students in a school
classroom (McGee & DeBernardo, 1999).

Table continued on next page

144

Table cont. from previous page
4

Failure of surveillance
systems to identify
student issues

Y

Carneal showed a gun to other students while at
school prior to the shooting (Moore, 2003).
In 71 days of school he had five minor
infractions. However, his grades improved from
eighth grade to ninth grade (Moore, 2003).
Carneal warned friends to stay away from the
prayer group the day of the shooting, indicating
“something big” was going to happen (McGee
& DeBernardo, 1999 p. 3).

5

Access to guns

Y

Carneal accessed guns from his parent’s home
and a neighbor’s garage (Moore, 2003).

Students later reported they did not tell school
officials about the gun because they neither
believed Carneal had ammunition nor thought he
would use the gun
Carneal was a high school freshman, making him
a new student to the school the year the incident
took place.
Carneal had casually discussed with his
classmates how he planned take over the school
and kill others.
Carneal was carrying two shotguns and two .22
caliber pistols. In total he had nine guns and
thousands of rounds of ammunition
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Table 4.9
Andrew Golden & Mitchell Johnson: Westside, Arkansas (March 24, 1998)
Indicator #
1

Indicator Description
Marginalization of
school shooter in social
worlds important to him

Y/N
Y

Evidence
Johnson was not popular among peers,
but had friends. He was sensitive about
his weight and was often teased (Moore,
2003).
Golden was considered to have a short
temper and vulgar mouth. He was not
popular at school (Moore).

Comments
Johnson frequently picked fights and was beaten
up by his peers for talking too tough (Booth,
Schwartz, & Mencimer, 1998).
Johnson’s parents divorced, causing turmoil and
instability in their living arrangements during his
youth.
Golden’s parents worked long hours and
reportedly left him alone regularly. He lived with
two half-siblings from his mother’s previous
marriage (Moore).

2

Presence of
psychological or social
disorder problems

Y

Johnson had talked about killing himself
since he was ten years old; a year prior
to the incident he had received
psychiatric counseling (Moore, 2003).
Johnson had been classified as
traumatized (Langman, 2009b).
Langman (2009b) categorized Golden as
a psychopath (Langman, 2009b). He had
a reputation as a menace who was cruel
to animals and other kids in the
neighborhood (Moore).

An older neighborhood boy reportedly sexually
abused Johnson. At the time of the shooting,
Johnson was charged for molesting a two-year old
girl.
Johnson had issues with his father who threatened
to move him back to Minnesota. This apparently
made Johnson feel hopeless and he did not want to
live anymore (Moore).

Table continued on next page
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Table cont. from previous page
3

4

5

Cultural scripts or
template for how school
shooter’s issues may be
resolved by committing
the attack
Failure of surveillance
systems to identify
student issues

Access to guns

N

Johnson and Golden did not
demonstrate evidence of a specific
cultural script.

Y

Johnson talked about bringing a gun to
school and once threatened another
student with a knife (Verlinden, Hersen,
& Thomas, 2000).

Johnson expressed high levels of anger when
disciplined at school, and the teacher killed in the
shooting incident had placed him in school
suspension earlier that year (Jeter, 1998).

Johnson had many prior school behavior
incidents and was suspended three times
during the school year prior to the
shooting incident (Verlinden et al.).

Moore (2003) noted that in hindsight there were
signs indicating Johnson was angry, sad, and
feeling desperate; however, he lacked anyone at
home or school to notice.

Golden often threatened peers at school.
He once shot another student in the eye
with a popgun loaded with sand
(Verlinden et al.).

Neighbors noted that Golden had struck little girls
and used obscene language when interacting with
both children and adults.

Y

In October 1997, a student reported to
his father Golden’s threat to bring guns
to school to kill people. The student and
father claim they told a school counselor
about this threat (Moore, 2003).
Johnson and Golden were fascinated
with weapons and violence and had
access to firearms (Verlinden et al.).
The firearms used in the shooting were
stolen from Golden’s grandfather’s
house (Moore, 2003).

School officials claim the reported threat was only
about Golden potentially harming himself and not
others. Officials did follow up with Golden and
his parents, but no further action was taken.

Golden began using handguns and rifles at the age
of six. His father trained him to shoot moving
targets (Verlinden et al.).
The boys stole three rifles and four handguns from
the grandfather’s house by using cable cutters to
access the guns (Moore, 2003). Three additional
guns that were left unsecured were taken from
Golden’s father (McGee & DeBernardo, 1999).
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Table 4.10
Andrew Wurst: Edinboro, Pennsylvania (April 24, 1998)
Indicator #
1

2

3

Indicator Description
Marginalization of school
shooter in social worlds
important to him

Presence of psychological
or social disorder
problems

Cultural scripts or
template for how school
shooter’s issues may be
resolved by committing
the attack

Y/N
Y

Y

Y

Evidence
Wurst did not fit in among his peers
because his dark interests and threats of
violence isolated him from his classmates
(Moore, 2003).

Comments
Unclear if the situation reached the extent of
feeling marginalized at school.

At home, Wurst did not feel accepted and
his parents argued regularly about how to
raise him (Moore).

Wurst lacked the strength to help more with
his father’s landscaping business. He
perceived his older stepbrothers to be in
better standing with his father than he
thought himself to be.
Wurst’s mother confirmed most nights she
left a light on in his bedroom and looked in
the closet and checked under his bed to help
her son fall asleep.

Wurst had suicidal ideations when he was
ten years old. He reported prior to the
shooting he often heard voices (Moore,
2003).
According to a psychologist’s note, he
manifested pre-schizophrenic ideations.
And “psychotic thinking and delusions of
persecution and grandeur” existed (Moore,
2003).
The Westside incident may have provided
the script Wurst employed for carrying out
his attack (Moore).

While there are varying expert opinions
regarding whether Wurst was legally insane,
Moore (2003) observed “there is little doubt
that Andrew Wurst was mentally ill.”
Wurst followed recent school shooting
incidents and talked regularly with his
friends specifically about the Westside
shooting incident.
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Reportedly, Wurst suggested to his friends
that he someday might be responsible for a
similar school shooting as the one in
Westside, Arkansas (Moore, 2003).
Prior to the attack, Wurst made multiple
references to the possibility of a shooting
at the upcoming dance.
Wurst bragged about carrying a gun the
night of the shooting (Moore).
Wurst’s parents kept pistol and bullets in
their room in an unlocked dresser drawer
(Moore, 2003).

His grades slipped as he entered the eighth
grade when he received mostly D and F
grades and had broken up recently with his
girlfriend. Additionally, Wurst reported he
drank and had recently tried marijuana
(Moore).
At no time did any student notify an adult
about Wurst’s remarks.
Wurst reportedly had a fascination with guns
and death.
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Table 4.11
Kip Kinkel: Springfield, Oregon (May 21, 1998)
Indicator #
1

2

Indicator Description
Marginalization of school
shooter in social worlds
important to him

Presence of psychological
or social disorder
problems

Y/N
Y

Y

Evidence
His parents planned to send their son to a
residential facility for students with conduct
disorders (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000).
Kinkel had a lack of positive relationships with
peers (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000).
As an adolescent, he was diagnosed with
depression and prescribed Prozac (Verlinden,
Hersen, & Thomas, 2000).
Kinkel stopped taking Prozac eight months
before the attack because his parent believed his
behavior had improved (Langman, 2009b).

3

Cultural scripts or
template for how school
shooter’s issues may be
resolved by committing
the attack

N

Kinkel enjoyed music and videos portraying
graphic violence (Green & Filips, 1998 as cited
in Verlinden et al, 2000).

Comments
Mr. Kinkel acknowledged he felt unable to
have a close relationship with his son.
Kinkel was on the football team but rarely
played due to poor attitude.
He was an oppositional child who struggled
socially from an early age (Brandon, 1998 as
cited in Verlinden et al. 2000). Kinkel’s
history of angry outbursts dated back to age
five.
Kinkel described the summer he was on
Prozac as the best summer he ever had
(Langman).
The researcher found no evidence of a
specific cultural script.
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Neighborhood children reported Kinkel bragged
about killing and torturing animals.

Kinkel had brought a gun to school the
previous day and received a suspension.

In English class, Kinkel routinely read from his
journal about his plans to kill his fellow
classmates (Green & Filips, 1998 as cited in
Verlinden et al, 2000).

Students did not take him seriously because
Kinkel often made threats of killing others.

Peers were aware of Kinkel’s fascination with
guns because he had previously talked about
suicide, and on one occasion he gave a class
presentation about how to build a bomb
(Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000).
Kinkel owned a .22 rifle that he kept in his room.
Additional guns belonging to his parents were
accessible in the house.

His parents had full knowledge of their son’s
firearms and even bought some of the guns
for him as gifts (King & Murr, 1998 as cited
in Verlinden et al, 2000).
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Table 4.12
Eric Harris & Dylan Klebold: Columbine, Colorado (April 20, 1999)
Indicator #
1

Indicator Description
Marginalization of
school shooter in social
worlds important to him

Y/N
Y

Evidence
Harris was smaller in stature and had several
medical issues as a youth that resulted in him
having feelings of shame and inadequacy
(Langman, 2009b).
Klebold was shy as a child and needed
organized play dates to be able to socialize well
with other kids (Larkin, 2007).
Klebold and Harris were described as “outsiders
who were pushed to the fringe of high school
society” (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000,
p. 40).
Klebold struggled with his identity as a child of
a mixed religious marriage (Larkin, 2007).

Comments
Both Harris and Klebold had their own
group of friends and active social lives
(Langman, 2009b).
Klebold and Harris both wanted to be part
of this group and had friends who were
members, but characterizations of their
affiliation were inaccurate and were due to
the fact they dressed similarly to members
of the Trench Coat Mafia (Cullen, 1999).
Klebold and Harris regularly endured taunts
and slurs from the popular students. They
felt that the class structure at Columbine
favored athletes and the most popular kids
(Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas).
Jefferson County was a religious area but
the Klebold’s disagreed about religion and
had not attended church in five or six years.
While there was conflict in the Klebold
home, there were no signs of physical
violence (Larkin, 2007).
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Presence of
psychological or social
disorder problems

Y

According to Langman (2009b), Harris was a
psychopath. His paranoia was characterized by
an “intense fear of losing … identity and, more
importantly, powers of self-determination” (p.
34).
Langman (2009b) believed Klebold had a
schizophrenia-spectrum disorder characterized
by psychotic symptoms ranging from strange
thoughts and abnormal obsessions to delusions
and hallucinations.

3

Cultural scripts or
template for how school
shooter’s issues may be
resolved by committing
the attack

Y

Harris and Klebold loved rock music that
glorified killing and death, and both were
fascinated with violent video games, war, and
military paraphernalia (Verlinden, Hersen, &
Thomas, 2000).
They played the video game “Doom,” a game in
which a lone marine’s objective was to save the
human race by eliminating subhuman monsters
(Larkin, 2007).

At the time of the shooting, Harris had been
diagnosed with depression and was taking
Luvox, a prescription medication. However,
planning for the attack predated the Luvox
prescription (Langman, 2009b). Harris
stopped taking Luvox shortly before the
shooting.
Langman further suggested Klebold had an
avoidant personality disorder, a socially
debilitating and exaggerated form of
shyness characterized by fear of rejection,
inadequacy and social anxiety (Langman,
2009b). Klebold sought peer acceptance but
never felt like he achieved it (Langman).
Klebold was fascinated with Charles
Manson and often wrote about violence in
his English class (Larkin, 2007).
They may have viewed themselves in a role
similar to the lone marine and believed
vanquishing their classmates was a mission
to save the human race (Larkin).
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Columbine administrators were aware of the
taunting directed at the so-called “Trench Coat
Mafia,” a group in which Klebold and Harris
were thought to be members. However,
administrators did not appear to try and stop it
(Verlinden, et al., 2000, p. 40).

Because Harris and Klebold were able to
amass and store a large amount of weaponry
in both of their bedrooms, parental
supervision of their activities appeared to be
lacking (Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas,
2000).

Fellow classmate, Robyn Anderson, helped to
purchase several of the weapons on behalf of
Klebold and Harris (Cullen, 1999).

Robyn Anderson was reportedly infatuated
with Klebold (Cullen, 1999).

Klebold and Harris had prior incidents with the
law. Klebold and Harris were arrested a year
before the attack for breaking into a car. As a
result, they entered into a youth diversion
program (Cullen, 2009).
Harris was reported to the sheriff for internet
postings threatening a classmate with death.

Both Klebold and Harris were reported to
the police for igniting pipe bombs.
Klebold and Harris warned classmates they
would no longer tolerate being harassed and
threatened: “We are going to shoot you”
(Verlinden, Hersen, & Thomas, 2000, p.
40).

Klebold turned in violent writings for his
English class. Additionally, both Harris and
Klebold worked on a school film production
portraying themselves shooting down athletes in
the school hallways (Wilgoren & Johnson,
1999).
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One of Harris’ friends provided the duo access
to firearms (Verlinden et al., 2000). Harris and
Klebold acquired their weapons at a local gun
show (Cullen, 2009). Classmate Robyn
Anderson purchased three guns on their behalf
(Cullen). Mark Manes, a drug dealer who ran a
gun business on the side, also purchased a gun
for Harris and Klebold in January (Cullen). A
couple of months later Manes bought 100
rounds of ammunition for them at Kmart.

Harris and Klebold were able to amass and
store a large amount of weaponry in both of
their bedrooms (Verlinden et al., 2000)
Harris posted pipe-bomb making
instructions on the Internet and kept bombmaking components in his bedroom
(Verlinden et al., 2000).
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Table 4.13
Charles Andrew Williams: Santee, California (March 5, 2001)
Indicator
#
1

Indicator Description

Y/N

Evidence

Comments

Marginalization of school
shooter in social worlds
important to him

N

Classmates reportedly called him
“anorexic” and “albino.” (Langman,
2014a p. 7). Classmates indicated
Williams was called a faggot and was
burned with cigarette lighters
(Langman).

Williams claimed he was tormented and bullied during
his time in Santee. He was short (5’4”) and considered
unusually thin.

Several classmates indicated he was
popular, well liked, funny and happy.

2

Presence of psychological
or social disorder problems

Y

Langman (2014) classified Williams
as a psychopathic shooter based on his
substance abuse, truancy, theft, lying
and dishonesty.

3

Cultural scripts or template
for how school shooter’s
issues may be resolved by
committing the attack

N

No evidence found

One peer explained, “all of us joke around with each
other, it’s a thing we do…it’s kind of all of us showing
our love” (Langman, p. 6).
Evidence of Williams being bullied was inconclusive
Overall, evidence was not sufficient to indicate
Williams was marginalized.
Following the shooting, Williams’ behavior was
characterized as calm and casual. During
interrogations, Williams was expressionless and
showed no signs of remorse (Langman, 2014a).
Williams made unsubstantiated claims of sexual abuse
by the boyfriend of one of his mother’s friends
(Langman, 2014a).
According to Langman (2014), Williams fell into a
troubled crowd, but there were no examples provided
of any script from peers or adults in Williams’ life.
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Williams talked about his plan to
attack the school with several
classmates. When questioned,
Williams reportedly responded, “I’m
just messing around.” (Langman,
2014a, p. 3).
While as many as 20 students were
alerted to Williams’ intentions, this
information was never communicated
to an adult (Figueroa & Rogers, 2005
as cited in Langman 2014a).

5

Access to guns

Y

Many hours of Williams’ day were
unsupervised and were spent using
drugs and drinking alcohol with his
friends.
Williams had experience using
firearms. The gun used was a .22
revolver. Williams stole his Dad’s key
to his gun case to access the weapon
and bullets (Dickey, 2013).

Because Williams was known as a jokester among his
friends, many did not believe he would follow through
with his threats, notwithstanding his claim that one day
he would “pull a Columbine.” (p. 3). Friends thought
he was joking but were concerned enough on the
morning of the shooting that they had patted him down
before school to see if he had a gun (Langman). The
gun was in his backpack, and his friends did not check
there.
While Mr. Williams was a supportive father, his son
did not avoid the temptations attendant to living in a
single-parent home.

His mother and other family members worked for the
military.
The Williams’ family kept guns in the home and used
them legally prior to the shooting.
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Table 4.14
Jeffrey Weise: Red Lake, Minnesota (March 21, 2005)
Indicator
#
1

Indicator Description

Y/N

Evidence

Comments

Marginalization of school
shooter in social worlds
important to him

Y

Weise and his cousin dressed in black and had spiked
and/or dyed hair and preferred heavy metal music in
contrast to their classmates who preferred country or
rap music (Burcum, Shah, & Collins, 2005)

2

Presence of psychological
or social disorder
problems

Y

Weise considered himself a loner, but
classmates thought Weise and his cousin
constituted a “tight but marginalized
clique” (Newman et al. & Fox, 2009 p.
1290).
Weise had suicidal ideations. During the
summer prior to the shooting, Weise
attempted suicide and spent time in a
psychiatric facility (Hufstutter, 2005).

3

Cultural scripts or
template for how school
shooter’s issues may be
resolved by committing
the attack

Y

A month before the attack, Weise had been
barred from attending Red Lake High
School due to an incident with a teacher
and concerns about his medical condition
(Hanners, 2005 as cited in Langman
2009b).
When Weise was eight years old, his father
committed suicide during a police standoff
(Langman, 2009a).

Weise had been prescribed Prozac, but it is not clear if
he was taking the medication at the time of the attack
(Langman, 2009b). The impact of the Prozac on Weise
was inconclusive (Langman). In January of 2005,
Weise became depressed, noting in one of his web
postings, “I’m living every man’s nightmare and that
single fact alone is kicking my ass. I really must be
(expletive) worthless” (Langman, 2015, p.75).

Weise and Louis Jourdain played out school shooting
scenarios over a yearlong period prior to the attack,
discussing potential logistics and repeatedly watching
movies depicting the Columbine rampage (Channen,
Louwague, Meryhew, & Von Sternberg, 2005 as cited
in Newman & Fox 2009).
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A year prior to the shooting, Weise
threatened an attack on the school on the
fifth anniversary of Columbine.
Weise showed disturbing drawings in his
notebook of people with bullet holes in
their heads, of half-living people with
blank stares, and of skeletons. These
incidents went unreported to school
officials (Newman & Fox, 2009)

5

Access to guns

Y

According to CNN.com, Weise used his
grandfather’s police-issued shotgun, two
handguns and a protective vest.

After-school activities were canceled and Weise was
questioned due to an email he wrote that indicated
something bad would happen on Hitler’s birthday
(Davey, 2005a as cited in Newman & Fox, 2009).
As many as 39 students had prior knowledge of a
potential attack (Newman & Fox, 2009). Weise’s
cousin and best friend Jourdain was arrested for his
role in planning the attack. Emails between Weise and
Jourdain revealed their discussions of a larger scale
attack on the school (Newman & Fox).
Months prior to the shooting, Weise posted comments
online under his real name that mentioned weapons
and violence, including his conviction that he had
lived a past life as a German soldier in World War II
(Johnson, 2005 as cited in Newman & Fox, 2009).
It was unclear where the weapons used in the shooting
were stored. Research did not indicate whether or not
they were secured (e.g. locked cabinet).
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Table 4.15
Thomas “T.J.” Lane: Chardon, Ohio (February 27, 2012)
Indicator
#
1

2

Indicator Description

Y/N

Evidence

Comments

Marginalization of school
shooter in social worlds
important to him

Y

Lane had lived with his maternal
grandparents, Jack and Carol Nolan,
since he was three years old (State v.
Lane, 2014). His parents, Thomas
Lane and Sarah Nolan, never married,
and a court had declared them unfit to
raise their son.

Lane’s home life at his grandparents’ house was not
without incident. In 2009, Lane’s half-brother Adam
Nolan was involved in an altercation with his uncle.
Lane reportedly restrained the uncle while Nolan beat
him. Nolan was charged with assault. Nolan also had a
substance abuse problem that resulted in him being
arrested several times for a variety of offenses (Glasier,
2012).

Presence of psychological
or social disorder
problems

Y

Following the shooting, Lane
underwent a psychological exam and
his answers were reportedly deceitful.
During a post-shooting competency
evaluation, Lane stated he heard
voices and experienced delusions
(State v. Lane, 2014).
Langman (2015) classified Lane as
traumatized (Langman, 2015).

Less than a month after this incident, Lane punched a
boy in the face and put him in a chokehold. It was not
clear whether Lane was punished for this incident.
During a follow-up competency exam conducted by a
different psychologist, Lane admitted he had previously
lied about hearing voices and experiencing delusions.
He also admitted to other fabrications, such as never
having experienced anxiety, confusion, or depression.
He also acknowledged his earlier claim of having been
sexually abused was false. Lane stated he could force
himself to cry when necessary to convince school staff
he was depressed (State v. Lane, 2014).
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Lane’s father was charged with
multiple crimes, including domestic
violence, assault, kidnapping and theft.
Lane’s mother was charged with
domestic violence and convicted of
disorderly conduct in 1995 (Langman,
2015).

There was no evidence indicating
Lane had shared his plan with any of
his friends or classmates (Langman,
2015).
Lane’s sister, Sadie, told the media in
November, their 19-year-old halfbrother, Adam Nolan, had died and the
family struggled to cope (Pinckard,
2013). Another potential motive may
have been connected to one of the
victims who reportedly dated Lane’s
ex-girlfriend at the time of the
shooting (Langman, 2015).
Lane claimed he had stolen both the
gun and ammunition used in the
shooting from his uncle the day before
the attack (State v. Lane, 2014).

The father spent nearly a year in jail after a conviction
of attempted murder and felonious assault in April
2002. It was not clear whether Lane had witnessed
parental domestic violence (Langman, 2015).
Very little was known about Lane. His beliefs and
motives were often contradictory. Due to Lane’s
admission of a tendency to lie, his testimony and
statements are unreliable.
According to Lane, he first considered going on the
shooting rampage two weeks prior to the attack. Lane
felt he needed to “accomplish something” and believed
that once he had conceptualized the attack he was
committed to follow through (State v. Lane, 2014, p. 6).
Following the incident, Lane did not reference any
potential motives. Lane claimed he did not know the
shooting victims and he randomly selected them. Two
of the victim’s parents refuted this claim, stating their
sons had socialized with Lane.

Other reports indicated Lane had stolen the gun and
ammunition from his grandfather with whom he lived
(State v. Lane, 2014).
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Table 4.16
Jose Reyes: Sparks, Nevada (October 21, 2013)
Indicator
#
1

2

Indicator Description

Y/N

Evidence

Comments

Marginalization of school
shooter in social worlds
important to him

Y

Reyes was late in developing language
skills, and Spanish was the primary
language in his home (Langman, 2014).
Reyes received speech therapy in
kindergarten and struggled academically.

By the sixth grade Reyes had fallen several grade
levels behind his peers in math and reading
(Langman).

Presence of psychological
or social disorder
problems

Y

Reyes told one of his teachers his father was
very hard on him when he was working at
the restaurant and was sometimes physically
violent (Langman). A cousin who worked at
the restaurant reported he had witnessed Mr.
Reyes slap his son when he made mistakes
(Langman).
Reyes often appeared to others as if he were
in his own world and often laughed or made
noises as if he were reacting to a thought or
internal conversation taking place in his
head (Langman, 2014).
A local psychotherapist had prescribed a
generic form of Prozac for Reyes three days
before the shooting (McAndrew, 2014).

On one occasion, Reyes’ father gave him a black eye
that remained visible for several days. Police charged
Mr. Reyes with child abuse (Langman).

One teacher noted that he “sometimes loses his temper
too easily, worries about things that can’t be changed,
is nervous, is fearful, seems lonely, is easily upset, is
negative about things, is pessimistic … often cries
easily” (Langman, 2014b p. 2).
It was unknown whether Reyes’ parents planned to
have the Prozac prescription filled.
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The parents’ marriage was unstable. Mr.
Reyes reportedly exhibited violence toward
his wife and once put a gun to her head
during an argument (Langman, 2014b).

According to a 2007 school report, Reyes witnessed
his father’s violence to his mother (Langman, 2014b).
Seeing his father improperly use a firearm may have
adversely influenced Reyes (Langman).

Reyes possessed 47 first-person shooter
video games and frequently conducted
online searches for multiple violence-related
topics such as “school shooting,” “murder,”
and “top 10 evil children” (Langman,
2014b).

Reyes viewed information on perpetrators of previous
school shootings, e.g., Kip Kinkel, Eric Harris and
Dylan Klebold, and T.J. Lane. He also watched the
video game Super Columbine Massacre and online
videos of the song “Pumped up Kicks,” a video
portraying a child shooting other children with his
father’s gun (Langman).
As a result of Reyes’ cognitive issues, he may have
believed by killing himself he could go back in time
and prevent past inappropriate behavior (Langman).

His belief that he could go back in time to
change things may have resulted from him
watching an anti-bullying film shown at his
school. The film depicted a bullied student
who shot a fellow student and later wished
he could go back in time to reverse his
actions.
Reyes referenced the ability to go back in
time to change things in the past in a note to
his parents written just prior to the attack.
He wrote about how he was a bad kid and
stated, “I can be a smart and better kid so I
can be the better son in our family”
(Langman, 2014b, p. 3).
The gun used in the shooting incident
belonged to his father. Reyes’ parents
thought they hid the gun well from their
kids.

Reyes was eligible for special education services, and
as a result, he had an Individual Education Plan (IEP).
Reyes’ January 17, 2013, IEP specifically stated, “Jose
will become frustrated when things go too fast, change
in schedule, or his daily routines. It is hard for him to
accept a poor grade on assignments, and it can take a
half an hour to an hour for him to calm down”
(Langman, 2014b, p.1).

Reyes’s father received a 9mm Ruger pistol as a gift
from a friend of the family (Langman, 2014b).
Limited information regarding Reyes’ experience with
firearms was available.
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Research Questions
The study’s results enabled, the researcher to answer the three research questions. Each
research question and the corresponding results are set forth below.

Research Question 1
Question 1 posited, “By examining past school rampage shootings, does Newman et al.’s
(2004) framework provide a viable lens for analyzing and evaluating the potential for lethal
student attacks within the public school K-12 environment?”
All 12 of the cases included in this study demonstrated a consistent pattern of affirmation
under the five indicators of Newman et al.’s (2004) framework. Four out of the five indicators
were present in at least 91.7%, of the cases suggesting Newman’s indicators were present the
majority of the time in all 12 cases. In some cases, it was undetermined if the indicator was
present. The exception was in the case of Andy Williams who lacked the presence of a specific
cultural script as a template, and did not appear to be marginalized in the social worlds that
mattered to him. Williams’ case was an outlier of this study. Indicator three, presence of a
cultural script, was evident in 75% of the cases. Despite a lack of presence in three cases,
indicator three proved to be reliable in well over the majority of cases included in this study.

Research Question 2
Question 2 posited, “Do any of Newman et al.’s (2004) “necessary but not sufficient”
conditions for the occurrence of rampage school shootings demonstrate efficacy and reliability?”
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Access to guns was the most reliable indicator (100%). Perpetrators who felt
marginalized either had a potential psychological or social disorder or fell under the radar of a
surveillance system. As an indicator feeling marginalized demonstrated the efficacy and
reliability in 11 out of 12 cases (91.7%). Presence of a cultural script provided the weakest
support for Newman et al.’s (2004) framework. Nine of the twelve cases (75%) supported this
indicator. While this number was comparatively low, it still represented a sizable majority and,
as such, could be considered a fairly reliable indicator.

Research Question 3
Question 3 asked, “What components of Newman et al.’s (2004) framework should
public K-12 school officials include in their threat assessment or evaluation process to identify
potential school shooters?”
Based on this study, each of Newman et al.’s (2004) indicators should be included as part of
a school threat assessment to identify a potential school shooter.


For marginalized students (indicator one), Newman et al.’s (2004) framework supported
the importance of threat assessment teams monitoring students who are on the social
fringes of the school culture.



Newman et al.’s (2004) framework also demonstrated the potential efficacy of a threat
assessment team considering the psychological frame of mind of their students.
Typically, this role would be performed by a trained psychologist or possibly a trained
counselor in the school. A school administrator who has suspicion or knowledge of the
presence of a psychological or social disorder (indicator two) should consult additional
experts in the field as part of the threat assessment process.
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A school administrator who is aware of a potential threat and is evaluating the
seriousness of a threat should also consider whether the student has a cultural script in
place (indicator three). The current study confirmed Newman at al.’s (2004) assertion that
cultural scripts such as witnessing violence in the home, playing violent video games or
watching movies that glorify murder increase the potential risk of that student. While
cultural scripts alone may not give reason to suspect a high likelihood for violence, when
considered along with other factors, they may be a tipping point.



Failure of surveillance systems (indicator four) applies to both the school and home
environments. Results of this study reflected in nearly all of the examined cases, someone
had prior knowledge of the threat and failed to report it.



Access to guns (indicator five) proved 100% reliable in all the studied rampage school
shooting incidents because without a weapon no attack would have occurred. When
considering students as potential threats, school administrators should assess the ease of
access to guns as part of the threat assessment process.
In conclusion, the results of the study’s three research questions support the use of Newman

et al.’s (2004) framework as part of a behavioral threat assessment. Additional data tables are
included below to provide insight to the specific cases considered in this study.

Additional Demographic Information

Analysis on the school shooters’ demographic and family information, included in Table
4.17, show all 14 perpetrators in the selected cases were male students. Eleven (79%) of the
perpetrators were white, one was Hispanic, one was Native American, and one was Native
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Alaskan/white. The perpetrators’ ages at the time of the incident ranged from 11 to 18 years and
represented grades 6 to 12.
Ten (71%) of the perpetrators came from family environments where some form of
neglect or abuse was occurring. Just under half (43%) of the home environments contained firstmarriage parents without stepsiblings. Five (36%) were perpetrators who lived in homes with
either one or no biological parent.
Family birth order varied among the perpetrators. Seven (50%) were second born, five
(36%) were first born, and two (14%) were third born in their families. No perpetrator in this
study came from a family with more than three children and one perpetrator was an only child.
Table 4.18 describes the communities where the selected rampage school shootings
occurred. Each of the studied incidents occurred in different states. The community populations
ranged from 1,907 to 92,000. No rampage school shooting occurred in an urban community. Six
incidents occurred in rural communities (50%) and six in suburban communities (50%). Violent
crime rates and median household incomes varied among the communities included in this study.

Table 4.17
School Shooter Profiles
Name

Sex

Race

Age

Grade

Birth
Order
1st (Only
Child)
2nd of 3
boys

Parental
Status
2 Parent
Married
0 Parent Foster
Home

Home
Environment
Unstable

Family Problems
(If Unstable)
Neglect and verbal abuse

Barry Loukaitis

M

White

14

9

Evan Ramsey

M

16

10

Luke Woodham

M

Native
Alaska/
White
White

Unstable

Abuse

16

10

2nd of 2
boys

Unstable

Neglect and verbal abuse

14

9

Stable

White

11

6

Unstable

Typical
Older Sister – High Achieving
Neglect

M

White

13

8

2nd (older
sister)
3rd of 3
(older ½
siblings)
1st of 2
boys

Unstable

Neglect and verbal abuse

Andrew Wurst

M

White

13

8

Unstable

Neglect

Kip Kinkel

M

White

16

9

1 Parent
(Mother)
Divorce
2 Parent
Married
2 Parent
Married
Step-Siblings
2 Parent
Mother and
Step-Father
2 Parent
Married
Step-Siblings
2 Parent
Married

Michael Carneal

M

White

Andrew Golden

M

Mitchell Johnson

Stable*

Typical
Older Sister – High Achieving

Eric Harris

M

White

18

12

2 Parent
Married

Stable

No issues other than his family
frequently moved

3rd of 3
boys (older
½ siblings)
2nd of 2
(older
sister)
2nd of 2
(older
brother)

Table continued on next page
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Dylan Klebold

M

White

17

12

2nd of 2
(older
brother)

2 Parent
Married

Unsure

Charles “Andy”
Williams

M

White

15

9

2nd of 2
(older
brother)

1 Parent
(Father)
Divorce

Stable

Jeffrey Weise

M

Native
Am.

16

9

Father deceased and mother
incapacitated; Weise lived with
grandfather

M

White

17

11

Unstable

Neglect. Additionally, Lane was
part of physical abuse towards an
uncle

Jose Reyes

M

Hisp.

12

7

0 Parent
Foster care
initially, then
lived with
maternal
grandfather
0 parent
Lived with
Maternal
grandparents
2 parent
Married

Unstable

Thomas “T.J.” Lane

Only Child
(mother
had 2 kids
with
another
man)
1st of 2
(younger
sister)

Unstable

Physical and verbal abuse

1st of 3
(younger
sisters)

Parents frequently disagreed and
a lack of warmth and love
reportedly existed in the home.
Klebold and his brother regularly
fought.
Lack of parental supervision was
the only known issue

*Research indicated Kinkel’s home stability issues were related to his parents’ ability to deal with Kinkel’s behavior. Known to his
parents, Kinkel was able to accumulate weapons in his room. Just prior to the shooting incident, Kinkel’s parents were in the process
of sending him to a residential treatment facility.

169

Table 4.18
Community Information
Name

City/Town of Residence

Population

Urbanicity

Median Household
Income

Rural
Rural
Suburb
Rural
Rural

Violent Crime
Rate
(per 1,000
residents)
3.9
1.5
9.25
12.8
3.73

Barry Loukaitis
Evan Ramsey
Luke Woodham
Michael Carneal
Andrew Golden
Mitchell Johnson
Andrew Wurst
Kip Kinkel
Eric Harris
Dylan Klebold
Charles “Andy”
Williams
Jeffrey Weise
Thomas “T.J.” Lane
Jose Reyes

Moses Lake, WA
Bethel, AK
Pearl, MS
Heath, KY(Paducah)
Westside, AR

14,953
5,471
21,961
26,307
1,907

Edinboro, PA
Springfield, OR
Littleton, CO

6,950
52,864
40,340

Rural
Suburb
Suburb

1.7
12.9
4.2

$26,652
$33,031
$71,319

Santee, CA

52,975

Suburb

2.4

$53,624

Red Lake, MN
Chardon, OH
Sparks, NV

5,000
5,000
92,000

Rural
Suburb
Suburb

1.4
1.8
4.7

$23,224
$46,074
$45,745

$36,467
$57,321
$37,617
$33,865
$32,896
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A description of the location and time of each rampage school-shooting incident is set
forth in Table 4.19. Of the 12 selected incidents, three occurred in February (25%) and three in
March (25%). Monday was the highest frequency day of the week with five incidents (42%)
followed by Friday with three incidents (25%). Five occurrences (42%) occurred before the start
of the school day while the remainder of the shootings took place during the school day. Three
incidents occurred in the morning (25%) and three occurred in the afternoon (25%). The
Edinboro, Pennsylvania, incident was the only shooting that occurred both at night and at an offsite school-sponsored event.
The point of entry for each rampage shooting varied. The main entrance of the school
was accessed in two (17%) of the shootings. Access via the side or rear entrance of the school
occurred four times (33%). In three cases (25%), the perpetrators did not enter the school. Once
inside the school, most perpetrators targeted common areas such as the lobby, hallways or the
cafeteria for their attack. This was the case in six (50%) cases. Two other shootings (17%) took
place in common areas outside the school, i.e., playgrounds or basketball courts.
Rampage shooting incidents ended in a variety of ways. Three (25%) cases ended in the
perpetrator’s suicide, four (33%) ended with police intervention, and four (33%) ended as a
result of school staff and/or student intervention.

Table 4.19
Rampage School Shooting Incident Details
Name

Month /
Year

Barry Loukaitis

Feb.
1996

Evan Ramsey

Feb.
1997

Wed.

Luke Woodham

Oct.
1997
Dec.
1997

Wed.

Michael Carneal

Day
of
Week
Fri.

Mon.
after
holiday
Tues.

Time
of Day

Bus
Drop off
Walk
Walk

School
Entry
Point
Side Door
of school

Location of
Shooting

Dead or
wounded

Shooter survived attack?

Classroom

3D
1W

Yes. Subdued by teacher

Just prior to start of
school

Not
known

Main
entrance

2D
2W

Yes. Surrendered to police

AM (exact time not
known)
Just prior to start of
school

Drove

Unknown

Hallways,
commons&
main lobby
Not known

Sister
Drove

Back Door

Lobby

3D
7W
3D
5W

Yes. Tried to escape, but
subdued by teacher
Yes. Surrendered to
principal

12:35P

Drove
(stolen
van)
Not
known

Pulled
firearms
but exited
N/A

Playground

5D
10 W

Yes.
Police apprehended

1D
3W

Yes. Owner of banquet
hall subdued him.

Drove
(parked 1
block
away)

Entered
back of
school

Off-site
School
Sponsored
Dinner/
Dance
Cafeteria

2D
25 W
(killed
both
parents
the day
prior)

Yes. Five students
subdued Kinkel

2:00P
(skipped classes)

Andrew Golden
Mitchell Johnson

Mar.
1998

Andrew Wurst

Apr.
1998

Fri.

After School Event
(Night)

Kip Kinkel

May
1998

Mon.

7:55A

Table continued on next page
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Eric Harris
Dylan Klebold

Apr.
1999

Tues.

11:17A

Drove

Charles “Andy”
Williams

Mar.
2001

Fri.

9:20A
Just prior to start of
school (Late start
day)

Walked

Jeffrey Weise

Mar.
2005

Mon.

3:00P

Not
known

Thomas “T.J.” Lane

Feb.
2012
Oct.
2013

Mon.

Just prior to start of
school
Just prior to start of
school

Bus

Jose Reyes

Mon.

Drop off
(Mom)

Entered
door near
cafeteria
initially to
place
bombs.
Exited and
returned
through
side
entrance
Unknown.

Shooting
started
outside
school and
proceeded
throughout
the building

15 D
24 W
Includes
Klebold
and
Harris
Suicide

No.
Suicides of perpetrators

Student
Quad and
men’s
restroom

2D
13 W

Yes. Surrendered to police

Presumed
to be main
entrance.
Door with
metal
detector
and
unarmed
guard.
Unknown.

Killed
security
guard then
entered a
classroom

10 D
7W
(including
Weise)

No. Suicide

Cafeteria

N/A
outside
school

Outside
Basketball
Courts

3D
3W
2D
2W
(including
Reyes

Yes. Apprehended by
Police
No.
Suicide
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This study did not yield a consistent pattern showing how the rampage school shooters
gained access to guns (see Table 4.20). Other than the Columbine shooting, at least one of the
guns used in the incident originated from within the perpetrator’s home. Additionally, in 10 out
of the 12 incidents (83.3%), at least one of the guns accessed by the perpetrator was unsecured
inside the home, and 11 of the 14 perpetrators (78.5%) had experience shooting a gun prior to the
incident.
Table 4.21 shows the shooters included in this study resided within the attendance
boundaries of the four middle schools and eight high schools where the incidents occurred. The
enrollments of the schools where the shootings occurred ranged from approximately 250 to 1900
students. Some of the perpetrators had recently moved to the community, while others had lived
their entire lives in the same community. This study showed nine out of the 14 perpetrators
(64%) attended their current school for two years or less. In some cases, a transition had recently
occurred from elementary to middle school or middle school to high school.
The majority of students in the study either achieved high academic marks or had
teachers who considered them to be bright students. The study indicated school staff viewed the
perpetrators as performing below average academically in three out of 14 cases (21%).
From a behavior perspective, three students (21%) had zero discipline or police issues,
six students (43%) had minor school infractions (e.g. detention); while the remaining five
students (36%) had at least one or more serious infraction (e.g., suspension or police
involvement) prior to the shooting incident. Of the perpetrators in this study, eight out of the 14
had reportedly been bullied (57%), while only two of the 14 perpetrators (14%) had bullied other
students.

Table 4.20
Rampage School Shooting Incident—Access to Guns
Name

Weapons
Carried

Source of
Weapon

Location Gun
Accessed From

Experience with firearms?

Gun
locked?

Barry Loukaitis

1 rifle
2 pistols
Shotgun

Family

Parents Home
(no specifics)
Safe near front
door

Yes
(played at home)
Minimal
(friends taught him to shoot prior to
incident)
Yes (Hunting)

Unknown

Knowledge from peer,
parent, school of
access?
Parent

No

Peers

Unknown

Yes (Shot gun at summer camp)

Yes (Locked
box)

Parent &
Peers
Peers (Brought gun to
school)

Yes (since age 6 was trained to shoot
moving targets)

Yes – Rifles
locked

Yes (hunted and played with BB
guns)

No –
handguns
unsecured

Evan Ramsey

Luke Woodham
Michael
Carneal

Andrew Golden
Mitchell
Johnson

Andrew Wurst
Kip Kinkel

Eric Harris
Dylan Klebold

Foster Family

Hunting
Rifle
2 shotguns
2 pistols

Owned by
shooter
Family and
stole from
neighbor

3 rifles
&4
handguns

Parents and
Golden’s
Grandparents

Pistol
1 rifle,
multiple
handguns
& 1 knife
Multiple
guns,
knives, and
bombs

Unknown
Parents Home
and broke into
neighbor’s
garage
House(s) of
parents and
grandparents
(specific
location not
identified)

Parents and
school staff aware of
possible threat
Parents

Parents
Parents

Parents’ Room
Kinkel’s room
and parents
guns elsewhere

Yes
Yes

No
No

Father and peers
Parents, peers and school
suspended him (Police
also aware)

Friend,
accessed from
gun show

Harris’ and
Klebold’s
bedroom

Yes (practiced with friends)

No

Peers
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Charles “Andy”
Williams

1 revolver

Father

Jeffrey Weise

1 shotgun
&2
handguns
1 handgun

Grandfather

Thomas “T.J.”
Lane

Jose Reyes

1 handgun

Unknown.
Uncle or
grandfather
(stolen)
Father

Father’s house
(specific
information not
available)
Grandfather’s
house

Yes
(skeet shooting & BB gun)

No evidence

Yes.
Williams
stole his
Dad’s key
Unknown

Unknown or
Grandfather’s
house (where he
lived)
Parents’ house

No evidence

Unknown

No evidence

No evidence

No

No evidence

Father & Peers

Peers & school knew of
threat

Table 4.21
School Specific Data
Name

Years at
School
3rd

Academic Standing

Evan Ramsey

Bethel HS
(446)

2nd

Honor Student

Luke Woodham

Pearl HS
(975)
Heath HS
(550)

2nd

Honor Student

1st

Average, declining grades, but
IQ of 120

Westside MS
(250)
Parker MS
(900)
Thurston HS
(1,465)

1st
3rd
4th
1st

Barry Loukaitis

Michael Carneal

Andrew Golden
Mitchell Johnson
Andrew Wurst
Kip Kinkel

Prior Behavioral
Issues
No

Bullied
Others
No

Yes
(several minor
infractions)
No

No

Possibly

No

Yes

No

Yes

Average
Above Average
Below Average

Yes
(several minor
infractions)
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

No
Yes
No

Average, declining grades

Yes

No

No

Honor Student

Victim of
Bullying
Yes
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School Name
(Enrolled)
Frontier MS
(600)

Eric Harris
Dylan Klebold
Charles “Andy”
Williams
Jeffrey Weise

Columbine HS
(1,900)
Santana HS
(1,900)
Red Lake HS
(300)

4th
4th
1st

Considered a bright student
Considered intelligent
Honor Roll

1st

Thomas “T.J.” Lane

Chardon HS*
(1,100)
Sparks MS
(775)

2nd

Failed 8th grade, but was wellspoken and enjoyed classic
literature
Considered a bright student

1st

Below Average

Jose Reyes

Yes
Yes
Yes
(minor infractions)
Yes

No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes (minor
infractions)

No

No

*Lane was technically attending Lake Academy Alternative School at the time of the incident. However, he rode a bus to Chardon HS
where he took a transfer bus to Lake Academy.
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Table 4.22 delineates several predisposing factors for rampage school shootings. Four
(29%) of the shooters were classified as having been traumatized. Five shooters (36%) were
psychopathic, and five of the shooters (36%) were psychotic (Langman, 2009).
Eleven out of the 14 (79%) perpetrators had suicidal ideations, and 12 (86%) showed
signs of depression or desperation prior to carrying out their attacks. Additionally, 12 of the
shooters (86%) demonstrated at least some form of family conflict. In some cases, these were
minor problems, as was the case with Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold. In other cases, such as
Evan Ramsey, physical and verbal abuse occurred in the home on a regular basis.
Additionally, nine of the perpetrators (64%) had not received treatment or services for
their social or psychological issues prior to the shooting incident. Four of the perpetrators (29%)
had been prescribed medication, and one perpetrator (7%) had been seeing a counselor outside of
school prior to the shooting incident.

Summary
This study provides evidence supporting the use of Newman et al.’s (2004) framework
for assessing individuals for their potential to become a rampage school shooter. While isolated
incidents involved indicators that may not have provided sufficient evidence, in its entirety
Newman et al.’s framework demonstrated efficacy. As such, based upon the results of this study
school threat assessment teams should consider using Newman et al.’s framework.

Table 4.22
Predisposing Factors
Name
Barry Loukaitis
Evan Ramsey
Luke Woodham

Mental
Illness/Disorder*
Psychopath
No
(traumatized)
Psychotic

Suicide
No

Depression,
Desperation
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
(discovered
after incident)
Yes
Yes
Unknown

No evidence

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Andrew Wurst
Kip Kinkel

Psychotic
Psychopath
No
(traumatized)
Psychotic
Psychotic

Eric Harris
Dylan Klebold

Psychopath
Psychotic

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Charles “Andy”
Williams
Jeffrey Weise

Psychopath

Yes

Yes

No
(traumatized)
Psychopath

Yes

Yes

No

Unknown

No
(traumatized)

Yes

Yes

Michael Carneal
Andrew Golden
Mitchell Johnson

Thomas “T.J.”
Lane
Jose Reyes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Family Problems
Yes
(neglect and verbal abuse)
Yes
(verbal and physical abuse)
Yes
(neglect and verbal abuse)
Murdered mother before school shooting
No evidence
Possible neglect
Yes (verbal and physical abuse)

Prescription/ Counseling
No

Yes (neglect)
No
However, he murdered his parents before
school shooting
Possibly (frequent moves)
Possibly
(frequent fighting at home)
Possibly
(neglect and frequent moves)
Murdered grandfather and his girlfriend
before school shooting
Yes
(neglect)
Yes
(verbal and physical abuse)

No
Yes. Prozac

No
No

No
No
Yes. Counseling

Yes. Luvox
No
No
Yes. Prozac
No
Yes. Prozac
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*Langman (2009) purports Newman et al.’s (2004) use of the label of “mental illness” is not sufficient. He recommends categorization
under the heading of “Psychological Type”. Langman’s rationale for this is “some of the traits or behaviors associated with
psychopathy either are not manifested in children or are difficult to assess….the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder might be
applicable, but as defined in DSM-IV-TR, it cannot be applied to people under the age of 18”.

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
This study analyzed Newman et al.’s (2004) framework to determine its efficacy for
assessing the potential for predicting the occurrence of K-12 public school rampage shootings. In
formulating the framework, Newman et al. did not intend to create a profile of potential rampage
school shooters but rather they sought to develop a collection of warning signs or indicators that
could be employed to avert a school shooting. My study’s goal was to examine the validity and
efficacy of Newman et al.’s framework by replicating and extending their research. This was
accomplished through a multi-round process of examining 12 incidents to determine if evidence
under the framework’s five indicators were present.
Rocque (2012) acknowledged, “Rampage school shootings remain very rare occurrences
which makes demonstration of any policy efficacy that seeks to prevent them problematic” (p.
310). While rampage school shootings remain infrequent, an increase in incidents over the past
two decades has yielded an increased sample size for study. As a result, this increased sample
size can be explored to identify potential patterns and tendencies of possible perpetrators. The
data tables set forth in Chapter 4 provided insights relevant to that discussion.
Research question one explored whether or not Newman et al.’s (2004) framework
presented a viable lens for use in a K-12 threat assessment process. Research question two
sought to understand which of Newman et al.’s indicators demonstrate efficacy. Research
question three posited, “What observable behaviors and events in Newman et al.’s (2004)
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framework should school officials include in their threat assessment or evaluation process to
identify potential school shooters?” Based on the findings of the current study, each of Newman
et al.’s (2004) indicators should be included as part of a comprehensive school threat assessment
to help identify potential school shooters. Several observable behaviors and events should be
included as part of a K-12 threat assessment based on review of the 12 incidents included in this
study. For ease of discussion, Chapter 5 is organized by Newman et al.’s indicators. Each are
presented and reviewed in relation to the current study’s findings.
Indicator One

Recall that indicator one relates to the rampage shooter feeling marginalized in social
worlds important to him. School administrators should be aware of marginalized students who
appear to be on the social fringes of the school culture. Table 4.21 reflects eight out of the 14
perpetrators in this study (57%) were bullied, a form of social marginalization. While not as
common, two out of 14 perpetrators were considered bullies. Andrew Golden and Mitchell
Johnson both bullied other kids. While this may be considered an anomaly to the results of the
study, it is worthy to consider bullies at school may still feel marginalized in some manner.
Students who feel marginalized at home can often be overlooked. Andrew Golden, for
example, came from a home in which his parents worked very long hours. Golden was often left
alone in the home and likely felt neglected (BBC News, 1998 as cited in Verlinden et al., 2000).
While stability at home cannot always be easily measured from demographic data, Levin and
Madfis (2009) found that nearly half of the school shooters in their study came from homes
ought with conflict. Therefore, schools should actively consider the family life of students and
how it may lead to marginalization as part of their threat assessment process. Threat assessment
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teams may request school counselors to meet with students to discuss their home environment.
Additionally, threat assessment teams could request to meet directly with the parents and
guardians to discuss concerns they see in school to identify if similar concerns exist at home. In
very serious cases, police or child and family services may be a resources to perform home visits
to investigate potential neglect or abuse.
Positive school climate could also be a way to mitigate the marginalization of students.
School climate refers to the quality and character of student life. School officials should ensure
the school climate provides a welcoming environment for sharing information regarding
potentially threatening situations as a means to address students who may feel marginalized.
As part of a positive school climate, school staff should also model positive behaviors. A
student threat not taken seriously or minimized by an adult can have severe consequences.
Student social structure matters in regard to behavioral issues and staff must avoid special
treatment of certain students. For example, students held to a different standard, such as athletes
and cheerleaders, as was the case in Columbine, can quickly cause deterioration in a school
climate. Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris experienced taunts and slurs from athletes and felt staff
did not intervene because of the athletes’ elite social status. Administration should immediately
address situations where staff show preference for certain students or groups of students.
Another method for building a positive school climate includes student participation in
extra-curricular activities. Schools that support students in finding opportunities to connect with
other students in clubs and activities promote the likelihood students will feel included in the
school structure. Administrators and staff can create additional activities and/or clubs as a
method to foster a positive school climate. If opportunities exist to recognize students who are
part of non-traditional clubs or activities, schools can enhance the climate with very little effort
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or expense. Newman et al. (2004) note that middle schools are usually primary targets of such
initiatives. This can often be the time in a child’s life when he starts to feel more marginalized.
School administrators who seek to improve school climate should consider research by
Pollack et al. (2008), who noted, “Simple and genuine measures, such as regularly greeting
students, talking to students, and addressing students by name, help to make students feel
connected and part of the school” (p. 8). School safety and security are dependent on two
conditions: 1) a predictable and orderly environment characterized by school staff establishing
consistent, dependable supervision and disciplinary procedures and 2) the climate being rooted in
students feeling they are connected to the school and supported by their teachers and support
staff (Cornell, 2006).
Several popular initiatives, such as cameras and metal detectors, of the post-Columbine
era have not been successful in creating a positive school climate. Such initiatives likely worked
to alienate students and produced a climate of fear and distrust (Trump, 2011). Additionally, the
use of zero-tolerance policies has not proven successful in reducing violence (Trump).
Furthermore, excluding students from the school setting through expulsions and suspensions
does not resolve the underlying issues or reduce existing conflicts. Jeffrey Weise, for example,
was expelled from Red Lake High School, yet the school was still targeted. Such actions have
even aggravated and enraged students to commit violent attacks (Levin & Madfis, 2009; Madfis,
2012). Additionally, installations of armed security guards, security cameras, and metal detectors
have failed to prevent school shootings. For example, Table 4.19 notes Weise’s attack at Red
Lake High School included a confrontation with a security guard at an entrance where cameras
and metal detectors existed. Weise immediately shot the guard and proceeded through the school
seeking additional targets.

184
Research from Levin and Madfis (2009) found that rampage school shooting attacks
often are part of a “cumulative strain” in which small incidents build (p. 1229). Their research
suggests opportunities are likely to exist that would deter the escalation of violence such as
warning signs in which school staff could intervene. However, “the problem is that teachers and
school psychologists, and counselors do not always react to troubled students until they become
troublesome and are seen as a threat to others” (Levin & Madfis, 2009, p. 1241 emphasis in
original). School staff should identify and attempt to resolve these strains and neutralize the
isolation from building into a potential massacre.
Marginalization may be one of the more challenging indicators for school threat
assessment teams to monitor. It requires the ability to compare the behaviors of the student to a
baseline of behaviors to monitor multiple interactions with various staff to attempt to discern if a
pattern of troubling activities become apparent. Allowing teachers and other school staff the
opportunity to collaborate and share information regarding students is an important objective for
school administrators. Promoting a culture of inclusion and allowing multiple opportunities for
students to feel a sense of belonging at school should be another primary objective.

Indicator Two

Indicator two considers how a rampage school shooters mental or social and emotional
state may magnify marginalized feelings discussed in indicator one. A school administrator who
has suspicion or knowledge of the presence of a psychological or social disorder may already be
supporting those students through school-based counseling, social work, or psychological
services. Special education services might be provided to some students as well. In some case,
school teams should not limit their involvement to simply those services. When possible, threat

185
assessment teams should consider whether the student has received any outside mental health or
counseling services. Mitchell Johnson was the only perpetrator included in this study who was
known to have received counseling services. Johnson contemplated suicide as early as the age of
ten, yet it was unknown if school staff were aware of these issues. Additionally, Kip Kinkel was
prescribed Prozac and described the summer he was taking it to be the best summer of his life.
Kinkel stopped taking Prozac prior to the shooting. It is unknown if school officials knew about
Kinkel’s use of Prozac and/or the decision to cease the use of it. School staff must tread lightly
in areas of mental health and social disorder issues. Only trained professionals should be
involved directly with the student when assessing any potential diagnoses.
The predisposing factors of the rampage school shooters included in this study are
located in Table 4.22. The vast majority (79%) had known suicidal ideations and 86% presented
as depressed or desperate prior to the attack. However, depressed persons may never have
suicidal or homicidal ideations. Nevertheless, this study offers a case for K-12 administrators to
be aware that suicidal ideations, depression and desperation might manifest into severe violence
within the school. Students with suicidal ideations may also need to be evaluated as a risk to
others and be properly routed through a designated threat assessment process until evidence
suggests otherwise. Furthermore, threat assessment teams should consider how familial supports
factor into a potential threat.
Typically, mental health services are not provided in a school setting and school
employees can be unaware that a student is receiving mental health services. However, under
new federal education law, the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), legal restrictions on school
staff’s ability to intervene may be decreasing. Rossen and Cowan (2016) noted how ESSA
“authorizes significant funding and provides broad latitude for states and districts to establish the
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services and systems that best meet the needs of their school communities” (p. 30). Schools
usually do not provide mental health services during the school day, but perhaps they should
because community resources can be fragmented and detached from educational needs (Rossen
& Cowan).
“One in five students will have a diagnosable mental health disorder at some point during
their school-age years that significantly impacts their ability to be successful” (Rossen & Cowan,
2016, p.29). Rossen and Cowan suggest the issue of mental health care in school districts is
analogous to their responsibility for other disabling conditions, such as vision impairment. While
a student’s vision impairment has been traditionally considered something that adversely impacts
education, mental health issues are not visible in some students who may internalize matters.
While some students likely exhibit warning signs in regard to mental health, others are adept at
masking their symptoms.
Trump (2011) contends budget constraints and limitations on staff time are two major
obstacles schools experience in supporting mental health initiatives. Unfortunately, even if
schools do a great job of supporting students’ mental health issues during the school day, those
same students may be experiencing a dysfunctional home or community environment.
Similar to suggestions under indicator one, school administrators should strive to find
time for teachers and related services staff to collaborate regularly. While focusing on
instructional time is certainly the priority, allowing time for staff to discuss their students’
dispositions may provide a clearer picture of a student demonstrating depressed or desperate
behaviors (Newman et al., 2004). Middle schools’ use of grade level teaching teams is one such
model that may support an opportunity for information sharing.
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With one out of five students likely to be experiencing some type of mental health issue,
school staff need to dedicate time to issues discussed in indicator two. Even if students never
exhibit signs of taking action on a serious violent attack, there is value in addressing concerns
under indicator two to improve success in the classroom. As Rossen and Cowan (2016) indicate,
issues related to mental health and social disorders impede the learning process and should be
treated as such. School administrators should be conscious of those who feel ignored and left out
by society. In serious instances, students may find examples of violence that provide an outlet
for their feelings.

Indicator Three

Indicator three relates to the rampage shooter having a template or cultural script in place
for how a violent attack may resolve their problems. Gun violence in America is considerably
higher than in other advanced countries (Ingraham, 2015). According to the FBI, United States
gun homicides totaled 8,124 in 2014, i.e., more than 22 gun homicides per day.
Media, movies, music, and video games may provide further templates for how both
fictional and non-fictional characters resolve matters with violence. Students who enjoy violent
video games, movies, music or are obsessed with prior mass shooting or genocide events should
rise to the level of concern in a threat assessment process. In some cases, adolescents make very
strong connections to how characters in the media content they consume are able to resolve their
struggles through violence (Newman et al., 2004). Jose Reyes (Sparks, NV), for example,
believed first-hand shooter video games and movie characters succeeded in resolving problems
through violence.
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A school team evaluating the seriousness of a threat should also consider whether the
student has a real-life cultural script in place. If a student comes from a home in which violence
occurs, as did Evan Ramsey (Bethel, AK) and Jose Reyes, evidence suggests he/she is more
likely to be a potential perpetrator in a rampage school shooting. School staff should have a
process for including these data in their threat assessment.
Developing adolescent minds are seeking role models. In some situations, role models
are not found in reality but are found in fictional characters that may create a sense of
connection. Michael Carneal referenced a movie The Basketball Diaries and Barry Loukaitis
cited Natural Born Killers, as movies that may have glamorized the redemptive feeling of
violence towards others. Additionally, obsessions with past school shooting incidents and
historical genocide (such as Nazi Germany) may indicate an adolescent is seeking notoriety
without concern for the ramifications of their actions. Such was the case with Eric Harris and
Jeffrey Weise who were fascinated with Hitler. Andy Williams talked about “pulling a
Columbine,” and Jose Reyes viewed information on perpetrators including Kip Kinkel, Eric
Harris and Dylan Klebold, and T.J. Lane. While cultural scripts alone do not give reason to
suspect a high likelihood for violence, when considered among other factors, they may form a
tipping point.

Indicator Four

Indicator four contemplates a failure of surveillance systems to identify troubled youth.
Failure of surveillance systems, also applies to both school and home environments. School staff
have opportunities to understand potential warning signs that may take place in either a home or
school setting. School administrators may be able to learn if a student is largely unsupervised at
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home. Neglected youth, such as Andy Williams (Santee, CA) or Andrew Golden and Mitchell
Johnson (Westside, AR), often had parents who either worked long hours or failed to engage
appropriately in their lives. In some situations, the home environment contained either one or no
biological parents. Evan Ramsey was one of five perpetrators included in this study who lived in
a home without both biological parents. In Ramsey’s case he lived in a series of foster homes
and experienced considerable neglect and abuse. Threat assessment teams should try to
determine the household makeup and adjust the level of risk associated with a student based on
such knowledge.
Findings of the current study, similar to many preceding it, demonstrated that leaked
information often preceded a violent attack. Klebold and Harris told multiple friends of their
attack and foreshadowed violence and despair in their school assignments. Kip Kinkel’s school
assignments also demonstrated profanity and violence. Andy Williams told multiple friends of
his planned attack to the extent that at least one friend searched his pants for a gun on the
morning of the attack (unfortunately, the gun was in his backpack, which was not checked).
Vossekuil et al. (2002) reported that over 80% of their perpetrators communicated their scheme
to at least one individual and nearly 60% informed multiple persons. To enhance school climate,
school administrators must provide resources for students to safely communicate potential risks
without fear of retribution or belief they will simply be ignored.
More directly, schools are in a position to monitor students who make threats. Many
students in this study foreshadowed their acts of violence. In some cases, homework and writing
assignments were marred with disturbing and violent threats or images. In other cases, students
learned of the attacks well in advance. These are all forms of leakage. School administrators
must make it a priority to create a culture in which students and staff tell someone if they are
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suspicious or worried about a potential written or verbal threat. All threats or concerns must be
treated respectfully. Student fear of retribution for reporting such incidents should be minimized
as much as possible. Threat assessment teams should consider implementation of some type of
anonymous tip line to encourage sharing those concerns without fear of what may happen.
School officials also face a challenge in monitoring potential student threats due to
changes in educational environment. Assimilating into a school’s culture is a difficult and
emotional process for an adolescent who seeks to cultivate an identity or sense of belonging
(Humphrey & Ainscow, 2006). Even transitions perceived as normal, e.g., elementary to middle
school and middle school to high school, can be challenging (Anderson, Jacobs, Schramm, &
Splittgerber, 2000). Table 4.21 shows the number of years each perpetrator had attended the
school prior to the shooting incident. Nine of the perpetrators (64%) had attended their school for
less than two years. Michael Carneal and Jose Reyes had attended their school for less than a
year after transitioning from another school within the school district. Administrators should
consider using transitions as opportunities for incoming students to connect with students and
staff. These transitions also afford staff to learn more about incoming students.
Students who move to a new community, are assigned to alternative schools, are home
schooled, or attend different school districts for grades K-8 and high school may require
additional coordination to understand better their behaviors and characteristics. Newman et al.
(2004) and Rocque (2012) advocated for increased staff accessibility to academic, counseling,
and disciplinary records for new students. While concerns about labeling or stigmatizing students
by sharing prior records exist, the potential damage of not sharing such records may be far
greater. In addition, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) protects the
privacy of student education records. Administrators should be aware of the law and follow
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consent guidelines before disclosing any personally identifiable information. Therefore, the first
course of action by an administrator might be to request consent from the parent or legal
guardian. Once consent is received, the information may be shared. If consent is not obtained,
legal counsel should be consulted to determine what, if any, student related records can be
shared. However, threat assessment teams may be able to take advantage of FERPA exceptions
for sharing information without consent when there is an “actual, impending, or imminent
emergency, such as an articulable and significant threat” (USDOE, 2013 p. 41). Ultimately,
administrators must balance the privacy rights of the student against the potential risk of harm
when deciding what action to take.
Trump (2011) asserts it is both unfair and unrealistic for schools to bear the burden of
solving youth mental health issues but contends the school should absolutely be a “key player at
the table” (p. 118). The information school administrators can gather is limited by privacy laws;
however, they should not hesitate to ask for consent to collect the most information possible to
make an informed decision about a potentially serious threat. Even if parents do not provide
consent, school administrators can share their concerns about the student directly with the
parents and, in serious cases, directly with a community based counselor. Such action may serve
as an opportunity to confirm whether similar observed behaviors have taken place outside of the
school setting. Mental health professionals are bound by confidentiality except in certain cases.
For example, they are required to report serious and immediate threats (Tarasoff v Regents of the
University of California, Cal. 1976), but in an exception under 45 CFR 164.512 in which a
provider may disclose information to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat is
permissible (Ellis, 2016).
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School administrators also should consider alternative staffing options to monitor student
threats. Limited research has indicated that School Resource Officers (SROs) decrease general
school violence, but the impact they may have on rampage school shootings is even more
difficult to discern given the limited sample size (Newman et al., 2004). Increased employment
of SROs came from the increase in school shootings in the late 1990s but slowed during budget
cuts following the great recession (Trump, 2011). If a district has SROs, they should function as
school employees to help students through challenging situations and avert a path to violence.
The goal should not be for the SRO to “cuff and stuff” by making arrests or simply reacting to
trouble (p. 86).
The home environment is a challenging area for school officials to monitor. While it
cannot be expected that every student’s home life becomes the business of school staff, this study
found potential for threat assessment teams to consider the home environment of students as part
of the assessment process. Table 4.17 indicates 10 (71%) of the perpetrators’ homes were
unstable. Additionally, less than half (43%) of the home environments contained two biological
parents. Neglect and abuse were common in 57% of the home lives of perpetrators included in
this study. The collective study on birth order data revealed no conclusive trends; however, 50%
of the cases examined in this study revealed the perpetrator was second born and did not have a
strong relationship with his older sibling. Threat assessment teams may want to consider if there
is an academically successful and/or popular older sibling and what this relationship may mean
in terms of the younger sibling’s ability to fit in both in school and at home. For example, Kip
Kinkel (Springfield, OR) and Michael Carneal (Heath, KY) had older sisters who were
considered both smart and popular. Pressure to live up to their older siblings’ successes may
have been a contributing factor. Interestingly, no perpetrators in this study came from a home
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environment with four or more children. Since the sample size of this study is small, no viable
conclusions should be made about family size or birth order. Future studies may wish to expand
upon this analysis.
Strong communication and collaboration skills are required to sufficiently address
concerns under indicator four. School administrators must be able to respond to forms of
leakage and direct concerns to a threat assessment team as necessary. From that point, threat
assessment teams would be wise to access all necessary resources. Strong community
relationships with organizations such as police and family counseling agencies may help to avert
a situation from turning violent.

Indicator Five
Indicator five assesses a rampage school shooter’s ability to gain access to guns or other
weapons. Access to guns or other weapons is the only indicator that is 100% reliable in
predicting a rampage school shooting incident. This seems rather obvious, as all rampage
shootings necessarily have guns involved as they are shootings. Although all rampage shooters
in this study had access to guns, many students have access to guns. This does not mean any
student who has access to a gun should rise to the level of concern for a threat assessment team,
it is simply another indicator for the team to be aware of as it completes a comprehensive threat
assessment.
Threat assessment teams should evaluate a student’s access to a gun from multiple
perspectives. The student’s household should be a primary focus. Does the parent own a
weapon? Is the weapon kept in a secure location? In threats concerning the safety of an
individual, an SRO or police officer should visit the home to check on and inquire about
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weapons in the home. Threat assessment teams should also consider the student’s peers in
evaluating a student’s potential access to weapons. In the case of Klebold and Harris guns were
accessed through peers; in this case, older peers were able to purchase weapons without parental
permission. A threat assessment team’s ability to consider multiple sources for accessing a
weapon rather than locking in on the home environment creates a higher probability for averting
an incident.
School administrators may ask parents if they have guns or weapons in the home and if
they are secured. In serious cases, the police could get involved through home visits to assess the
situation. Police involvement is essential in this area. Possession of guns by minors or attempts
to access unregistered or stolen weapons are police matters. Parents of students who pose a
potential threat and who may be careless about securing weapons are also concerns with which
the police can assist. While laws exist to protect gun owner’s rights, police and/or parent
intervention can help prevent the ease of access by the suspected student. Additionally, police
may know of suspected gun suppliers in the community and can help monitor specific students
thus assisting the school in its process.
A 2012 Congressional Research Services report estimated there were approximately 310
million guns in 2009 and approximately 357 million in 2013 (Ingraham, 2015). These estimates
indicate there are more guns than people in the United States. The number of weapons on K-12
school campuses continues to be a concern. For example, a 2015 National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES) report noted 5% of students surveyed had carried a weapon to school within
the 30 days prior to the survey’s administration. According to the NCES’s 2015 study, during the
2013-14 school year, schools reported 1,501 firearm possession incidents, or three occurrences
per 100,000 students. While the NCES study did not focus on gun control legislation, it should
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be noted the 14 perpetrators included in this study were able to access a gun. Many of the
perpetrators’ parents, guardians or neighbors had failed to secure firearms in their homes. As
shown in Table 4.20, the perpetrators accessed at least one unsecured gun in 10 out of the 12
shooting incidents (83.3%) included in this study. No patterns emerged about how and from
where guns were accessed. While many law-abiding citizen own guns and treat them
responsibly, there was a consistent pattern of neglect or carelessness by the parents, guardians,
and family members of the perpetrators included in this study.
In spite of the information presented above, recent data suggest some improvement in
keeping guns away from children. The NCES (2015) study found students ages 12-18 who
reported access to a loaded gun without adult permission decreased from 7% in 2007 to 4% in
2013.
While access to guns alone may not pose a problem, students identified in the threat
assessment process should be evaluated based, in part, on the student’s ability to access a gun.
In each of the incidents studied, students accessed guns. Usually this was due to the gun being
unsecured. Threat assessment teams are limited in their ability to control whether weapons are
stored in a child’s home and/or if they are securely stored. However, threat assessment teams
can consider the probability of risk of weapons in the students’ home and engage local police to
assist in protecting the safety of their students and staff.

Additional Considerations for Threat Assessment Teams
In addition to considering Newman et al.’s (2004) five indicators, there are factors threat
assessment teams may want to consider. These are set forth below. The threat assessment
approach requires a member of a threat assessment team to gather information and answer
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questions to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to suggest a school shooting may occur
(Reddy et al., 2001). Thus, the development of an effective threat assessment approach may be
the ideal initial step in the identification of potential behaviors or outcomes (Chavez, 1999;
Furlong & Morrison, 2000 as cited in Reddy et al.). In Chapter 2, Cornell’s (2006) Virginia
Model for Student Threat Assessment provided background for a research-based method that
school-threat assessment teams could use as a template. Other potential threat assessment models
also exist. For example, Deisinger and Randazzo (2008) created a decision tree model for use by
K-12 school officials.
Regardless of the threat assessment model school officials elect to employ, all threat
assessment processes are conceptually similar. Their common purpose is to identify a threat and
determine how serious the threat may be. For students identified as potential school shooters,
school officials can mitigate risk of an incident by implementing a risk management plan as well
as referring the potential school shooter to a counselor, social worker, psychologist, and/or other
mental health related services (Reddy et al., 2001).
Threat assessment team members should have varying roles depending on the specific
school district and the type of assessment process the team chooses to employ. Prior research
shows assessment team participants should include principals, mental health professionals, and
law enforcement officers (Langman, 2015; Newman et al., 2004; O’Toole, 2001). Larger school
districts or high schools may be able to include additional staff, such as a dean of students. In
general, the size of the threat assessment team should not be larger than is necessary to conduct
timely and objective reviews. Team sizes can be either expanded or contracted in response to the
nature of a specific threat.
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The threat assessment team should strive to differentiate between credible student threats
and false alarms and should examine multiple perspectives related to the background of the
student who made the threat (Langman, 2015). For example, if the student is receiving special
education services, it may be necessary to include special education staff on the team. It may also
be necessary to include outside school staff, such as legal counsel, to assist on a case-by-case
basis. Regardless of team size or the roles of the team members, documentation of the entire
process will ensure a consistent threat assessment approach.

School Shooter Profiling

Utilizing school shooter characteristics from previous incidents to develop a profile or
checklist for preventing future attacks is not recommended. A threat assessment team should
utilize previous incidents to assist in widening the scope of potential ways a school shooter may
reveal their intentions prior to the attack. Additionally, members of a threat assessment team
may find it helpful to examine the information in Tables 4.17 and 4.21 to avoid potential biases.
Table 4.21 provides data showing the majority of students in this study were considered average
or above average academically and in most cases (74%) never had a serious school infraction
(suspension or police involvement). School administrators may have a blind spot for certain
groups of students who have historically perpetrated a rampage school shooting. It may run
counterintuitive to members of a threat assessment team that intelligent Caucasian males have
the capacity to execute a rampage school shooting. Table 4.17 notes that only male students have
perpetrated a rampage school shooting attack. This does not mean a female student would never
be an attacker, but the probability is less likely based on past data.
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Table 4.19 presents details of specific rampage school shooting incidents. The conclusion
of the attack varied among the 12 incidents. While some perpetrators were stopped through
police intervention, in just as many cases (33%), a school staff or student assisted in ending the
rampage. Three incidents (25%) ended in suicide. Interestingly, a rampage attack culminating in
suicide had not occurred prior to Columbine. Since Columbine, three out of five incidents (60%)
have ended in suicide. Possibly Columbine represented a shift in the approach of rampage school
shooters toward an outcome beginning with an assault on others but culminating in suicide. This
is a relatively new trend and should be considered with caution. However, a threat assessment
team considering a student who is suicidal as only a risk to him/herself would be wise to be
aware that a shift toward harming others could develop and manifest in a rampage school
shooting.
Community Considerations

Table 4.18 sets forth the characteristics of the communities included in this study. Fifty
percent of the incidents happened in rural settings, while 50% occurred in suburban settings. The
results of this study suggest rampage school shootings are more likely to occur in communities
located outside an urban or large city area. This study indicated rampage school shootings were
not related to the community’s violent crime rate, median household income, or size of
population. Newman et al. (2004) note close knit and homogenous communities present a
greater potential threat. The current study was not able to either confirm or refute that claim.
Regardless, administrators should avoid believing that a rampage shooting “can’t happen here”.
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School Facilities

Schools typically have many doors that are easily accessible from the outside (Trump,
2011), which increases the opportunity for a malicious attack on schools. For example, Table
4.19 indicates Kip Kinkel and Michael Carneal both entered through an unsecured back door of
the school. In the Columbine attack, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold entered unsecured doors near
the cafeteria. At the time of those attacks, leaving doors accessible at multiple locations
throughout the school day was common. However, such practices have largely changed in
today’s school environment. This study’s findings did not identify any specific patterns
associated with school facility entry points or shooting locations. Common spaces such as
hallways, lobbies, cafeterias, and playgrounds were typically the setting for rampage school
shooting. However, no trends of the specific location among these common areas were
identified in this study.
Convenience for parents and staff generally drives the desire to have multiple points of
access. Trump (2011) recommends use of panic bars that secure the door from the outside but
allow for egress in the case of an emergency. In recent years, many schools have moved toward
investing in single points of entry along with visitor management systems (Trump).
While no incidents in this study occurred in a portable classroom, their use presents a
safety concern. Trump (2011) noted that two of the main concerns include unlocked doors and a
lack of communication with the main facility. If school districts feel portable classrooms are
necessary, they need to include such areas in the district-threat assessment plan. Assuming
portable classrooms are absolutely necessary, school administrators should limit their use and
discontinue use of portable classrooms when capacity in the school building allows for it.
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Even if portable classrooms are not used, communication systems in school buildings are
often antiquated. In cases of a school shooting, the ability to notify staff immediately and
proceed into lockdown procedures are essential. Trump (2011) argues for the use of cell phones
by crisis team members to ensure positive communication flow even if classroom phone systems
are down.
School districts considering new facility construction should consider Crime Prevention
through Environmental Design (CPTED). CPTED is a field of study dedicated to the application
of concepts associated with how design impacts safety (Trump, 2011). Trump recommends
inclusion of these concepts early in the design process. Areas of focus include the placement of
common areas and sites for after-hours events, parking lot placement and traffic patterns, and
line of sight for hallways and areas requiring supervision. Trump contends that implementing
measures focused on addressing safety is much easier in the initial construction process than
attempting to retrofit a campus. Building chain-link fences around schools, increasing lighting,
and removing graffiti are part of recommended practices for school administrators (Fox &
Burstein, 2010 as cited in Rocque, 2012).
Challenges exist around measuring the efficacy of additional security measures. Metal
detectors, security cameras and random locker sweeps must be balanced against the perceived
loss of freedom each initiative includes. Despite the spread of such initiatives since the
Columbine attack, there is not a method of rigorous evaluation to demonstrate their success
(Skiba & Peterson, 2000; Snell et al., 2002 as cited in Rocque, 2012).
Nationally, school districts have reported at least one positive tendency in access point
procedures. An NCES study (2015) found approximately 76% of students aged 12-18 observed

201
locked entrance or exit doors during the school day in 2013. That represented an increase of 11%
from 2011 and a 38% increase from 1999.
Further attention to school facility design and improvements is needed in K-12 schools.
Partnerships with police, fire, and regional safety organizations likely will yield potential
opportunities for improvement. As school districts consider remodeling, expansion of facilities,
or constructing new school buildings, it is advised that threat assessment experts be included in
the design phase to ensure student safety is considered.

Limitations of Study

This study was limited in several ways. First, the sample size was constrained.
Thankfully, we do not have more occurrences to draw from as rampage school shooting
incidents devastate communities. While future years likely will yield opportunity for a larger
sample size, it is unknown if there will ever be a point when a study will include a large enough
sample from past results to produce a completely reliable and valid threat assessment procedure
that averts future rampage school shootings.
Since this study did not consider averted rampage school shootings, it was limited in its
consideration of comparative data from schools that had prevented incidents. There may be
validity in future research identifying specific attributes of school staff to student ratios where
rampage school shootings took place compared to those that averted a similar incident.
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Suggestions for Future Study

Future research should include a more in-depth consideration of facility design and
staffing models to support best practice behavioral threat assessment models. For example, do
schools have one single point of entry throughout the day? If not, who monitors entry and exit
points in the school? Does that person, or persons, change depending on the time of day? Is
monitoring done actively or passively? When school districts renovate or construct new schools,
how are safety considerations handled? What communication plans are in place should
something suspicious occur? Areas of research such as this may prove valuable to the field as K12 administrators consider optimal school facility design in assessing threats at their schools.
This study did not include averted rampage school shooting attacks. Future research
should focus specifically on the discrete category of averted rampage school shootings.
Obtaining detailed data on these events is challenging, mostly because the high levels of media
coverage and journal articles do not extend to incidents in which a shooting incident never
occurred. Even when an averted incident does rise to the level of media coverage, the news cycle
is short and the details necessary for a research-based study typically are not easily accessible.
Knowing the successful ways in which schools have discovered and prevented rampage attacks
would be helpful for principals and threat assessment teams.
Further research should also focus on the specific training and professional development
process for K-12 staff. How prepared principals and superintendents feel about leading their
respective buildings or district through the implementation of a behavioral threat assessment
process is unclear. Determining the specific challenges at K-12 school districts will provide the
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field with a better understanding of resources for developing strong threat assessment teams
grounded in best practice research.
At the time of this study, only the state of Virginia has a requirement for behavioral threat
assessments at the K-12 level. In contrast, many collegiate campuses have a mandated process
(Ellis, 2016). Current research does not indicate the rationale for limiting the requirement to the
collegiate level. Future research on this practice will be valuable to the field. Based on my
research, I feel all schools should have a behavioral threat assessment process. The primary
concern for school administrators must be safe educational environments and the well-being of
students. While the process should be flexible enough to meet the needs of each individual
school district, all districts should be engaged in the process and identify a model for proactively
evaluating threats to their specific educational environment.

Conclusion
This study supports the use of Newman et al.’s (2004) framework as part of a behavioral
threat assessment. Principals of K-12 schools and associated school staff, including a behavioral
threat assessment team, are the anticipated beneficiaries of this study. Superintendents and other
senior leadership team members at the district level will also benefit from the findings of this
study through providing additional supports and resources to those individuals charged with
monitoring student threats.
Superintendent and Principal preparatory courses should include awareness on mental health
research and legal implications for staff. Staff training should focus on what supports schools
may provide to mitigate risks associated with mental health. School administration should not
ignore the effects mental health has on the learning process given approximately 20% of school-
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aged children are impacted (Rossen & Cowan, 2016). Schools can assist in lowering barriers to
seeking mental health care by reducing the stigma, reducing scheduling conflicts and eliminating
transportation challenges. Training for staff should also focus on how to build relationships with
community-based resources. Schools cannot support the mental needs youth in their community
alone. Forging strong relationships and building trust within the community is essential.
From a legal perspective, school staff should be trained on the proper way to handle a
student who is believed to have a mental health or social disorder. Teachers should provide
referrals to trained experts, such as social workers or psychologists within the school building or
district. Principals should ensure building staff communicate legitimate concerns to them as
soon as an issue is suspected. Principals and superintendents would benefit from training on how
to navigate through the appropriate process when investigating behavioral threats from students
to best understand when confidentiality applies and when it may be broken. Community-based
counselors and/or parents may initially be reluctant to disclose otherwise confidential
information, but school administrators with serious or imminent concerns for the safety or self or
others should pursue and share information about the student in order to protect the safety of all
students and staff.
School districts need to account for how the various roles on a threat assessment team will
collectively position the district to avert the myriad of threats that may arise. Principals and
threat assessment teams must feel empowered and supported in identifying and acting on
potential student threats. Schools with a threat assessment in place must inform their
superintendent about the efficacy of the process. Threat assessment teams should ensure a
consistent and comprehensive assessment is being utilized in each situation.
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Use of a threat assessment model, such as Deisinger and Randazzo’s (2008) decision tree
model, outline the process threat assessment teams should take to identify the seriousness and
legitimacy of the potential threat. Common to all threat assessment processes should be an initial
screening to determine if the threat is imminent. School staff should consider the specificity of
the threat to determine if it is substantive or transient. All substantive and imminent threats
would be directed immediately to law enforcement. Assuming the threat is not imminent, the
concerned staff member should discuss the situation with the Principal to determine if a
substantive concern exists. Upon determining one exists, the threat assessment team should meet
to conduct a full inquiry. Assessment teams have the option of developing a management plan
or referring the case to a trained expert. Critical to the process, the threat assessment team must
be diligent about documentation and follow up on all cases. It is recommended that a regular
meeting is established to monitor and discuss ongoing management plans or referrals. This may
be done on a monthly basis or potentially more frequent depending on the availability of the
team. Threat assessment team should set aside time to reflect on the lessons learned from the
process once a case is officially closed.
While the Board of Education and community need not be involved in the details of a threat
assessment process, they should have knowledge of the school district’s research-based approach
for prevention of school-based threats. Administration should understand partnerships with local
police, fire, community-based counseling services and other agencies help to enhance the
efficacy of the threat assessment process.
Additional professional development opportunities exist for Superintendents and
Principals related to facility design and operational school facility procedures. Schools should
strive to do more than the minimum requirements. Teachers and school building staff are adept at
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knowing the priority trainings take based on the manner in which the training is conducted. It is
recommended that drills are directed in as realistic manner as possible. Active shooter drills are
required in some states, but do not necessitate students being involved in the training. Further,
these trainings may be conducted at any time in the day and date in the school year. While such
trainings may provoke concern for students and parents, being prepared for such an event is not
possible without regular and realistic practice. Schools are encouraged to effectively
communicate the importance of such trainings and attempt to create scenarios that closely
simulate a real attack. Research has shown many active shooter incidents take place before
school hours or over the lunch period. Trainings during these times of the day are recommended.
Finally, building staff should be considered the true first responders to an incident.
Teachers may find themselves in a position to either save a wounded colleagues life by
administering first aid, defend their students from the attack, or to apprehend the perpetrator.
School staff should be trained in these areas as well.
Communication systems should be well thought out. Use of cell phones, classroom
phones, walkie-talkies, and intercom systems in the school may all be considered as part of the
plan. Ensuring these communication devices work effectively should be a priority.
Operationally, staff should be aware of the building security measures and ensure only
authorized access to the building is allowed. All visitors and late student arrivals should proceed
through the main visitor entrance. Administrative staff must take seriously their role to monitor
who enters and exits the facility. Suspicious activity and non-compliance of building procedures
should be addressed immediately. Bus drivers, custodians, and food service staff should all be
trained to be alert for suspicious activity and to report concerns immediately to the building
Principal.
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When administration remodels or builds a new school, it is important to invite emergency
responders into the conversations during or prior to the design process. Special attention should
be taken towards protecting the perimeter of the property with barrier fencing that allows sight
beyond the property boundary. Staff in the administrative office should have highly visible sight
lines to high traffic areas including parking lots and the main entrance. Additional time to
prepare for a potential risk may prove to be critical.
A potential rampage school shooting could be plotted anywhere. School staff must be
prepared and proactive in their threat assessment approach. Given the massive destruction to the
community, administrators must take on the obligation to have means in place to avert a serious
violent attack seriously. O’Toole et al. (2000) pioneered the shift from the use of a simple profile
for a shooter to a more effective model of evaluation. Behavioral threat assessment teams are
likely the best method for prevention. While no process will completely eliminate risk, an
assessment team utilizing Newman et al.’s (2004) framework as described in this study may be
the best investment of time and resources a school district has to protect the safety of its students.
Verlinden et al. (2000) argued for differentiating risk factors for school shootings
compared to general youth violence. This means that even within the general threat assessment
process, there may be a need for discrete indicators based on the type of violent attack the team
is seeking to avoid. The process of evaluating a child for a routine behavioral issue or for minor
crimes, such as stealing, has not proven to be an effective indicator for evaluating threats of a
more serious and potentially deadly nature, such as rampage school shootings (McGee &
DeBernardo, 1999; Newman et al., 2004; Verlinden et al.).
While Newman et al.’s (2004) framework provides a solid base for a reliable prevention
approach for rampage school shootings, schools must consider how to account for the various
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types and levels of threats they may encounter. A successful threat assessment relies on
communication among administrators, teachers and students to create an environment in which
threats of violence are reported routinely, investigated, and addressed and the contributing
underlying factors receive appropriate attention (Collins, 2007). As future research provides a
broader perspective on the topic, administrators should monitor the field and compare new
theories to the effectiveness of their own district’s approach.
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